The ethics of migration in the long run

Abstract

In the contemporary ethics of immigration, the “conventional view” is often assumed to be restrictionist: the claim that states have a moral right to control immigration. But has this view always been considered “conventional”? A review of major political theories on human mobility and political power, from the 16th to the18th century, suggests not. The restrictionist view on immigration was far from being the “conventional view.” Instead, freedom of movement was supported across a wide range of political theories, both rights-based and consequentialist. During the 16th–17th centuries, denying innocent people their freedom of movement was seen as an injustice, an unjustified hostility, and therefore a potential justification for retaliating with war. In the 17th–18th centuries, sovereigns were commonly advised to attract immigrants and discourage emigration. Consequentialist arguments drawn from mercantilism, physiocracy, and classical economics often favoured liberal mobility policies. The rediscovery of this intellectual history challenges the assumption that immigration control is the natural or default starting point for normative debate. It demonstrates both that restrictionism is a historically contingent and relatively recent position, and that freedom of movement is a topic that has been strikingly neglected in contemporary political theory.