Abstract
The coup launched by the Thai army in 2006 evinced two important features. First, it revealed the country's vulnerability with regard to managing domestic stability, amidst its image as the second-biggest economy in Southeast Asia. Second, it marked the rise of a mobilisational force outside of the Bangkok-based elites, particularly on the part of the rural-dwelling citizens at the grassroots who were willing to challenge the well-established political power that had dominated the country for many years. The heightened political uncertainty in Thailand leading up to the coup was driven by certain crucial actors – including some who had controlled the Thai political landscape since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932: the monarchs, the army, and the economic and bureaucratic elites; these actors were joined by the new mass political groups. Although the book does not highlight the coup in 2014, all of the authors predicted that the heightened political uncertainty in Thailand would continue unfolding, since the old political network has been seriously challenged since 2001 by Thaksin Shinawatra's political network.
This book addresses a key question: Why has Thailand faced similar threats over the years even though the country has been on a democratic path since the mid-1970s? Coups, a never-ending hazard in Thailand, represent not only the military's intention to take over the government but also an illegitimate instrument for elite groups to restore the previous order, which had been in place for decades before the new political elite group emerged in the early 2000s.
The authors address domestic uncertainty in Thailand from the perspective of at least four different themes, which correspond to the four parts of the book. The introductory essays highlight the causes of the political instability, focusing on the elitist approach, which features dominant roles played by key actors, such as the monarchy, the Privy Council, the army, and the former prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, along with his allies in the government. Pavin Chachavalpongpun elaborates on McCargo's network monarchy, the political network attached to the monarchy and its proxies, such as the Privy Council and the military, to assert their political and economic interests throughout the country. This political network, according to Chachavalpongpun, is the root cause of the never-ending political battle in Bangkok, given that the military defend the monarchy – plotting a coup in the name of legitimacy – against other networks, such as Thaksin's political network, that challenge the old-established political power (p. 5).
In the first part of the book, Federico Ferrara characterises “Thai-style democracy” as no more than a shield for a network monarchy to dominate the country. Yet, as he describes, the network faced a major challenge when Thaksin and his allies emerged to control the government (p. 27). The battle between the two political groups that started in 2006 has remained Thailand's most significant political clash.
The second part of the book consists of chapters by James Ockey, Thongchai Winichakul, and David Streckfuss, who highlight the roles of certain components of network monarchy – namely, the monarchy and the military, and the instrument both groups used to crack down on opposition protests: lese majeste. Although the military is deeply divided, it is continually mobilised for political purposes by a small elite group under the Privy Council, presided over by former general Prem Tinsul-anonda (Ockey, p. 62). In addition, the competition among elites for political power has resulted in political upheaval within society. Furthermore, the monarchy-related groups have refused to change their political views to align with democratic principles, particularly when it comes to political competition and dealing with political crisis (Winichakul, p. 91). In the same vein, the old-establishment power started to view the growing opposition group as a real threat even though it could be ignored in the past. Accordingly, the monarchy and its allies in Bangkok still use and manipulate long-established lese majeste laws to suppress all politically motivated protests by Thai citizens and even by elites considered disloyal to the monarchy (Streckfuss, p. 127).
The third part of the book highlights the political conflict among elites in Bangkok that led to the politicisation of society across the country, manifested in the rise of colour-coded political groups and the new middle-income peasant class. Michael Nelson stresses that the rise of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) as a social movement was driven by a fragmented society's desire to challenge the authority of not only the pro-Thaksin government but also monarchy-related elites (p. 150). The PAD viewed those elites as having intensively threatened stability, particularly for the middle class in Bangkok. However, the PAD was not the only mass movement gaining steam; political awareness – the consciousness to pursue certain political interests – was also becoming increasingly important for those living in the northeast part of the country. The farmers, fishermen, and urban labourers who had transformed themselves from passive voters into the core of the Red Shirt political movement, pulled the political discourse from the Bangkok-based elites to a local circle. Accordingly, Nick Nostitz argues that, in contrast to the Bangkok-based elites, the Red Shirt movement saw that a fierce political battle in Bangkok had left many poor people in undeveloped rural areas (p. 179). Thanks to Thaksin, this movement challenged conservative elites, and its leaders vowed to secure more institutional reforms. As Andrew Walker argues (p. 209), the clear political engagement of the farmers refutes the notion that the movement was merely civic.
In the fourth part of the book, two essays highlight the impact of Thailand's crisis on its policies regarding domestic and international security problems. Marc Askew argues that the tensions and violence in Thailand's southern provinces had not been affected by the coup, mainly because the southern insurgency haunted Thai governments long before the coup and has continued to do so since the coup. The problem in the southern, Muslim-dominated area could not be solved decisively because of the inconsistency of governmental policies. Though welfare-based and cultural approaches have been tried across the Muslim-majority areas since conflicts began to erupt in the 1940s, there has never been a strong political commitment from Bangkok-based elites to politically address the problems there; the lack of a political approach to the South was particularly detrimental when the military, with its coercive methods, returned to the southern provinces to take charge via security policies (p. 240). The problem was exacerbated when the established powers, such as the Democrat Party and the military, manipulated the southern crisis to destabilise the legitimacy of the Thaksin government prior to the coup in 2006. Pavin Chachavalpongpun also stresses how the military benefitted from the coup by exploiting the Thai–Cambodian border issue in order to re-affirm its role in the foreign policy realm (p. 255).
By highlighting all crucial actors and their motivations in the 2006 coup, this book provides significant insights into Thailand's continued political crisis. However, the topic of the rise and role of Thaksin as a new political figure outside the monarchy was left out. Accordingly, the book does not describe the roles played by Thaksin and his allies who, for the first time in Thai history, were able to challenge the old-establishment powers by mobilising popular support from mostly urban and rural workers, farmers, and fishermen. In addition, this book shows a gender bias since there is not a single female author in it covering contentious issues in Thailand's political landscape, particularly since the coup of 2006. Though Thailand has its own female political and economy experts,
activists, and politicians who can elucidate the effects of the coup to the society, the book does not include them to discuss the issue.
However, this book is highly recommended for those interested in the democratic consolidation process in Southeast Asian countries, particularly from critical perspectives. Democracy, which has been practised since the 1970s in Thailand, is seen merely as an electoral system – similar to how it is viewed in many other Southeast Asian countries. As such, it lacks a strong basis for dispute settlement between elites and citizens at the grassroots. This collection of essays provides a clear example of how Thailand contributes to the global debate on the future of democracy in post-authoritarian states, which is currently pre-occupied with the Arab Spring.