Abstract
The aim of this paper is to discuss the issue of regional integration and regional identity-building in Southeast Asia. The idea is to problematise the quest for a regional identity by relating the efforts of integration to the issues of multi-ethnicity, national identity-building and multicultural societies in times of globalisation. The article consists of three broad themes intending to capture the complexity of regional identity-building: regionalism and regional cooperation; tensions by diversity; and dilemmas of regional identity-building in multi-ethnic societies illustrated by Laos and Burma/ Myanmar. This analysis is explorative in character and attempts to combine different bodies of literature in order to better understand some of the contradictory processes related to regional identity-building in Southeast Asia. A tentative conclusion is that without an accommodating, inclusive and pluralistic society, the creation of a common regional identity will remain an elitist political project.
Introduction
We envision the entire Southeast Asia to be, by 2020, an ASEAN community conscious of its ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage and bound by a common regional identity.
We see vibrant and open ASEAN societies consistent with their respective national identities, where all people enjoy equitable access and opportunities for total human development regardless of gender, race, religion, language, or social and cultural background (ASEAN vision 2020).
The leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have a vision to create a common identity in Southeast Asia by 2020. Considering the recent history of the region, this is quite significant. A little more than a decade ago, Southeast Asia was divided into two blocs, one with the old ASEAN members Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Brunei, and the other with the newest members Vietnam, Laos, Burma/Myanmar 1 and Cambodia. Despite integration efforts since the announcement, the region still suffers from unsolved conflicts and substantial socio-economic inequalities between, as well as within, the countries. In order to create stability and to remain in power, the regimes engage in different projects of strengthening their national identities, which creates contradictory processes within the countries, as well as between them. The aim of the paper is hence to discuss the issue of regional integration and regional identity-building in Southeast Asia and to problematise the quest for a regional identity, as stated in the ASEAN Vision 2020 cited above, by relating the efforts of integration to regional diversity and to the issue of national identity-building. I will argue that the quest for a regional identity is a political (elite) project and that without an accommodating, inclusive and pluralistic society, a common regional identity will be hard – if not impossible – to create.
Burma was renamed Myanmar by the military junta in 1989, but the decision has been questioned by civilians as well as by parts of the international community (see e.g. Schairer-Vertannes 2001).
The literature on regionalism and regional integration has so far primarily focused on regional security and the economics matters of nation-states, and the interaction and collaboration between the states together with the development and functioning of regional organisations. The region's violent past, strategic importance, and the last decades’ exceptional economic developments can partly explain this. Attempts to measure regionalism have often focused on quantifiable indicators such as level of interaction. According to Acharya (2000: 1), regional perspectives on Southeast Asian politics and international relations are scarce. Also, there is relatively little written about regionalism from the perspectives of the conceptualisation of regions and regional identity-building in relation to local and national identity formation processes, and what it takes to integrate individuals of diverse cultural and ethnic groups into a regional identity (Jones 2004: 143). This despite the fact that Southeast Asia is a mosaic of different cultural and ethnic groups, and that it is often pointed out that globalisation processes increase the risk of ethnic fragmentation (see e.g. Kinnvall 2002). Accordingly, different bodies of literature will be combined in order to better understand the complexity of regionalism.
In this paper, “identity” is used in a very simplistic way, as the intention is to problematise the political project of creating a regional identity rather than to focus on identity issues as such. The process of identity formation is extremely complex and varies depending on time and space. Identities can be overlapping and individuals may have several identities. Southeast Asia encompasses people from the urban middle class in Singapore as well as rural ethnic minorities in Laos, and state identity does not necessarily equal individual identity. Besides, what ASEAN actually means by a “common regional identity” is not entirely clear. Solidarity and cooperation, an increasingly integrated market and more open societies appear to be keywords (see Jones 2004: 141), but say little about how to create a common identity in practice.
The paper is divided into three major parts: the first focuses on the development of regionalism in Southeast Asia; the second part highlights tensions of diversity in the region; and the third part presents two cases, Laos and Burma/ Myanmar, as illustrations of multi-ethnic and multicultural societies that may challenge the quest for a common regional identity. Besides the fact that Laos and Burma/ Myanmar are newcomers and the economically poorest of the ASEAN member states (and having an arduous path to integration for those reasons), minority groups in those two states comprise a relatively large part of the population. Still, the two regimes have chosen different ways to approach the minority issue.
This part of the paper focuses on some of the integration attempts in Southeast Asia from the 1960s onwards with special emphasis on ASEAN. The history and development of ASEAN cannot be ignored in understanding the regional project, even thought ASEAN by no means equals Southeast Asia as a geographical concept – East Timor has not been allowed to become a member, for example. Accordingly, the paper also discusses the foundations for a region and whether there is anything special about Southeast Asia that may influence regional identity-building.
Southeast Asia versus East Asia
During the last couple of decades, cooperation within regions has, in general, escalated. The most successful example of regional integration, the European Union (EU), produced a “reform treaty” as late as December 2009 in order to enhance the integration process. The NAFTA and Mercosur agreements in the Americas are other examples of regional projects (Jones 2004: 141). In Southeast Asia, ASEAN is promoting increased integration, which, for example, is expressed in ASEAN Vision 2020. In November 2007 the first-ever ASEAN charter was signed, and within a year it was ratified (Narine 2009: 375). ASEAN was created in 1967 with Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines as its founding members. The idea was to create an organisation for economic, social and cultural cooperation. However, security issues implicitly played a role (Acharya 2000: 84). For example, the fear of communism spreading beyond Indochina and Burma/Myanmar was a major reason for creating the organisation. 2 Brunei joined ASEAN in 1984 as the sixth member. In 1995 Vietnam became a member, and in 1997 Laos and Burma/ Myanmar followed. The membership of Cambodia was delayed until 1999 because of internal unrest. 3 The enlargement may be viewed as an act to balance the influence of China as well as a way to check Thai hegemonic ambitions on mainland Southeast Asia. Another reason was the increasing competition over natural resources in the region, an area in which the newer member states are rich. 4
ASEAN was also created to stabilise the region after Konfrontasi and the Malaysian-Philippine dispute over Sabah (Collins 2003: 128).
Acharya 2000: 135. Interestingly, Cambodia's entry into ASEAN was delayed due to political turmoil, while Burma/ Myanmar was allowed to join in 1997 despite severe human rights violations.
Rüland 2000: 434-435. In conjunction with ASEAN's 40th anniversary in August 2007, Contemporary Southeast Asia published the special issue “ASEAN at 40. Progress, Prospects and Challenges” (Vol. 29, No. 3, 2007). The issue provides a good overview of the history of the organisation and how it has been studied over the years. Also see Nesadurai 2009.
The quest for official regional cooperation in Southeast Asia has not been consistently pursued over the years. The various collaboration patterns have made the process complicated – partly because of membership constellations and partly because they have been caught between security and economic considerations (see Yepes 2003 for a detailed account of the regionalisation process). Furthermore, while ASEAN has been enlarged and in that respect has created a stronger regional unit, the concept of East Asia has begun to emerge. In this context East Asia consists of the ASEAN member states in Southeast Asia and China, Japan and South Korea in Northeast Asia. The first attempt to introduce East Asia as a region stems from the beginning of the 1990s and the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) within the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC), but it failed to be realised. The second attempt, ASEAN+3 (PR China, Japan and South Korea), has so far been more successful. According to Takashi Terada (2003), the major explanation for is the Asian financial crisis, the development of regionalism in other parts of the world, and Japan's promotion of ASEAN+3. 5
There have been Japanese attempts to promote ASEAN+6 (also including Australia, New Zealand and India), but according to Terada (2010) ASEAN+3 is the “winning” constellation.
The leaders of ASEAN+3 have met on a regular basis since the mid-1990s to promote regional cooperation. The first informal ASEAN+3 meeting was organised in 1997 in order to promote political and economic cooperation at the top level. The aim was to promote mutual understanding, trust, neighbourliness and friendly relations to further peace, stability and prosperity in the region. The Asian financial crisis showed that Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia were closely linked, which naturally encouraged increased cooperation in the East Asian region. In parallel regional integration was expanding in Europe as well as in America, which in turn called for an Asian response (Terada 2003). Added to that, the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) 6 cooperation contributed to the idea of East Asian through meetings between the southeast and northeast Asian countries, meetings which were necessary in order to develop a common Asian standpoint vis-à-vis the European counterpart (Gilson and Yeo 2004: 28).
ASEM was established in 1996 by the EU (then 15 members), the European Commission and ten Asian countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Japan and South Korea). Today also the ten new EU members and Cambodia, Laos and Burma/ Myanmar are members, i.e. ASEM includes today 39 partners. ASEM deals with economics, politics and the people-to-people and cultural dimension of international relations (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/asem_summits/asem5/news/ip04_1178.htm; Reiterer 2002; Yeo 2000).
Finally, while Japan had previously not been interested in excluding the Pacific part of an Asian region, it made a surprising turn-about on the issue. However, some observers still have doubts about more substantial East Asian regionalism, partly because of cultural differences and partly because of a fear of ASEAN being marginalised within an East Asian region (Terada 2003). Also, East Asia has nothing equivalent to the European Commission, or even a regional political structure. APEC is too heterogeneous to be relevant, and the ASEAN secretariat is sub-regional (Stevenson 2004: 841).
This development could explain ASEAN's move at its seventh summit meeting, in Bali, Indonesia, in 2003, where initiatives were taken to revitalise Southeast Asian regionalism by the establishment of an ASEAN Economic Community, an ASEAN Security Community, and an ASEAN Social and Cultural Community. The member states felt there was a need to speed up economic integration in order to meet the challenges from China and India. Security collaboration was needed for creating stability in the region, as non-traditional security threats, such as terrorism, may damage the economies. Moreover, conventional security issues such as military conflicts between the Southeast Asian states were not seen as a danger any longer (Dieter 2009; Ferguson 2004: 396; Singh 2004: 2-3; Smith 2004). The vision of the initiative was primarily to create a single market with free flow of goods, services, investments, capital and skilled labour in 2020 (Hew 2004: 47; ASEAN vision 2020). Hence, there were clear ambitions to create a stronger Southeast Asian/ ASEAN region, even if the agenda is highly voluntaristic, with limited supranational and institutional aspects (see Ferguson 2004: 395; Yoshimatsu 2006: 127). Interestingly, the biggest trade zone in the world by population and third by economic value, the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (FTA), came into effect 1 January 2010, contributing to a China-centred regionalism (although Cambodia, Laos, Burma/ Myanmar and Vietnam have exceptions in tariff reductions until 2015). 7 Besides promoting regional economic integration it also reduces the perceived threat of China (Dieter 2009: 83; The Economist 2010).
According to the agreement, the average tariff on goods from ASEAN countries to China is reduced to 0.1 per cent. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand introduce tariff reductions on Chinese goods from 12.8 to 0.6 per cent. By 2015 the policy of zero-tariff rates for 90 per cent of Chinese goods is going to extend to Cambodia, Laos, Burma/ Myanmar and Vietnam (Chheang Vannarith 2010).
Hitherto Southeast Asia has been assumed to constitute a region. But what actually characterises a region? Most definitions are based on attributes such as geographic proximity, shared cultural and social characteristics and common history (Acharya 2000: 4). However, region is a contested concept (see Kratoska, Raben, and Schulte Nordhold 2005 for a comprehensive historical/ geographical account of Southeast Asia). The term Southeast Asia, for example, only came into general use during the Second World War (Acharya 2000: 7; Huxley 1996), especially in relation to Japan's occupation of the area during the Pacific War (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002: 591). Scholars have described Southeast Asia as a “unity-in-diversity”, in the sense that Southeast Asia contains divergent and overlapping characteristics (see Acharya 2000: 3). For example, although the countries are neighbours, some of them are on the mainland while others to a large extent consist of archipelagos. Furthermore, mountains separate some countries while the Mekong River connects places creating different kinds of societies; there are similarities as well as differences between languages, cultures, religious practices, and so on. On top of this, Southeast Asia today displays more homogeneity and convergence than ever before (Acharya 2000: 2, 4-5) due to the increasing integration and globalisation processes and the increasing socio-economic disparities in society.
However, “unity-in-diversity” is a confusing term insofar as it is both descriptive and normative and can be viewed as a possible (political) solution to the tension involved in the integration process. For example, in the European case, “unity-in-diversity” well captures the Commission's efforts to create a more coherent EU while it at the same time allows for different national features. “Unity-in-diversity” avoids the (potential) clash between the creation of coherent political, cultural and social entities (unity) and “differing internal identity constellations (diversity)”, and can therefore be used in the process of regional identity-building. 8 It is important to keep in mind though, that the integration process has come much further in Europe than in Southeast Asia – at least concerning common institutions – and the socio-economic, political and maybe also cultural differences are more pronounced in Southeast Asia than in Europe. Moreover, increasing globalisation may lead to unification in some areas, such as trade agreements, and fragmentation in others, such as ethnic conflicts.
Hellström 2003: 182. Note that the way Acharya uses the concept “unity-in-diversity” differs from Hellström – the former is more a description of a region while the latter is also a strategy as it can “be used to achieve greater homogeneity among the actors involved in the process of identity construction” (Hellström 2003: 182).
But even if we can establish criteria for a region, how can we understand regional integration and regionalism? 9 Some scholars see regionalism as a by-product of globalisation processes, i.e. regionalism is “determined by location and specificity within the world economy or traditional production structures”. Regionalism can be described as a kind of re-territorialisation (Scholte 2000: 42). New alliances and collaboration patterns are created in order to cope with the new challenges caused by globalisation, and even if the states lose some of their power, regionalism strengthens the states vis-à-vis the rest of the world. At the same time, a process of de-territorialisation is taking place, i.e. territories are not as important as they used to be. Borders simply lose their importance through increased integration, such as trade.
According to Beeson (2003: 252), regionalisation implies processes that are largely the consequences of private sector-led economic integration, while regionalism is based on processes of regionally cooperation and coordination that are self-consciously driven consequences of political activities. This would mean that East Asia primarily is a sign of regionalisation, while ASEAN cannot be regarded as regionalisation due to the relatively modest intra-regional trade between the ASEAN states (Beeson 2003: 259). Another alternative would be regionness (see e.g. Acharya 2000: 157). However, for the sake of simplicity I will not make that distinction and primarily use the term regionalism (and regional integration).
Adherents of constructivism see norm and policy diffusion – where the concept “unity-in-diversity” could play a role – as drivers of regionalism. Patterns of interaction in the form of regional collaboration shape the idea of a region through diffusion of norms, policies and practices of regional organisations and collaboration (formal as well as informal). For example, a common identity can be reinforced through peaceful conflict solutions in political, economic and territorial issues. Also, a united front to the outside world is identity-strengthening (Acharya 2000: 10; also see Kivimäki 2001: 22), which ASEM could be an example of.
Yet others take a more realistic approach, arguing that the question of hegemonic power is decisive for regionalism, or that regionalism is defined by patterns of interaction – both concerning cooperation and conflict (Acharya 2000: 9). Different Asian regional initiatives such as ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), 10 East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), 11 and Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 12 can be viewed as examples that demonstrate that the hegemony of regional politics and economic arrangements is a struggle between different state strategies that are seeking to define the regional project (Guerrero 2001: 5). According to Mark Beeson (2003: 252), the regional integration in East Asia, i.e. the ASEAN+3 Initiative, will continue to be constrained by international tension and a form of reactionary regionalism. The so-called reactionary regionalism implies that regional initiatives both have been a response to external events and designed to mediate and moderate their impacts. For example, the United States’ wish to form bilateral cooperation with the Asian countries has prevented region-wide integration and a regional identity (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). Further, the ASEAN regional forum (ARF) was created in 1994 (Acharya 2000: 146) as an instrument for ensuring continued American involvement in the region, and to encourage China in good international behaviour. 13 But China, in turn, viewed the forum as “a vehicle for promoting multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific to counter America's unipolar status in a post-Cold War world” (Emmers 2001: 275). In this sense, ARF is a security cooperation responding to external events, which also include power-balancing considerations. 14
AFTA was created in 1992 (Acharya 2000: 150), but ASEAN's economic cooperation has always been subordinated to national security agendas. Economic development was viewed as the best way to “ward off communist and ethnic rebellions” (Rüland 2000: 427).
EAEC was the first attempt in the beginning of the 1990s to introduce East Asia as a region, but it failed.
APEC suffers from not being completely Asian (the members are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan ROC, Thailand, United States, Vietnam), and it has been unable to accommodate and represent the different Asian and Western impulses within it (Beeson 2003: 262).
ARF has 27 participants and is the only Asia Pacific-wide body that discusses political and security issues (the participants are the ASEAN members, their Dialogue Partners, and Papua New Guinea, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, East Timor, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (Severino 2007: 412-413).
ARF is not the first security cooperation in the region. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1954-1977, was created to oppose further Communist gains in Southeast Asia. However, it only had two members from Asia, Thailand and the Philippines (the other six were Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan and the United States) (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002: 592).
As indicated above, there is nothing inherently natural about regions. Benedict Anderson's (1991) idea about nations as “imagined political communities” 15 can easily be transferred to regions, such as Southeast Asia and East Asia (Acharya 2000: 2; Sum 1996: 208). Regions have to renegotiate their identities because of societal changes caused by globalisation, norm and policy diffusion and/or hegemonic power, forcing them to redefine their interests similarly to the way states do (Sum 1996: 210). 16 This leads us to the question of whether there is anything particular about Southeast Asian regionalism that distinguishes it from other regionalisation processes around the world.
The community is imagined because most of its members will never meet or hear of each other, yet they feel they belong to the same community or comradeship and are willing to fight and die for one another (Anderson 1991: 6-7). Anderson is interested in exploring the psychological appeal of nationalism, in other words, what makes people willing to love and die for their nations. He is also interested in why people in certain circumstances come to imagine themselves as part of a nation (Kellas 1998: 56). His point of departure is that nationalism is a cultural artefact of a special kind (Özkirimli 2000: 143), made possible through education and exposure to ideas about nationalism. Anderson has been criticised for his view that “experiences of nationalism in Western Europe, America and Russia have supplied for all subsequent nationalism a set of modular forms from which nationalist elites in Asian and Africa had chosen the ones they liked” by, for example, Chatterjee (1993: 5) who claims that “anti-colonialism creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society well before it begins to battle with the colonizer […] by dividing the social institutions and practices into two domains: the material and the spiritual”, where the latter contains the nation's cultural identity. He means that the nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa are posited on difference with the modular forms of national society propagated by the modern West, rather than on identity (Özkirimli 2000: 155).
See Chan 2005 and the Special Edition of Asia Pacific Viewpoint (Vol. 46, No. 3) for discussions about the rise of a “New Asia”.
The governments of Southeast Asia are without doubt the chief advocates of regionalism and of creating a regional identity. Accordingly, it is important how these actors perceive and interpret the idea of a Southeast Asian region (see e.g. Gilson and Yeo 2004: 25-26). It was not until the Cold War was over and the Cambodia issue was solved that the idea of a region was reinvented and pursued. Before that, Southeast Asia was deeply influenced by de-colonialisation processes, nationalism, and the Cold War – all of them decisive for the regional pattern of international relations (Acharya 2000: 12, 72). In Southeast Asia, regionalism is linked to authoritarianism, as authoritarianism “created the political basis for a common subregional political and ideological framework” (Acharya 2000: 59). The regimes could justify their rule by referring to the communist threat, ethnic unrest, and that economic development was facilitated by authoritarianism (Acharya 2000: 59). Authoritarianism, in turn, has been facilitated by the “ASEAN way”, which is a method of conflict prevention and conflict resolution based on norms central to ASEAN, such as non-intervention in internal affairs and non-use of force in inter-state relations. Decisions are made through consultations and dialogue in order to reach consensus. Quiet diplomacy and informality are important means to avoid legalistic procedures and public scrutiny (Sharpe 2003; Katsumata 2003: 107). The “ASEAN way” is made possible because of the elitist nature of Asian politics. According to a senior Malaysian diplomat, 80 per cent of the foreign ministers’ important decisions were made during informal meetings. 17 The “Asian value debate” has also fed into the process of regional identity-building by claiming that there is a common set of values in Asia. Although toned down the last few years, the “Asian value” argument still colours the debates on democracy and human rights in the region (Lawson 2005: 110).
According to Nischalke (2000), the “ASEAN way” is a myth, and the collaboration is based on functionality rather than shared visions.
Even today, the ASEAN area is full of potential conflict such as the Spratly archipelago which is totally or in part claimed by Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei (Sharpe 2003: 240). Another example is the tension between Thailand and Burma/ Myanmar over border disputes, refugees, Burmese illegal labour migrants, and the lack of dialogue with the opposition and ethnic minorities. All of this undermines mutual trust, which is an important precondition for identity-building (Rüland 2000: 431). Thus, compared to, for example, regional integration in Europe with its long tradition of democracy and peace (at least in the “old EU” prior to the Eastern Bloc enlargement), ASEAN stands out as both authoritarian and relatively burdened by conflicts, aspects that have consequences for a regional identity. It should be pointed out though, that ASEAN never had the ambition to become a European Union, with such far-reaching institutional cooperation. ASEAN was originally set up as a diplomatic community more than anything else (Smith 2004: 416).
To sum up, the integration process in Southeast Asia has proceeded in waves, constantly challenged by sovereignty issues and various political considerations. Different organisations and countries have competed for spheres of influence over time, and presently “ASEAN+” appears to be en vogue. A special characteristic of Southeast Asian regionalism is its emphasis on authoritarianism, and it is perhaps this foundation that creates the greatest challenge for a regional identity, due to the limits authoritarianism puts on regional diversity (which will be discussed below).
This part of the paper highlights regional diversity and nation-building as counter forces and thus challenges to regionalism and the creation of a regional identity. It also discusses trans-nationalism and divided loyalties in times of increasing migration and porous borders, which challenge the present form of citizenship granted by individual states. This is the part of my argument that I find missing in the literature about regional integration and regionalism. While much of the analysis focuses on economic and security issues, the role of national identity-building and citizenship is being discussed in other places, omitting an important aspect of the regional identity-building project.
Challenges for Unity
Despite the efforts to increase regional integration, there are still many challenges ahead. For example, doubts have been raised as to whether ASEAN can build a (security) identity based on the “ASEAN way” without institutionalisation and legally binding agreements (Sharpe 2003: 248). According to Tobias Nischalke (2002: 109-110), only conditional support among the member states can be found for the idea of an ASEAN community. He suggests that ASEAN is a rule-based rather than an identity-based community. He cannot find evidence of a collective regional identity based on “shared meaning structures, mutual identifications and norm compliance with the ‘ASEAN way’”. In fact, according to Nischalke, security is still guaranteed through outside alliances, the US being the most important. What has united ASEAN so far is the code of regional conduct enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) from 1976. 18 Jürgen Rüland (2000: 38-39) argues that realist motivations are still valid in foreign policy behaviour in Southeast Asia, and that policy-making is influenced by precolonial perceptions of the external world with unstable inter-state relations and thinking in terms of balance of power and buffer zones. Further, one should not forget that the military is still influential in the region – Burma/Myanmar, Thailand and the Philippines are cases in point – and that ASEAN tends to conceal disagreements in public (Nischalke 2002: 91).
ASEAN endorsed regional resilience in TAC, which means regional stability. If all member states strengthened national development, addressing the threat from communist and ethnic insurgency, there would be domestic security, which in turn would lead to stability in the region (Collins 2003: 129).
Differences in values and political systems within ASEAN also impede the creation of a common identity. The discrepancies became even more pronounced after its enlargement, and again after the financial crisis, when it became obvious that “Asian values” were no guarantee of economic success. Thailand, for example, has launched a number of initiatives promoting human rights and democracy that, for obvious reasons, are seen with suspicion by the more authoritarian regimes (Rüland 2000: 442). The Philippines and Indonesia have also started to adhere to the universalistic concept of human rights, which is opposed to the idea of non-interference – and thus not in line with the Asian concept of human rights (Kivimäki 2001: 9). Malaysia's former prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, who once supported Burma/Myanmar's admission to ASEAN, was also one of its critics later on, threatening to expel Burma/ Myanmar from ASEAN due to its treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi. The brutal suppression of the street protests in Burma/Myanmar in September 2007 after the drastic rise of oil and fuel prices received even more severe criticism from several ASEAN member states and can be seen as an interesting change from the “ASEAN way”. However, not all the ASEAN countries are as intransigent in their criticism, as for example Malaysia above, and it may be premature to suggest that the “ASEAN way” has given away to a more flexible interpretation of the concept (Katsumata 2003). 19 ASEAN countries are still concerned over state sovereignty and domestic stability, and so far it has been impossible to agree on an appropriate style of regional diplomacy (Sharpe 2003; Katsumata 2003: 107).
But at the 11th ASEAN Regional Forum, 2 July 2004, the ministers “urged Myanmar to take every action that will add substance to the expression of its democratic aspiration” (http://www.aseansec.org/16245.htm).
As indicated above, Burma/ Myanmar has caused a lot of diplomatic trouble for ASEAN. Another example concerns ASEM, where the European side for a long time refused to accept a Burma/ Myanmar membership. A compromise could only be reached by barring high-ranking Burmese officials from participating in meetings. Burma/ Myanmar constitutes an old dilemma in the region: the confrontation between commercial activities and human right issues (Bray 2002). ASEAN has engaged in so called “constructive engagement”, as the ASEAN governments argued that a strategy of expanding economic ties was the most effective way to promote economic and political change, and allowing Burma/ Myanmar to become a member of ASEAN is part of this strategy. Another reason to grant membership was to avoid Burma/ Myanmar forming closer ties to China, which in turn could pose a strategic threat to Vietnam (Hadar 2001: 415). 20 However, in recent years there have been discussions about putting pressure for further political talks by using a carrot-and-stick strategy, i.e. to increase aid little by little at the same time as threats of banning all exports from Burma/ Myanmar are posed if there are no changes towards democracy (Kurlantzick 2002). However, sanctions are not really effective as long as Burma/ Myanmar's largest trading partners refuse to support them (Hadar 2001).
Western governments have, in line with the views of Aung San Suu Kyi, taken a confrontational approach, imposing arms embargo and selective sanctions in the form of travel restrictions for leading members of the regime. Since 1997 the US has imposed a ban on new investments in Burma/ Myanmar. However, existing investments are allowed to continue, for example the petroleum company Unocal – albeit not without fierce criticism (Bray 2002: 158).
Within the ASEAN group one can also discern various cooperation patterns. For example, Laos and Vietnam have a special relationship through their political orientation. The relationship between Vietnam and Cambodia has been coloured by Vietnam's support of the overthrow of Pol Pot in the late 1970s and the succeeding Hun Sen regime. The countries along the Mekong River (Burma/ Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand and China's Yunnan Province) cooperate in a number of issues. For example, they have discussed increased collaboration in the fields of infrastructure, telecommunication, power links, trade, human resource development and tourism.
Simultaneously, self-identity and how others perceive a country impinge on the relationships between the countries. Border disputes and mutual distrust go back a long time in history. The legacy of colonialism, the Cold War and the role of China exert a great influence over politics in the region. Vietnamese are viewed with scepticism in Laos and Cambodia (see e.g. Amer 2006), and the Thai tend to look down on Laos as a backward or underdeveloped country. Many Thai tourists travel to Laos to see “traditional values”, while the Lao see themselves as protectors of the real Buddhist values, which the Lao think that the Thai have lost. At the same time, many Lao look up to the Thai in terms of development and sophistication (Evans 1999: 30). Consequently, strangers are frequently seen with suspicion and possibly also as a threat to national identity because they may introduce new ideas and practices (see e.g. Houtum and Naerssen 2001: 130). It should be pointed out, though, that there are efforts to change the situation: for example, ASEAN is trying to create an awareness of a regional identity by introducing the issue into primary education curricula. 21
Compare with Anderson's print-capitalism (1991), meaning that commercial printing made it possible to spread the idea of the nation and the ideology of nationalism (also see Kellas 1998: 57).
One important difference between European and Southeast Asian regionalism is the legacy of colonialism and the kind of nationalism it has created in many parts of Southeast Asia. 22 This kind of nationalism is in fact anti-colonialism and was important in many parts of the “Third World” during the 1950s and 1960s. The problem was, however, that at independence the nationalists inherited the borders established by the colonial powers, and these did not always reflect cultural or national divisions. Consequently, nation-building was on the agenda for practically all the new states. Anti-colonial nationalism consequently turned into a nationalism of inter-ethnic disputes and conflicts (Kellas 1998: 94-95; Chatterjee 1993: 3; also see Özkirimli 2000: 182). This happened in Indochina and Burma/ Myanmar. As a result, conflicts between ethnic minority groups and major groups have been a problem for the governments for a long time, and still are. For example, harassment of ethnic, mainly Christian, minorities in the highland of Vietnam led to a flow of refugees to Cambodia. The majority of ethnic Lao live in Thailand, 23 and there are Burmese refugee camps in Thailand, and so on (see e.g. Rajah 2002; Jerndal and Rigg 1998).
Plenty has been written about nationalism in Southeast Asia despite criticism that nationalism is an ethnocentric concept with the west as a norm (see e.g. Tarling 2004: 15). I will leave that debate aside, and instead I will focus on colonialism and nationalism in multi-ethnic societies, and what consequences there may be on regional identity-building.
Approximately 20 million Lao live in Thailand compared to 4.5 million in Laos (Jerndal and Rigg 1998: 821).
Thus, ever since the days of national independence the fear of collapse has haunted the states in Southeast Asia. Ethnic conflict is part of this fear, which is understandable considering that the region contains 32 ethno-linguistic groups, with each state containing at least four major ethnic communities (Yao 2001: 12). The ideology of “ethnicity” has to a large extent manifested itself in the process of building a modern nation-state. The ruling, post-colonial, powers became more or less “obsessed” with classifying people because they believed that modern nations had to consist of identified populations based on language, territory, economics and culture (Toyota 2003: 312). National identity is, however, not a straightforward concept. National identity may consist of more than one identity, for example an ethnic identity and a state identity (i.e. state as in country), which in turn may create conflicting loyalties (Kellas 1998: 21). Moreover, nationalism and patriotism focus on loyalties to the state, while ethnic nationalism may seek to disintegrate the state (for a comprehensive discussion about nationalism in Southeast Asia, see Tarling 2004.). In other words, there may be conflicting nationalisms, which in turn may create conflicts (Tarling 2004: 26). A way to solve this problem is to become a multinational state that guarantees ethnic rights to the nations within it (Tarling 2004: 67), something that, for example, Burma/ Myanmar has chosen not to do (see further below).
Today ethnicity and national identity-building are important issues to many states. In times of rapid societal changes, nationalism is able to offer myths of ancestry and kinship to individuals. This in turn, creates a sense of identity, security and moral authority for individuals (David Brown in Tarling 2004: 24) – even if it may take time to persuade people that nationalism is the right path, rather than, for example, religion (Tarling 2004: 25). However, minority nations often exist within states. These minority nations are dominated by one or more majority nations, which hold the position of a hegemony, at the same time as most such ethnic groups are ethnically tied to nations in other states or countries (Donnan and Wilson 1999: 6). Ethnic nationalism often arises out of a sense of alienation, but also of resentment against unfair political, economic, or social exclusion (Scheff 1994: 281). Few governments in Southeast Asia are able to guarantee equal citizen rights to all. Instead, most Southeast Asian states ethnicise their governance by informal policy preferences for one ethnic group, or structural discrimination based on “racial categories” (Yao 2001: 13). Practices of inclusion and exclusion are in reality strongly associated, or framed, by nation-building projects (Houtum and van Naerssen 2001: 126). Indigenous people are often stereotyped as backward and ignorant, and Ken Kampe (1997) argues that the state authorities’ preoccupation with teaching skills that meet urban rather than rural needs in the quest for nation-building has contributed to the alienation of indigenous people and an erosion of their sense of identity. Thus, the quest for a national identity may weaken as well as strengthen the nation.
The ASEAN states’ assurance that they will not interfere in each other's domestic issues has facilitated the completion of the nation-state project (Tarling 2004: 199-200). At the same time, the nation-state project is challenged by the process of de-territorialisation and the diminishing importance of borders through the increased integration. Old bonds of allegiance and feelings of belonging together with other people upheld by ethnic groups that are spread across national borders also facilitate trans-national mobility (see e.g. Evans, Hutton, and Khua Khun Eng 2000). This, in turn, leads to “trans-localised” identities, which potentially are contradictory (Toyota 2003: 302). As a result, nations have to “deal with the confusing and conflicting nature of identity boundaries” (Jones 2004: 148). Especially
border people may demonstrate ambiguous identities because economic, cultural and linguistic factors pull them in two directions. They are also pulled two ways politically, and may display only a weak identification with the nation-state in which they reside (Donnan and Wilson 1999: 60).
For example, ethnic minorities in northern Thailand and Burma/ Myanmar live in areas that extend beyond national boundaries (i.e. national boundaries do not correspond to state borders). The failure to negotiate ethnic aspirations within the nation-state has lead to armed separatist movements, which have extended to the neighbouring states (Yao 2001: 13). According to Janet Sturgeon (2004), new small entities are being created in the borderland of China, Thailand and Burma/ Myanmar. These are state appointed and serve to protect the border for the homeland at the same time as they enable illicit information, people and goods to cross the borders. This is made possible by drawing strategically on multiple identities. Violence forcing people to migrate has also contributed to the development of these small border polities (Sturgeon 2004: 464, 468).
Such trans-national social spaces and multi-local affiliations are nothing new. Historically, migrations, invasions and displacements have been common in Southeast Asia. This, in turn, has led to repeated shifts of cultural borders and political loyalties. This means that ethnic identities have also changed over time (Toyota 2003: 310). However, this raises questions about identity – for instance, whether identity should be related to the place of origin or to the place of settlement – and today the increasing flows of trans-national migrants actually opens up new social space for marginalized individuals and groups previously constrained by officially imposed ethnic categorisation. Accordingly, identity becomes de-territorialised and an “imagined community” of trans-localised identities (Toyota 2003: 317), or “imagined trans-national communities” (Donnan and Wilson 1999: 157), come into existence. Self-determination movements may also feel part of an “imagined community” through connection with exiles in diaspora. Their identity, or perception of identity, differs from that of the regime, and often such identities can be manipulated in order to motivate struggle. Refugees are another group that may feel they are part of a wider community through the Internet, media, travel, clothing and so on (Dudley 2002: 167, 171). These processes should also be taken into account when discussing regional identity-building.
To sum up, regional integration in Southeast Asia has manifested itself in a number of organisations, most notably ASEAN, which has recently tried to speed up the integration process. However, the quest for a regional Southeast Asian identity has been challenged not only by conflicts among the member states, but also by initiatives to create a larger entity, namely East Asia (ASEAN+3). Economic gains stand against security issues and (old and new) power balance considerations. There is still a fear of being dominated by a hegemonic power, be it regional or from other parts of the world. Integration has, to a large extent, been an elite project with the underlying goal of creating domestic stability without external interference in order to stay in power. Nevertheless, the last decades’ democratisation has lead to disagreements between the member states with regard to domestic interference and human rights issues. Needless to say, the newest ASEAN members have made these disagreements even more pronounced. Arguably, Southeast Asian regionalism is influenced both by power considerations and patterns of interaction primarily at the state level. Finally, the importance of the regionalism/authoritarianism should not be underestimated, especially not in relation to the issue of ethnicity and national identity-building. By viewing the linkage from a “unity-in-diversity” perspective, the difficulties with a regional identity become evident. “Unity-in-diversity” requires room for differences within the region, but considering the number of (ethnic) conflicts and the governments’ fear of losing control over their citizens, there is still a long way to go before such diversity can be accepted by the governments and “unity-in-diversity” applied as in the European case.
The Cases of Laos and Burma/ Myanmar
I did not choose to include Laos and Burma/ Myanmar because I believe they are representative of Southeast Asia: my goal was rather to exemplify the difficulties involved in creating a common regional identity. While poor economic performance and low level of development often are put forward as the main reasons for regional integration difficulties, the focus here is on the role of nation-building and ethnic minorities in the respective countries.
Nation-building and Ethnicity
The nation-state is a fairly recent phenomenon in Southeast Asia (Yao 2001: 4), and the ASEAN countries’ particular concern over state sovereignty is obvious. Some states have become stable politically as well as economically, but others are still weak. What they have in common is that their main security concern is still domestic. Laos and Burma/ Myanmar are among the weakest states in ASEAN. They are still at a relatively early stage of nation-building, and the governments of the two states are preoccupied with various domestic political and security issues (Katsumata 2003: 116-117). Many argue that for a nation-state to gain legitimacy, its people must recognise that they share memories that can form a nation and that the state's boundaries coincide with the nation (Collins 2003: 23). Accordingly, a shared identity is crucial for the legitimacy of the state – something that has been, and still is, a challenge in Burma/ Myanmar and Laos. In addition, both countries face problems with ethnic rebels. 24
Many of them involved in the drug trade, see e.g. Lyttleton 2004; Kusuma Snitwongse and Suchit Bunbongkarn 2003: 294. In Laos, there have been reports about violent outbreaks in remote areas, and a few bombs have exploded in the capital. However, it is uncertain whether these incidents were conducted by organised groups or criminal individuals (see e.g. Jönsson 2002: 125).
What makes Laos and Burma/ Myanmar somewhat different from their neighbours (besides Cambodia and Vietnam) is their relative under-development (see Rigg 2003: 12). This gap is actually widening between, for example, Laos and Singapore (Stuart-Fox 2002). Both countries (together with Vietnam and Cambodia) have experienced sustained stagnation or decline in human well-being. Socialist development failed in Laos (1975-86), and Burma/ Myanmar has suffered from economic mismanagement (1962-today) (Rigg 2003: 328). At the same time, people desire better lives through economic development and modernisation, 25 and consequently ASEAN offers a possible solution to their problems. Some observers say that Laos joined ASEAN to get a sense of identity and belonging both within the region and on the international level (Pruzin and Weber 1996).
See Yao (2001) for an interesting discussion about identity, modernity and Asian resistance against the hegemony of Western values (e.g. Asian values and Asian particularism versus universal values).
However, regional integration is problematic for a number of reasons – such as regional inequalities and political obstacles related to non-interference and human rights. In addition, ethnicity has made international cooperation difficult when donors focusing on poverty reduction want to target poor ethnic groups like the Hmong, who have been maltreated because of their association with rebel groups during and after the American-Vietnam war. Underdevelopment and social exclusion are closely intertwined, and in multi-ethnic and multicultural societies such as Laos and Burma/ Myanmar, the degree of inequality tends to be higher (Jones 2004: 145). Another side to this is that the poor and the socially excluded have little influence over their situation. For example, in both Laos and Burma/Myanmar people have been resettled. In Laos, the “resettlement of ethnic minorities has become a central feature of the rural development strategy”. However, resettlement implies leaving a well-known territory and changing a traditional way of life, and settling in a new environment and integrating into new culture references (Evrard and Goudineau 2004: 938), which many of the resettled people have had difficulties with. In Burma/ Myanmar poor communities have been relocated to remote areas. Burma/ Myanmar is also known for its policy of forced labour (Lanjouw, Mortimer, and Bamforth 2000; Grundy-Warr 2004).
A shift in consciousness about the nation came to Laos when French colonialism introduced the idea of “the history of the nation”, and the elite became aware of the “backwardness” of their country and the reforms that were needed (Evans 1998: 185). Laos achieved full independence from the French in 1953, and in 1975 the communists came into power after a long period of civil war that the royalists lost. Ethnic minorities became important in official portrayals of the people, which drew on historical conditions of nation-building and the armed struggle against the enemy (cf. Taylor and Jonsson 2002). The government's nationalistic discourse and ethnic categorisation were thus closely linked (Pholsena 2002: 180). But ethnic minorities were not only important in official portrayals. In 1975 ethnic minority groups were encouraged to join the struggle on the side of the communists, and also today the regime makes an effort to include representatives from different ethnic groups in leading positions (see Pholsena 2006 for a comprehensive account of Laos and the making of a multi-ethnic nation).
Ethnicity was already reinforced during colonial times, as ethnographic classification became an important aspect of the colonial strategy. The French brought a new model of state and society, where the relationship between ethnic and racial identities was self-evident. The French identified peoples as “races”, and they assumed that people could be ranked on a scale of progress in accordance with the evolutionary theories of the time. Consequently, people in the highlands were mapped according to their backwardness (Taylor and Jonsson 2002: 238). This patronising attitude towards the rural population still exists: one example of this attitude is the National Ethnic Cultural Garden situated outside Vientiane. It was ostensibly built to promote and disseminate knowledge about the traditional cultures and fine customs of ethnic groups, but it has become an amusement and picnic park for Lao and Thai tourists. Along with a few typical traditional ethnic Lao houses, the Garden also contains a zoo and replicas of dinosaurs (from Savannakhet), which according to Grant Evans (1998: 127) reveal a deeper prejudice that certain ethnic groups are primitive and backwards.
There are today, according to official statistics, 49 ethnic groups distributed between four ethno-linguistic categories in Laos (60 per cent are ethnic Lao). In the 1950s Lao Lum (valley Lao), Lao Theung (Lao of the mountain slopes) and Lao Sung (Lao of the mountain tops) were introduced as classification terms. The classification was intended to emphasise the unity of the country in order to eliminate the colonial classification based on racial connotations, and to build a sense of national identity, and the terms Lao Lum, Lao Theung and Lao Sung are still commonly used (Pholsena 2002: 185). The government continues to be preoccupied with ethnicity and ethnic classification. For example, the Lao population census in 2000 was based on ethnic criteria, and it attempted to map Laos’ invisible ethnicity through objectification of the “other” ethnic groups by defining cultural features on the one hand and erasing the dominant ethnic group's ethnicity on the other hand (i.e. ethnic Lao). However, the word “Lao” denotes both the idea of ethnicity and the idea of nationality, and this has in effect made “Lao” superior as it both includes an ethnic group and the whole population. To put it differently, there is an ambiguity that is both linguistic and conceptual (Pholsena 2002). This has caused a debate about how to use the word “Lao” – not the least among Lao expatriates who often belong to ethnic minorities (see e.g. Evans 1998: 8-9).
Since 1975 the regime has tried to create a different present by reconstructing the past through repression and reinterpretation (Evans 1998: 6). But according to Evans (1998: 11), the writing of history in contemporary Laos has been problematic. The idea of shared memories has become difficult in Laos for several reasons. For instance, some people remember the old regime positively, while others lived in the mountains with the communist Pathet Lao and only have memories of propaganda against the royalist regime. In addition to that, the younger generation know little of history and are more interested in modern lifestyles (Evans 1998: 7). Jerndal and Rigg (1998: 810-811, 818) argue that Lao identity has been manipulated in the interests of national unity. They suggest that Laos presents a good example of Benedict Anderson's idea of the “invention of imagined national communities; the creation of state ‘languages-of-power’; the remoulding of populations into new (national) units; and the retrospective invention of national identity”. Ever since French colonialism, when France encouraged Lao nationalism in order to resist pan-Thai nationalism and keep Indochina together, the question of whether Laos deserves to be labelled a nation has been debated.
In order to strengthen nationalism and to create a Lao identity, the authorities try to create myths and heroes. It is important for them to distance themselves from Thai cultural supremacy, but it can also be interpreted as a way to seek “local” modernity. One way is to make links to a royal past. By resurrecting old kings, it is hoped that nationalism will be inspired (Evans 1998). Another way is to create heroes. There is, for example, a cult of Kaysone, who led the Lao People's Revolutionary Party from 1955 and also led Laos itself from 1975 until his death in 1992. The state's creation of a cult of Kaysone is a part of its strategy to invent national legitimizing myths. However, there is a limit to how much a cult can be developed, as any personality cult may drift too close to the cult of the overthrown monarchy (Evans 1998: 31).
Burma/ Myanmar and the Quest for a Mono-ethnic Nation
In Burma/ Myanmar the nation-building project was shaped by its relationship with Britain and India. Britain defined the borders and offered Western education. But neighbouring India also affected Burma/ Myanmar through the British annexation which lasted until the 1930s with the result that Burma/ Myanmar was treated as a province of India, and also because the Burmese government found Indian educational and political models useful to advance their own progress (even if India was also focus of antagonism because Indians staffed the Burmese bureaucracy and so on) (Tarling 2004: 97-99). Burma/ Myanmar became independent from Britain in 1948, and in 1962 the Burmese military seized power in a coup. In the 1980s a democratic movement started, leading to an election in 1990 in which the party National League for Democracy (NLD), with Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi as its leader, won a clear victory. However, the military refused to accept the results, and Aung San Suu Kyi has thus remained under close surveillance ever since (Schairer-Vertannes 2001). The regime promised general elections in May 2010, which have yet to take place. The elections would eventually pave the way to a civilian government, albeit military controlled. An election would be the fifth step in the “seven step roadmap to disciplined democracy”, which was released by the regime in 2003. In 2008 a constitutional referendum was conducted as a part of this process, but the result was controlled by the regime (Seekins 2010: 199-201; Mathieson 2010).
In Burma/ Myanmar, nation-building has had, and still has, violent expressions. Burma/ Myanmar has used a policy of assimilation to create a mono-ethnic nation (Collins 2003: 27; for a comprehensive account of present Burma/ Myanmar and its modern history see Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than 2005; Ganesan N. and Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2007). This approach is usually used where the hegemonic group has the control over the state machinery and can impose its own values on other groups within the state. However, while this may create a strong national identity, it may also create resentment in the peripheral communities as their identities are challenged. In Burma/ Myanmar there are at least eight ethnic communities based on linguistic, religious and regional divisions. Around 68 per cent are thought to be ethnic Burmese. The major minority groups are the Karen, Shan, Arakanese, Kachin, Chin and Mon. Though most are Buddhist, the Christians have a leadership role in the Karen State, and the Arakan State is home to about a million Muslims and Hindus (Reynolds et al. 2001: 96). When it became evident to the ethnic communities that they would not have autonomy under the military regime, their resistance to the assimilation policy became military. There are still groups fighting, but since 1989 the majority of the insurgents groups have signed ceasefire agreements with the military regime, though many of the groups retain their weapons (Bray 2002: 157; Reynolds et al. 2001: 99; Smith 2005: 78-80).
The tensions in Burma/ Myanmar continue because of the Myanmarisation/ Burmanisation where Burmese culture, language and Buddhism 26 are absolutely hegemonic (in addition to political, economic and constitutional problems). 27 Myanmarisation/ Burmanisation implies that all citizens should feel like true Myanmar/ Burmese citizens, regardless of “race”. The idea is to “crowd out all alternative concepts of unity that various ethnic groups and foreign languages might have expressed throughout history” (Houtman in Tarling 2004: 203). But the situation is complex, as people are divided by religion, languages and caste categories. For example, people can be Burmese Buddhists, Indian Hindus or Muslims, or members of native minority communities (Thant Myint-U 2001: 245).
Buddhism is more important for the regime in Burma/ Myanmar than in Laos. The British colonial power abolished the monarchy in Burma/ Myanmar at an early stage and instead Buddhism became a unifying factor. The communist abolished the monarchy in Laos in 1975 (see Evans 1998).
Collins 2003: 29, 31. One way to check for the presence of nation-states is to look for “the growth of myths and memories of common ancestry and history of the cultural unit of population; the formation of a shared public culture based on an indigenous resource (language, religion etc.); the delimitation of compact historic territory, or homeland; the unification of local economic units into a single socio-economic unit based on the single culture and homeland; and the growth of common codes and institutions of a single legal order, with common rights and duties for all members” (Anthony D. Smith in Hall 1999: 9-10).
Ethnic tensions and conflicts have resulted in migration and flows of refugees. Even though the Thai government currently is trying to control and “legalise” some of the undocumented migrants in Thailand, a few years ago around two million Burmese citizens lived in Thailand. Approximately 125,000 lived in camps close to the Burmese border, and another 500,000 to 1,000,000 were workers who worked in, for example, textile mills and construction jobs (Human Rights Watch 2003). Ethno-nationalism is being recreated in some of the refugee camps and could feed fragmentation, but the articulation of Karen nationalism, for example, is weak as many realise that they may never return to their homelands (Rajah 2002: 533; also see Grundy-Warr 2004). The assimilation approach in Burma/ Myanmar has obviously led to a backlash of the elite's nation- and state-building project making Burma/ Myanmar a weak state with areas not under government control (Collins 2003: 56; Lorch 2006: 19).
The aim of this paper was to examine the political project of regional identity-building in Southeast Asia. One the one hand, the prospect for further integration appears promising. ASEAN is trying to further the integration process by aiming at a common regional identity as proposed in the ASEAN Vision 2020. On the other hand, “one is only as strong as one's weakest point”. The newest member states have made the process complicated by making the organisation more diverse than ever, economically as well as politically. Even though a country such as Thailand, which is not too concerned with protecting an imagined national essence, is interested in further integration, there is also, for example, Burma/ Myanmar, which adheres to a tradition of resistance (Lynch 2004: 340). Thus, one could question the gains achieved through the enlargement project considering the associated problems. However, it makes sense from a balance of power perspective. The member states are still afraid that powers with hegemonic ambitions, such as China in relation to Southeast Asia as whole or Thailand and Vietnam in relation to Laos, will gain too much influence. There is also a substantial amount of resistance within some countries against too much external economic, political and cultural influence.
One also has to remember that ASEAN was designed as an organisation for states engaged in nation-building rather than as a supranational organisation, and the quotes introducing the paper should not be over-interpreted. Nation-building is often a brutal business, and the states wanted to make sure that neighbouring states would not interfere in their domestic affairs. Consequently, sovereignty remained firmly at the national level rather than at a supranational level. The idea was to create a strong region based on strong states, not strong regional institutions. Also, as the security threats were primarily domestic, the function of ASEAN would be “to accelerate economic growth, social progress and culture development in the region” (Collins 2003: 128-129). The increased interest in furthering regional integration and the interest in the creation of a common regional identity can be explained by greater global competition which calls for a stronger region, i.e. a reaction against “the West” (Lawson 2005: 113). Another explanation may be that ASEAN over the years has fostered a sense of a Southeast Asia region through collaboration which encourages further integration. At the same time, it seems unlikely that the “ASEAN way” will be abolished in the near future, which in turn may slow down the integration process. 28 And, if Southeast Asia becomes integrated in a larger East Asian region, the integration process will become even more complex.
Kivimäki (2006: 18) argues that a new “ASEAN identity” is being built based on a genuinely developed network of institutions rather than on elitist declarations.
The forces of globalisation may encourage further regionalism, but globalisation may also encourage fragmentation. Ethno-nationalism and trans-nationalism pose a threat to many states, creating divided loyalties and thus also questioning the legitimacy of the regimes. There are different ways to deal with multi-ethnic societies in order to create a national identity. For example, Laos has chosen to create a common past and to include members of all ethnic groups in the government structure. Although ethnic discrimination exists, the resistance is – at least so far – limited. In Burma/ Myanmar, the situation is different. The regime pursues a strategy of assimilation aiming at a mono-ethnic society based on Burmese values and identity. The result has been violent resistance against the Burmese hegemonic power, in the form of not only conflicts, but also of widespread distrust. The behaviour of the Burmese regime during the 2007 demonstrations and their aftermath stand in stark contrast to the image ASEAN wants to portray, and serves as a reminder of how heterogeneous the ASEAN member states are, and how difficult it is to create a united region when some of its member states are not interested in complying with the wishes of the others. Thus, Laos and Burma/ Myanmar provide good illustrations of the difficulties involved in creating national, and regional, identities in multi-ethnic societies. Although the two countries are special cases insofar as that they also are low-income countries and authoritarian, they are members of ASEAN and they are included in the realm of a regional Southeast Asian identity – despite their differences.
The analysis above fits well into the picture of Southeast Asia as a region characterised by some kind of “unity-in-diversity”. But does it work as a political strategy to enhance a regional identity, as in the case of the Europe? It depends on how it is constructed, both in regards to “unity” and “diversity”. Without doubt, Southeast Asia is a region with great diversity, and each country is, in fact, composed of diverse cultures. The question is, then, how much “unity-in-diversity” can be achieved? And who should decide what constitutes “unity” and what constitutes “diversity”?
So far dominant groups have clung onto power and limited the acceptance of a diverse citizenry, which has made the quest for a regional identity a political, elite-driven project. According to Jones (2004: 148, 152), regional identity will be nothing but an imposed superstructure with no facilities of governance until citizenship becomes a concern and a focus of all ASEAN nations. The growing number of migrants requires nations to deal with shifting identity boundaries and, due to the multicultural composition of the region, the importance of ethnic identity will most certainly grow in significance. Hence, it makes no sense to discuss regionalism and regional identity without including the issue of local and national identity-building together with citizenship – at least not in times of globalisation. It is not possible to draw any conclusions by looking only at Laos and Burma/Myanmar, but at least the two cases open up critical discussions of the political project that is regional identity-building in Southeast Asia.
So, is a Southeast Asian regional identity plausible by 2020? It is questionable. Maybe it is possible at the state level, if the political will is really there, but in order to make ASEAN truly regional, the sense of belonging to a common identity, whatever it may entail, must be “imagined” at the individual level as well (cf. Emmerson 2005: 182; Nesadurai 2009: 109; Narine 2009: 377). But maybe that has never been the goal. After all, in an increasingly globalised world, lifestyles and rural–urban divides may be more decisive for identity than nationality is. Identities are in a constant flux that must be negotiated: They are contested depending on political and socio-economic developments. Regardless of future developments, additional attempts to bridge the gap between different bodies of literature are warranted in order to provide a more sophisticated and nuanced picture of regional identity-building in Southeast Asia.