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Abstract

Previous studies have shown exposure to something cute affects moral tendencies and prosocial behaviors, but how it affects people's moral judgment is still unknown. This study examines the effect of cuteness exposure on the judgment of morally transgressive events and explores the moderating effect of the moral transgressor's socioeconomic status. In Experiment 1, we find that individuals judged moral transgression incidents more harshly after viewing cute images. Experiment 2 examined whether the socioeconomic status of moral transgressors moderates the effect. The results revealed that when cuteness was primed, individuals were more tolerant of the advantaged than the disadvantaged, and made harsher moral judgments about the disadvantaged. In summary, the findings suggest that exposure to cute stimuli can enhance individuals’ moral sense and thus lead to harsher moral judgments. This effect is more pronounced when transgressors have low socioeconomic status.

Keywords

cuteness perception moral judgments moral transgressions socioeconomic status

Cuteness possesses its own unique charm in comparison to beauty (Kuraguchi & Ashida, 2015; Kuraguchi & Kanari, 2020). The concept of cuteness and the feelings associated with it are universal across cultures (Nittono et al., 2021). (Lorenz, 1943) first proposed cuteness as an academic concept, using the term Kindchenschema (baby schema), which refers to people and things with baby-like characteristics. Thus, cuteness often is associated with concepts related to infants or children. Cuteness perception is defined as the emotional experience that is aroused in an individual in response to a person or object with baby schema (Zhang & Zhou, 2020). Previous studies have demonstrated that baby schema or cuteness perception can influence people's cognition, emotions, and behavior (Gorn et al., 2008; Hildebrandt & Fitzgerald, 1978; Lishner et al., 2011; Mcarthur & Apatow, 1984; Nenkov & Scott, 2014). Several studies have found that cuteness perception can influence an individual's attention and behavior. For instance, viewing cute pictures can affect participants’ attentional persistence and bias and improve their performance in fine-motor dexterity tasks (Álvarez-San Millán et al., 2022; Cardenas et al., 2013; Nittono et al., 2012; Yoshikawa et al., 2020).

The relationship between cuteness and morality has also attracted the attention of researchers (Machan, 2018; Sherman & Haidt, 2011). Sherman & Haidt (2011) point out that people's reaction to cuteness is a moral emotion, and the sociality induced by cuteness can expand people's moral circle¹ and thus motivate them to give cute people or objects more moral care. Therefore, previous findings tend to suggest that cuteness perception can enhance people's moral sense and thus promote various prosocial behaviors. For example, being exposed to cute things can promote more support for campaigns to save endangered animals (Huddy & Gunnthorsdottir, 2000), increase recycling and donation behavior (Jang, 2022; Wang et al., 2017), and make people more likely to fill out a self-administered survey on organ donation (Bellfield et al., 2011), among other prosocial behaviors (Shin & Mattila, 2021). Some researchers believe this accommodating behavior triggered by cute things is related to positive emotions (Tai et al., 2011), such as love, warmth, happiness, and tenderness (Ren et al., 2017). The baby schema (cuteness) serves as a priming cue stimulus that could facilitate an individual's behavioral intention to donate to a cause by arousing empathy (Yang et al., 2022). Cuteness perception can also improve animals’ moral status in the minds of people, thus increasing their empathy and reducing consumption of meat products (Zickfeld et al., 2018).

All of these studies point to a strong connection between cuteness and morality. However, previous research has mainly focused on the relationship between cuteness perception and moral behaviors, while direct evidence on whether cuteness influences judgments of immoral behavior is lacking. The two current experiments provide empirical evidence that cuteness perceptions influence individuals’ judgments of moral transgressions. In the following sections, we first describe the influence of cuteness perceptions on judgments of events. Next, we review the influence of cuteness on emotion. Finally, we explain the rationale for socioeconomic status as a moderating variable.

Theoretical background

Cuteness affects judgments of transgressive events

Relatively few studies have examined how cuteness perception influences people's judgments of transgressive behavior, and the findings are inconsistent. Baby faces, a typical characteristic of baby schemas, can create the impression of greater honesty or innocence. In judicial decisions, baby-faced defendants are more likely to be convicted of a lesser crime of negligence than a more serious crime of intent (Zebrowitz & Mcdonald, 1991). In corporate public relations crises, having a baby-faced CEO increases the perceived credibility of their denial of misconduct and can improve people's attitudes toward the company (Gorn et al., 2008). When a name-brand company is involved in severe transgressions, a very cute logo can reduce consumer penalties against the brand (Septianto & Kwon, 2021; Septianto & Paramita, 2021). The cuter the design of an artificial intelligence assistant, the more likely it is to be accepted by the user, even if the service fails (Lv et al., 2021). And while consumers are more likely to forgive baby-faced service providers when they experience service failures in the hospitality and travel services industries, this baby-faced effect diminishes as the severity of the service failure increases (Liu & Li, 2022). However, findings in medical settings have been contradictory. Baby-faced doctors in general are recipients of higher expectations, satisfaction, and loyalty, but when they are accused of medical fraud, they are considered more unprofessional and less serious than doctors with mature faces (Chang & Chen, 2015).

These findings are all related to cute persons or objects, which means people's judgments of events are influenced by the cute characteristics of the objects themselves. However, does incidental exposure to cute stimuli unrelated to a transgressive event also affect people's emotion and judgments of immoral events? How does this effect relate to the influence of cuteness on emotion and cognition?

The influence of cuteness on emotion

Broadly speaking, previous research tends to assume that emotions evoked by cute traits are primarily positive. The sight of cute people or objects can stir positive emotions in people. For example, the cuter a picture of a baby or car is, the stronger the positive emotional response it generates (Almanza-Sepúlveda et al., 2018; Miesler et al., 2011). Relevant physiological studies have confirmed that the emotion provoked by cuteness is positive, characterized by smiling, and is distinguishable from other expressions of positive emotions (Ihara & Nittono, 2012; Nittono & Ihara, 2017; Nittono & Tanaka, 2010). At the same time, the perceived vulnerability associated with cuteness also triggers complex emotions such as compassion, tenderness, and empathy (Dijker, 2014; Griskevicius et al., 2010; Lishner et al., 2011).

Moreover, some researchers believe that cuteness can awaken a particular social relationship emotion named kama muta, which in English is similar to the emotions of something warming one's heart, being moved, and being touched (Fiske, 2020; Steinnes et al., 2019). Kama muta largely mediates people's sociality, motivates affective devotion and moral commitment to communal sharing, and inspires individuals to improve the welfare of others (Fiske et al., 2019; Zickfeld et al., 2019). And child-related cues unconsciously activate the concept of goodness, driving people into moral purity without wanting to contaminate it (Desai, 2011). When exposed to cute stimuli closely related to the baby schema, individuals may also feel that they are, themselves, morally pure, resulting in harsher judgments of immoral behavior (Gino & Desai, 2012). From this perspective, cuteness is also a particular kind of moral emotion.

The social intuition model holds that emotions, as a rapid and salient intuition, also often systematically influence complex moral judgments (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001). According to the excitation transfer theory (Cooper, 1998; Sinclair et al., 1994; Zillmann, 1971) and arousal hypothesis (Cheng et al., 2013), prior emotional arousal does not subside when subsequent behavioral judgments are made, but is instead misattributed to amplify the perceived immorality of the target behavior. Individuals’ emotional arousal plays an important part in the cognitive process of moral judgment (Buon et al., 2016). Incidental sensory states that have been previously aroused, regardless of valence, do not disappear when judging moral transgressions later (Cheng et al., 2013). Such an incidental emotional response to cuteness could influence the perception of events unrelated to the source of cuteness (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Shin & Mattila, 2021) and may magnify moral judgments, by leading people to view immoral behavior as more immoral (Avramova & Inbar, 2013).

We argue that people's incidental emotional reactions after exposure to cute stimuli influence their subsequent judgments of moral events. The observers who are exposed to cute stimuli would feel that they are, themselves, morally pure and will improve standards of moral judgment. Thus, we formulate the hypothesis in Experiment 1 that exposure to cute stimuli can lead individuals to judge moral transgressions more harshly (H1).

The moderating effect of socioeconomic status

In social judgments, the role of individual status has been recognized as significant (Hester & Gray, 2020). Researchers typically operationalize the status of the transgressor in moral judgments in terms of socioeconomic status (SES). The moderating effect of SES is related to the cognitive and emotional consequences of perceived cuteness.

On the one hand, the perception of disadvantage aligns with the cognitive consequences of cuteness, primarily derived from stereotypes associated with infants and young children. Infants and young children often evoke a sense of vulnerability and weakness due to their cuteness. Consequently, when cuteness perceptions are primed, individuals become more sensitive to disadvantaged entities. Similarly, cute objects inherently project an impression of vulnerability or weakness (Keating et al., 2003; Xu et al., 2019), and are often perceived as possessing relatively low physical, social, and intellectual abilities (Mcarthur & Apatow, 1984). This perception of vulnerability can heighten individuals’ sensitivity and attentiveness towards disadvantaged individuals after exposure to cute stimuli. Meanwhile, the cute object could also give off an impression of innocence, honesty, kindness, and warmth (Berry & Mcarthur, 1985). These two joint cognitive consequences, triggered by cute stimuli, may cause individuals to focus more on positive stereotypes associated with individuals of low SES, such as warmth, kindness, friendliness, trustworthiness, enthusiasm, and sincerity (Durante et al., 2017; Fiske et al., 2002). The striking contrast between this favorable impression and their immoral behavior may induce cognitive conflict and dissonance (Cooper, 2007, 2019; Festinger, 1957), which in turn may undermine people's support for the disadvantaged and lead them to make harsher moral judgments. In other words, it follows the adage, “the greater the expectation, the greater the disappointment” (Brockner et al., 1992). The cognitive consequences of cuteness perception will have a primary impact on disadvantaged groups. It implies that people will pay more attention to the positive qualities of disadvantaged individuals than to their disadvantaged situation. Therefore, we hypothesize that the cognitive dissonance brought about by the cuteness perception will cause individuals to make harsher moral judgments about the low SES (H2).

On the other hand, high SES groups are often negatively positioned in moral judgments. They are often stereotyped as morally deficient and are less likely to engage in prosocial behavior (Kraus et al., 2012; Piff et al., 2010; Piff & Robinson, 2017). According to the shifting standards model (Biernat, 2012; Biernat & Manis, 1994), people employ a dual criterion when making moral judgments about groups with stereotypes: confirmatory and minimum standards (Sawaoka et al., 2014). The confirmatory standard determines whether a stereotyped group possesses attributes consistent with the stereotype, setting a higher standard accordingly. Conversely, the minimum standard assesses whether the stereotyped group meets the general expectations’ minimum requirements, establishing a lower standard. When evaluating the moral attributes of high SES members, people tend to set higher confirmatory standards. Consequently, for the same immoral behavior, harsher moral judgments are often rendered against high SES groups (Jiang et al., 2023; Xu et al., 2020). However, expanding the moral circle of care is an important approach to reducing the bias in moral judgment (Sawaoka et al., 2014). By including high SES members within this moral circle, individuals apply minimum standards for moral judgment, resulting in more lenient judgments. As previously mentioned, cuteness, as a moral-emotional stimulus, has the potential to expand the moral circle (Machan, 2018; Sherman & Haidt, 2011). We formulate the hypothesis that cuteness perceptions can widen the moral circle of an individual, resulting in relatively lenient moral judgments for groups of high SES (H3).

Experiment 1: Examining the effect of cuteness perception on moral judgment

Experiment 1 employed a picture-priming paradigm and sought to test our main hypothesis (1) that exposure to cute images can make individuals judge moral transgressions more harshly.

Pilot study

Prior to the formal study, we recruited 84 volunteers (from the same school as the participants in the formal experiment, M_age = 21.63, SD = 3.01) for a pre-test to identify valid and appropriate experimental material based on past research (Nittono & Ihara, 2017; Ren et al., 2017; Shu et al., 2011).

First, we selected 70 cute pictures (including infants, animals, and animated characters) from the Internet based on the definition of cuteness described above (Xu et al., 2019). Then, 11 participants (five female) were selected to rate the cuteness levels of the 70 cute pictures on a 7-point scale, with 7 being very cute. We selected 50 pictures with mean scores significantly greater than the theoretical median of 4 (p = .018). We also selected 70 neutral pictures, which were common objects from everyday life (tables, chairs, books, teacups, etc.). The 16 participants (nine female) rated the 70 neutral pictures on a 7-point scale in terms of emotional valence (1 = very negative, 7 = very positive). The final 50 pictures selected had mean scores that did not differ significantly from the theoretical median of 4 (p = .14). Finally, a total of 100 pictures of cute and neutral objects were placed in random order (for examples see Figure 1). The 30 participants (19 female) rated the pictures on a 7-point scale, with higher scores representing stronger cute feelings when seeing the pictures. A paired-samples t-test of the results revealed a significant difference (p < .001) between the ratings for the cute pictures (M = 5.10, SD = 0.29) and the neutral pictures (M = 2.91, SD = 0.47), t = 21.64, 95% confidence intervals (CI) = [1.99, 2.41] d = 3.95.

Figure 1.
Examples of cute pictures (A) and neutral pictures (B).

In accordance with previous studies (Yang, 2013), we developed and revised the moral transgression story materials based on four criteria: (1) the morally transgressive behavior is considered unethical by most people; (2) the morally transgressive behavior does not cause physical harm to others; (3) it is frequent in real life; and (4) there are some situational factors that can explain the moral transgression. Based on major moral issues facing contemporary China (Yang, 2012), we compiled five moral stories related to honesty and fairness that were closely applicable to college students’ daily life (cheating, lying on one's resume, etc.; see Appendix 1). The 27 participants (16 female) were asked to rate the morality and correctness of the scenarios, which were randomly distributed among participants in paper-based form, on a 7-point scale. The lower the score, the more immoral the behavior in the story. Based on the results, we selected three types of immoral events: namely cheating on exams (M = 2.07, SD = 0.96), lying on one's resume (M = 2.00, SD = 1.07), and writing a paper on behalf of another person (M = 1.81, SD = 1.21). There was no significant difference in the degree of moral transgression between these three behaviors, F(1, 26) = 0.61, p = .18, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .001.

Participants

We used G∗Power (Faul et al., 2007) to perform an a priori power analysis for the difference between two independent means (two groups). After setting the relevant parameters (tails = two, effect size d = 0.8, α = 0.05, 1−β = 0.85, allocation ratio = 1), the calculations showed that 30 people per group was an appropriate sample size.

The 60 Chinese college students from a university in Fujian, China, were recruited via an ad to participate in a formal experiment. They were randomly assigned to the cute group (16 female; M_age = 20.63, SD = 2.23) or neutral group (14 female, M_age = 21.87, SD = 2.12). The participants had never participated in a similar experiment before and received financial compensation after the experiment.

Procedure

Experiment 1 had a completely randomized between-subject design: the independent variables were image-priming type (cute vs. neutral) and the dependent variable was the average moral judgment score for the three stories. The priming pictures were designed uniformly with a pixel size of 1000 × 1000 (300 ppi) in Photoshop. All materials, including the 100 pictures and three immoral stories, were presented in the form of PowerPoint files on a computer with a screen diagonal of 13.3 inches and a resolution of 1920 × 1080.

We divided this study into two parts: participants were asked to view and rate the images before performing the moral judgment task. All subjects were randomly assigned to either the cute or the neutral group. After entering the lab, participants first relaxed for five minutes in order to calm down. Before entering the formal experiment, the researcher told the participants that they would be completing two unrelated experimental tasks.

During the priming phase of the task, we told participants that this is a test of sensitivity to pictures’ cuteness. Participants would be viewing either cute or neutral pictures on the computer in turn (at five-second intervals) and would rate each picture on a seven-point scale (1 = very uncute, 7 = very cute) of cuteness. Then, in the moral judgment phase, the participants would read three moral stories in turn and rate the protagonist's behavior in the story on a 7-point scale (1 = very immoral, 7 = very moral).

Results and discussion

Manipulation check

The independent sample t-test was adopted to examine the cuteness ratings of the pictures between the two groups. Results showed that there are significant difference, cute group (M = 5.43, SD = 0.55) is significantly higher than the neutral group (M = 3.05, SD = 1.10), t (58) = 10.52, p < .001, d = 2.72. The results of repeated measures ANOVA of 2 (priming condition) × 3 (Vignette) showed that the main effect of three vignettes was not significant, F(2, 116) = .426, p = .654, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .007, nor was the interaction, F (2, 116) = .942, p = .393, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .016. Therefore, the results of the moral judgments of the three vignettes were aggregated for subsequent data analysis.

Analysis of differences in moral judgment

The independent sample t-test was used to analyze the difference of moral judgment between the two groups. Results showed that there was significant difference in moral judgment scores between the cute group and the neutral group. The score in the cute group (M = 2.22, SD = 1.08) was significantly lower than that in the neutral group (M = 3.34, SD = 1.86), indicating that participants in cute group were more severe in judging immoral events, t (58) = −2.85, p = .006, 95% CI = [−1.91, −0.33], d = 0.74.

The results reveal a link between cuteness perception and moral judgments. After exposure to incidental cuteness stimuli in the environment, individuals develop harsher moral judgments about immoral behavior.

Experiment 2: Examining the interaction between cuteness perception and socioeconomic status

From Experiment 1, we can draw a preliminary conclusion: after cuteness priming, individuals make more severe moral judgments of moral transgressions. The next question to be explored is whether this effect is moderated by the SES of the moral transgressor. We created a between-subjects design in Experiment 2 and predicted that participants would make harsher moral judgment for the low SES but make lenient moral judgment for the high SES after viewing the cute pictures.

Participants

Based on the moderate effect sizes derived from previous studies, we calculated the appropriate subject size as 141 by G∗Power based on the relevant parameters (Effect size f = 0.3, α = 0.05, 1−β = 0.85, group = 4). The 145 participants were recruited via advertisement (female = 89; M_age = 21.02, SD = 2.43) and are from the same school as Experiment 1, but none of them participated in the previous Experiment 1. Experiment 2 taking a 2 (priming types: cute vs. neutral) × 2 (socioeconomic status: advantaged vs. disadvantaged) two-factors experimental design. All participants randomly allocated to four groups: neutral/disadvantaged group (n = 36; neutral/disadvantaged group (n = 38); cuteness/disadvantaged group (n = 35); cuteness/advantaged group (n = 36).

Procedure

Experiment 2 utilized the same picture priming paradigm as Experiment 1. Based on Experiment 1, we added advantaged and disadvantaged background information for the protagonist of the moral events (see Appendix 2). For example, the advantaged SES is described as: Li Hua, a college student, is from the urban area of this city. His parents are in business, and his family conditions are excellent; the disadvantaged socioeconomic status is described as: Li Hua, a college student, comes from poor rural areas, and his parents are farmers.

The picture materials are the same as Experiment 1. And as in Experiment 1, the procedures were divided into a picture scoring phase and a moral judgment phase. Each material is followed by two 7-point scoring questions, which are: 1. How would you rate the morality of Lihua's actions in the vignette? (1 = very immoral, 7 = very moral); 2. Do you think the socioeconomic status of Lihua in the vignette? (1 = very disadvantaged, 7 = very advantaged).

Results

Manipulation check

Independent sample t-test was adopted to examine the priming effect.² There was a significant difference between the advantaged group (M = 4.88, SD = 1.27) and disadvantaged group (M = 3.23, SD = 1.03) regarding their perceived disadvantage condition indicating that the socioeconomic status manipulation was successful, t (143) = 8.57, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.27, 2.03], d = 1.42. There was significance difference between the cute group (M = 5.32, SD = 0.71) and the neutral group (M = 1.66, SD = 0.67) on picture scores, t (143) = 31.94, p < .001, d = 5.31, but there was no significant difference on SES judgement, t (143) = 1.76, p = .08, d = .293. This suggests that the picture-priming manipulation was successful and had no significant effect on judgments of SES.

The results of repeated measures ANOVA of 2 (priming condition) × 3 (vignette) showed that the main effect of three vignettes was not significant, F(2, 286) = .504, p = .605, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .004, nor was the interaction, F(2, 286) = 1.604, p = .203, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .011. The results of repeated measures ANOVA of 2 (socioeconomic status) × 3 (vignette) showed that the main effect of three vignettes was not significant, F(2, 286) = .52, p = .595, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .004, nor was the interaction, F(2, 286) = .955, p = .386, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .007. Therefore, the results of the moral judgments of the three vignettes were aggregated for subsequent data analysis.

Interaction analysis

The priming type and SES were used as independent variables, and the moral judgment was used as dependent variable for ANOVA. The result showed that there were no significant main effects of priming type and SES, F(1, 141) = .89, p = .347, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .006, 95% CI = [−.162, .457]; F(1, 141) = .17, p = .682, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .001, 95% CI = [−.245, .374], but there were significant effects on the interaction between priming type and SES, F(1, 141) = 14.74, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .10 (see Figure 2).

Figure 2.
The interaction between priming type and socioeconomic status in Experiment 2.

Simple effect analysis found that the score of moral judgments of priming by cute pictures (M = 2.56, SD = .16) were significantly higher than by neutral pictures (M = 1.81, SD = .15) in the advantaged group, F(1, 141) = 11.68, p < .001, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .076, 95% CI = [.315, 1.182]. On the contrary, the score of moral judgments of priming by neutral pictures (M = 2.47, SD = .16) was significantly higher than by cute pictures (M = 2.02, SD = .16) in the disadvantaged group, F(1, 141) = 4.11, p = .045, $η_{p}^{2}$ = .028, 95% CI = [.011, .895]. The results suggest that individuals are not more supportive of the disadvantaged but judge their morality more harshly after being primed with cuteness perceptions.

General discussion

Cuteness is a very popular and positive element in contemporary society, especially among young people. Cuteness culture has penetrated into everyday communication, advertising, and literary and artistic works, affecting almost every aspect of people's lives. Thus, incidental exposure to cuteness cues is unavoidable. Although researchers have identified a link between cuteness and morality, previous studies have focused more on how cuteness perceptions influence viewers’ own moral behavior. The present study focused on how incidental cuteness perceptions influence moral judgments. Based on the effects of cuteness on emotions and cognition, we performed two experiments to examine the differences in moral judgments made by individuals after viewing cute and neutral pictures. The results of this study demonstrate that individuals judge immoral behavior more harshly when they are primed with cute pictures unrelated to the moral transgression, validating H1. Moreover, these harsh moral judgments were more pronounced when moral transgressors had a disadvantaged status, confirming H2. Our results could further validate the link between cuteness and morality. Additionally, sense of cuteness can be considered a special emotion related to morality, leading to make a leniency moral judgment for the advantaged, confirming H3. We discuss the results of the present study based on the results of previous studies (Ren et al., 2017; Shin & Mattila, 2021) and the theoretical model of emotion and moral judgment (Avramova & Inbar, 2013; Buon et al., 2016).

On the one hand, in line with previous research indicating that exposure to cute stimuli induces broadly defined positive emotions (Nittono & Ihara, 2017), our results are consistent with the social intuition model of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001, 2007). As with other elicited emotions (e.g., excitement, enjoyment), individuals may develop certain cognitive biases about immoral events after induction to cute emotions via incidental picture cues. Such biases increase individuals’ dissatisfaction with the object of moral judgment and reinforce the perception of immoral behavior (Cheng et al., 2013). Viewing cute pictures promotes positive emotions such as love, warmth, and tenderness, which warm the human heart, stimulate empathy, and elicit the instinct of kindness (Ren et al., 2017). According to excitation transfer theory (Zillmann, 1971), these emotions and motivations can spill over to situations unrelated to the picture, which may lead to harsher blame for a moral transgression (Avramova & Inbar, 2013; Horberg et al., 2011). Furthermore, the results of this study provide further support that cuteness perception is an emotion associated with moral purity. Exposure to cute stimuli may put individuals in a psychological state of moral purity. In such a state, a person would think of themselves as clean from a moral standpoint, and thus feel virtuous (Gino & Desai, 2012). It is only by taking a more critical and harsher attitude toward moral transgressions committed by others that they can demonstrate their kindness.

On the other hand, individuals did not show more tolerance in their moral judgments of disadvantaged transgressors after exposure to cute stimuli—they were actually harsher. This suggests that the unfavorable position of the disadvantaged did not inspire sympathy or understanding among the moral judges. As discussed earlier, incidentally viewing cute pictures may prime individuals’ positive impressions of the disadvantaged, including such attributes as caring, enthusiastic, and virtuous. Cognitive dissonance occurs when negative events conflict with this positive impression of vulnerable groups, leaving individuals in a state of psychological tension (Festinger, 1957). In order to alleviate the cognitive dissonance caused by inconsistent impressions, we try to restore balance by changing our existing cognitions, adding new ones, changing the importance of different perceptions, changing our behaviors, and so on (Cooper, 2007, 2019). When the disadvantaged engage in immoral behaviors, this is inconsistent with our positive cognition of them and thus threatens our kind beliefs primed by the cute pictures. Thus, individuals may adjust their perceptions and assume that the disadvantaged transgressor is inherently immoral. To maintain their belief in kindness and reduce cognitive dissonance, individuals have to be more critical and punitive to the disadvantaged. In contrast, moral cognitive expectations of individuals towards high SES groups inherently tend to be low and do not engender cognitive dissonance. Rather, moral judgments concerning these groups are primarily shaped by the emotional consequences stemming from perceptions of cuteness. Cuteness, regarded as a morally relevant emotion, carries the emotional outcome of broadening an individual's moral circle (Machan, 2018; Sherman & Haidt, 2011). This outcome, in turn, diminishes the moral standards set for the advantaged, thereby prompting individuals to adopt the minimum standard for their moral evaluations (Sawaoka et al., 2014). Consequently, individuals may exhibit greater tolerance and leniency towards the moral judgments made concerning high SES groups.

In conclusion, the perception of cuteness exerts a substantial influence on individuals’ moral appraisals. It has the potential to magnify severe criticism against low SES groups while concurrently diminishing the moral expectations placed upon high SES groups. It is important to acknowledge the multifaceted nature of this effect, underscoring the necessity for further research to elucidate the specific mechanisms through which emotions related to cuteness impact moral judgments. This enhanced understanding will facilitate the development of strategies to better comprehend, manage, and channel the effects stemming from the perception of cuteness.

Limitations and directions for future research

This study also has some shortcomings that limit the interpretability of the results. We should be cautious about generalizing the results to judgments of other moral behaviors, as the moral vignettes used in this study only involved cheating behavior. Other immoral behaviors and domains, such as lying, stealing, and gossiping, are also of interest to researchers (Ellemers et al., 2019; Haidt et al., 2003). Moreover, moral research encompasses many other areas that can be studied using the priming paradigm, such as fairness, cooperation, normative behavior, and moral dilemmas. Furthermore, the focal variables in this study were all measured with single items, and some items that would provide supporting information are lacking. For example, other emotional states (e.g., pleasantness, excitation, and approach motivation) could be assessed during or after the picture-rating task (Yoshikawa et al., 2020; Yoshikawa & Masaki, 2021). Some questions could also be added about moral judgments, such as judgments about the correctness of the protagonist's behavior and whether the punishment for the transgressor should be increased. More importantly, cognitive judgments about the disadvantaged can also be assessed.

This study raises several questions that should be further explored in future research. Firstly, the priming material only consisted of pictures and did not differentiate between various types of cute objects depicted in the pictures. Therefore, subsequent studies could improve the priming technique by incorporating a wider range of cute objects, such as object with whimsical cuteness (Nenkov & Scott, 2014). It's also crucial to investigate the impact of different sources of cuteness priming, such as cute babies, baby-faced adults, small animals, and inanimate objects, to gain a comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon (Nittono & Ihara, 2017). Moreover, researchers should consider incorporating various priming methods, including video, audio, and picture priming, as well as suprathreshold and subthreshold priming, to explore the potential nuances and variations in cuteness priming (Shin & Mattila, 2021).

Secondly, the mechanisms that link the perception of cuteness to moral judgment remain a mystery to us. It is crucial to conduct further investigations into additional factors such as mediators, moderators, and neurophysiological mechanisms. We can't neglect to take into account the impact of individual differences on the perception of cuteness. For instance, prior research has indicated that variables like gender (Lobmaier et al., 2010), age (Sprengelmeyer et al., 2009), individual traits (Carroll et al., 2020; Lehmann et al., 2013), and cultural background (Zheng et al., 2016) could potentially exert an influence on the perception of cuteness. Further evaluation of the mediating effects of emotion (such as empathy and sympathy) and cognition is necessary to understand the impact of perceiving cuteness on moral judgments. This requires a comprehensive exploration and understanding of these factors to gain deeper insights into the relationship between cuteness and moral judgment.

Finally, the picture paradigm was employed to evoke participants’ perception of cuteness. However, it is important to note that the participants’ emotional response to the cute pictures was incidental and not based on perceiving the moral transgressors themselves as cute. Future research could investigate variances in moral judgments when individuals with different degrees of cuteness, such as those with baby-faces, are considered as moral transgressors. Additionally, it would be interesting to explore how the influence of baby-faces as an attractive characteristic (Berry & Mcarthur, 1985; Zebrowitz et al., 1993) compares to other attractive characteristics, like beauty, in terms of their impact on moral judgments. Attractiveness has been shown to shape perceptions of vanity, leading to the belief that more attractive individuals are less moral and more immoral (Han & Laurent, 2022). Therefore, it is worth further exploration to determine whether baby-faced (cute) features also play a role in shaping people's moral judgments.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the participating students who voluntarily participated in the study. Thanks to Jiang Yi, Zhao Xin, Xin Cong, Zong Zhaobiao, Luo Yuan, and Zhang Yuanjun for their valuable comments on paper revision. We also thank the editor and reviewers for their hard work in reviewing and comments.

Ethical statements

The study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of Fujian Normal University, Fujian Province, China. All the procedures performed in the studies involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.

Data and material availability

All data have been presented in the article and appendices. The datasets and pictures generated for this study are available on request to the first author. The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Zhicong Zhang

Notes

Appendix

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Viewing cute pictures can influence judgment of moral transgressions

Abstract

Keywords

Theoretical background

Cuteness affects judgments of transgressive events

The influence of cuteness on emotion

The moderating effect of socioeconomic status

Experiment 1: Examining the effect of cuteness perception on moral judgment

Pilot study

Participants

Procedure

Results and discussion

Manipulation check

Analysis of differences in moral judgment

Experiment 2: Examining the interaction between cuteness perception and socioeconomic status

Participants

Procedure

Results

Manipulation check

Interaction analysis

General discussion

Limitations and directions for future research

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

Ethical statements

Data and material availability

Declaration of conflicting interests

Funding

ORCID iD

Notes

Appendix

References