Arguing and bargaining in international forums: The need for a novel approach

Abstract

Most of the literature examining forum-based social interactions considers arguing and bargaining as the main modes of communication used by negotiating parties, and authors have often claimed that arguing interactions can be distinguished from bargaining ones on the basis of the presence/absence of some validation mechanisms. Starting from this assumption, authors have tried to study real-world international negotiations and to distinguish arguing from bargaining empirically. These attempts, however, have encountered several paralyzing methodological hindrances. This paper claims that the current differentiation between arguing and bargaining is built on erroneous assumptions and on a certain degree of undertheorization of bargaining types of forum interaction. The position advanced in this paper is that both arguing and bargaining types of interaction rely on similar validation mechanisms. Furthermore, the study shows that this erroneous distinction is the reason why authors have hitherto been unable to isolate and distinguish arguing from bargaining while looking at real-world international negotiations. The final goal of this paper is to challenge the current definitions of arguing and bargaining, and to provide the first step of a long-term research project aiming at the reconceptualization of these two types of interaction.

Introduction

International forums are the main instrument by which states address joint problems of global politics. Above all, forums are places of dialogue, “interactive processes” (Kotzian, 2007: 80) in which delegates meet and communicate through verbal and non-verbal language conveying their concerns, sharing their views, and attempting to reach an agreement. All concerns, hopes, promises and threats made during the forum are expressed by single acts of speech, which can be different from each other. Different acts of speech convey different types of interaction. For example, a delegate can persuade another that a particular choice is fairest; someone can coerce others to make a specific decision by threatening them, and so on.

Researchers have approached the study of international forums in different ways, depending on the questions they wanted to answer. However, here is argued that the primary way to answer some research questions is to ensure that the vast sea encompassing everything uttered during the forum is separated and delimited into single acts of speech, and that those acts of speech are systematically categorized according to the type of interaction they convey. ¹

How can decision-making procedures influence the way delegates interact during negotiations? Does the predominance of particular interactions influence the output of the forum? To what extent is true that certain political regimes often resort to specific types of interaction over others when negotiating? These critical questions, and many more, can be answered only by systematically comparing between different types of international forums. Such comparison is possible only if one systematically categorizes the different types of statements delegates made during the negotiation. Being able to categorize in a systematic way each act of speech according to the interaction it conveys allows us to assess the frequency with which one type of interaction occurred during a forum, and, in turn, this allows researchers to compare the frequencies of certain types of behavior in different forums. This comparative process would then help assess with greater clarity and reliability whether, for instance, delegates interact differently in a forum where decisions are taken through consensus than in a forum where decisions are taken by majority; or whether democratic countries tend to act differently than authoritarian ones during the same international forums. It is then possible to see that building a method of forum’s statements categorization, that can be empirically tested and implemented reliably and validly, would significantly help in cross-case comparison of different inter-state negotiations.

According to most of the literature examining forum-based social interactions, arguing and bargaining are the main modes of communication used by negotiating parties (Bang, 2021: 222). Most authors have claimed that arguing statements can be effective only if they rely on certain validation mechanisms (Ulbert and Risse, 2005: 353), that in this paper will be defined as empirical, normative and contextual validation mechanisms. Conversely, bargaining is often defined as the strategic display of promises and threats, and as a type of interaction that does not rely on validation mechanisms (Ulbert and Risse, 2005: 353). Starting from this assumption, authors have tried to study real-world negotiations and to distinguish arguing from bargaining empirically. Their attempts, however, have encountered several paralyzing methodological hindrances.

This paper claims that the first step in order to build a reliable method of categorization of international forum statements is to test whether such a method can be theoretically based on the current ways arguing and bargaining are defined. The position of this paper is that the current differentiation between arguing and bargaining—a differentiation based on the presence/absence of validation mechanisms—is built on erroneous assumptions, and that both arguing and bargaining rely on similar validation mechanisms. Furthermore, the study shows that this erroneous distinction is the reason why authors have been hitherto unable to isolate and distinguish arguing from bargaining while looking at real-world inter-state negotiations. The objective of this paper is to highlight the problems laying within current definitions of arguing and bargaining, in order to open up space for a research agenda aiming at their redefinition. Such a research project stems from the conviction that more nuanced definitions of arguing and bargaining would provide a clearer and more reliable method of categorization of forum statements, enabling the discipline to gain greater knowledge over the dynamics regulating international negotiations.

The first section will examine how arguing and bargaining have been defined in the literature, and the difficulties encountered by authors when trying to distinguish one from the other empirically. The following section will analyze the validation mechanisms that arguing relies upon, distinguishing between empirical, normative and contextual validation mechanisms; furthermore, the section will also explain why bargaining is defined as a type of interaction that does not rely on validation mechanisms. The third, fourth and fifth sections will examine ideal-typical statements of arguing and bargaining, while claiming that the existing distinction between arguing and bargaining relies on erroneous assumptions, and that a more in-depth analysis of bargaining types of interaction is needed; in the fourth and the fifth sections, the dialogue between Melians and Athenians will be used in order to support the claim. Finally, the conclusion will explore considerations which in future works might lead to a redefinition of arguing and bargaining, aiming to overcome current problematics and to provide sounder bases for the construction of a reliable method of categorization of international forum statements.

The omnipresence and ineffability of arguing

Scholars examining social interactions within international forums have often claimed that diplomatic delegates negotiate through two main modes of communication: arguing and bargaining (Bang, 2021: 222). Arguing is usually defined as an interaction by which a speaker attempts to convince a listener based on reliable empirical evidence (Ulbert and Risse, 2005: 361) and/or ethical considerations (Müller, 2004: 397). ² It is described as “truth-seeking [behavior] with the aim of reaching a mutual understanding based on a reasoned consensus” (Risse, 2000: 2) ³ and an attempt to change the preferences of forum participants and persuade them through the logic of the “better argument” (Hanrieder, 2011: 43; Saretzki, 2009: 158). ⁴ On the other hand, the literature defines bargaining as a type of interaction that attempts to reach a specific outcome through the strategic display of promises and threats (Müller, 2004: 397; Saretzki, 2009: 162). While most of the literature agrees that arguing and bargaining are the two predominant interactions occurring within international forums, any attempt to isolate and distinguish the former from the latter while looking at real-world international negotiations was hindered by seemingly insurmountable obstacles.

Nicole Deitelhoff and Harald Müller, for example, carried on the most comprehensive attempt to isolate and identify these interactions within inter-state negotiations. At the end of their study, the two authors claimed that, although most of the forums they examined presented features suggesting the presence of arguing, they were unable to isolate the precise moment during negotiations in which arguing occurred (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005: 170–171). Moreover, they found it impossible to distinguish arguing from bargaining because every forum interaction seemed to contain some degree of both (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005: 177). This was a puzzling research outcome. On the one hand, arguing seemed ineffable, and it was impossible to identify moments within forums in which arguing interactions took place precisely. On the other hand, arguing was an omnipresent feature in negotiations since almost every interaction contained some degree of reason-giving usually associated with it. Deitelhoff and Müller concluded that “arguing could not be isolated empirically from bargaining” and that, at the same time, “arguing was ubiquitous in international relations” (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005: 171).

Deitelhoff’s and Müller’s study highlights the awkward position in which the literature concerning social interactions within international forums finds itself. First, most authors still identify arguing and bargaining as the main types of interaction that diplomatic delegates use during negotiations (Bang, 2021: 222). Second, the theoretical models they envision are often empirically inapplicable because authors encounter several difficulties distinguishing arguing from bargaining when examining real-world negotiations (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005; Krebs and Jackson, 2007).

Another important attempt to distinguish arguing from bargaining, this time examining negotiations occurring in domestic politics, was undertaken by Katharina Holzinger (Holzinger, 2004, 2005). Holzinger’s mode of categorization built on Searle’s speech act theory (Holzinger, 2004: 204–205), and it filtered negotiations transcripts through a coding scheme categorizing statements on the basis of certain “performative verbs” (Holzinger, 2004: 207–209). There are certain, undeniable merits to this work; for instance, Holzinger’s paper is one of the first realizing that “bargaining and arguing can only be clearly distinguished at the level of individual utterances and speech acts” (Holzinger, 2004: 196). However, her approach is methodologically inapplicable to the study of a very large majority of international forums. Indeed, to implement Holzinger’s method of categorization one should have access to forum sessions’ negotiation transcripts (Holzinger, 2004: 205–215). While this is not such a restrictive precondition while analyzing domestic politics forums, it becomes an insurmountable hindrance when examining international forums, since integral transcripts of inter-state negotiations are very rarely available. ⁵ Another issue with Holzinger’s model is that it is based on the pre-assumption that arguing is the only type of interaction that relies on reason-giving mechanisms (Holzinger, 2004: 197–198). ⁶ Thus, similarly to other authors within the literature (Saretzki, 2009; Ulbert and Risse, 2005), Holzinger assumes that bargaining does not rely on reason-giving—or validation mechanisms—and that when bargaining claims are justified through reason-giving, one is actually witnessing to the use of arguing in support of bargaining statements (Holzinger, 2004: 199–203). This paper, however, claims that before attempting to build a method of categorization based on this presupposition it is necessary to examine arguing and bargaining interactions in greater detail, and test whether such presupposition should be maintained or not.

Aside from Holzinger’s case, after Deitelhoff’s and Müller’s paper most of the literature has developed in two directions. Some authors have tried to identify new types of forum interaction, different from arguing and bargaining (Bang, 2021); while other researchers have ceased attempting to identify arguing empirically and instead have started focusing on the various factors within international forums that could encourage its usage (Risse and Kleine, 2010). This paper argues that recent developments in the literature need to be revisited. It is necessary to review how the practices of arguing and bargaining are defined and distinguished, in order to detect the causes behind their empirical intractability within the study of international negotiations. Indeed, conceptualizing new types of forum interaction without previously understanding the grounds of the empirical undetectability of arguing and bargaining might lead once again to create theoretical models that are not empirically applicable. Conversely, renouncing the attempt to develop an empirically detectable definition of arguing and looking for features that promote arguing within inter-state negotiations can be equally problematic. Indeed, how can researchers understand what triggers arguing or makes it practical without a theory allowing precise detection of that interaction on an empirical level? The objective of this paper is, therefore, to review the ways arguing and bargaining have been conceptualized, highlight the reasons behind arguing’s empirical “ineffability” and “omnipresence,” address the flaws of the current definitions of these two types of interaction, and outline a long-term research agenda aimed at “re-defining” the practices and dynamics of arguing and bargaining.

Arguing and bargaining: A problematic distinction

Arguing interactions have often been defined as empirical and normative statements that “are made with the claim of being valid” (Saretzki, 2009: 162), while bargaining interactions have been described as strategic displays of empirical demands, promises, and threats (Müller, 2004: 397). If these definitions are accepted, it can be concluded that arguing relies on certain validation mechanisms, while bargaining does not. Most of the literature maintains that arguing claims can be validated on either empirical or normative bases (Johnston, 2001: 496–498). Empirical validation is established by providing reliable, previously-established knowledge (Saretzki, 2009: 167)—for instance, scientific evidence (Ulbert and Risse, 2005: 361)—that demonstrates the truthfulness of the statements made (Müller, 2004: 397). Normative validation—that is, the claim that the speaker is upholding ethical and moral principles—can be established by assessing the impartiality and consistency of the speaker (Saretzki, 2009: 167). Finally, arguing claims find validation by appealing to the credibility of the speaker: subjects that have proved in the past to be both competent and truthful have more chances to deliver a persuasive arguing statement because they will be considered trustworthy (Ulbert and Risse, 2005: 359–360).

From this brief overview, it can be agreed that arguing is generally conceived as a type of interaction that can rely on three different validation mechanisms: empirical, normative, and contextual. Arguing actors rely on empirical validity when they try to convince interlocutors—through assertions backed by empirical and reliable evidence—that they are telling the truth. On the other hand, arguing interactions claiming to be based on ethical and moral considerations rely on normative validity. Finally, interactions claiming to be valid because the speaker has proved to be trustworthy in the past—or because a certain statement is the most coherent to make given the present context—are examples of arguing that seeks contextual validation.

However, these validation mechanisms can exist only in presence of an “external authority” which is accepted by both the speaker and the listener (Saretzki, 2009: 163). Indeed, empirical evidence can be considered reliable only if there is a shared understanding of what is reliable and what is not. Similarly, normative validity can be assessed only if there is a common frame of reference that establishes what is ethical and what is not. Contextual validation mechanisms can take place only if there is a shared understanding of the context in which interlocutors are in. This external authority allowing the existence of a common frame of reference can be found in “agreed-upon treaties, universally held norms, scientific evidence, [. . .] other forms of consensual knowledge” or, in “special” cases, in a public witnessing to negotiations (Ulbert and Risse, 2005: 353). Since arguing is a type of interaction that requires three different elements—a speaker, a listener, and a certain type of external authority—arguing has been considered a structurally triadic interaction (Saretzki, 2009: 162). Finally, the presence of both validation mechanisms and a triadic structure has led most authors to conclude that arguing interactions are procedurally reflexive (Ulbert and Risse, 2005: 353). In fact, if arguing claims attempt to prove their validity by appealing to a certain external authority, an arguing interaction is likely to be characterized by a constant back-and-forth between interlocutors in the attempt to assess and establish the validity of each claim.

Bargaining interactions have been defined as the strategic display of promises and threats. For this reason, they are seen as speech acts that do not need to be validated. According to existing definitions, bargaining claims base their effectiveness not on their validity, but uniquely on their credibility—that is, on the likelihood that the promises and threats made will be enacted in the future (Saretzki, 2009: 158). Since bargaining speech acts do not rely on mechanisms of validation, they do not need the presence of a mutually accepted external authority to assess their validity. This means that bargaining is considered to be structurally dyadic, since it is an interaction that requires only two elements: a speaker and a listener (Ulbert and Risse, 2005: 353). Finally, the lack of both validation mechanisms and common frames of reference entail that bargaining statements are not characterized by any back-and-forth between interlocutors. In other words, bargaining is a procedurally sequential type of interaction rather than a reflexive one (Ulbert and Risse, 2005: 353).

To summarize, the existing literature considers arguing interactions as claims that rely on empirical and/or normative and/or contextual validity, and that are structurally triadic and procedurally reflexive. On the other hand, bargaining speech acts are defined as claims that do not rely on validation mechanisms and are therefore structurally dyadic and procedurally sequential. This paper argues that this traditional way of distinguishing arguing and bargaining is erroneous, that the problematic nature of current distinctions is mainly caused by a certain level of undertheorization of bargaining, and that the flaws in current definitions of arguing and bargaining are the reason why authors have encountered hindrances when trying to isolate and categorize these two types of interaction within real-world negotiations.

The hypothesis advanced by this paper is threefold. First, bargaining interactions, like arguing ones, rely on empirical, normative and contextual validation mechanisms. Second, the existence of validation mechanisms in bargaining interactions implies that the latter can only occur in presence of an external authority functioning as a common frame of reference. This means that bargaining, like arguing, is a structurally triadic type of interaction. Third, the presence of validation mechanisms and of a triadic structure entails that bargaining interactions are procedurally reflexive, in the same way arguing statements are.

Validation mechanisms in promise-based bargaining

This section and the following assess the claim that bargaining interactions rely on validation mechanisms, are characterized by a triadic structure and can be described as procedurally reflexive. Thus, both sections will mainly focus on bargaining. The reason is that, while previous authors have extensively analyzed arguing’s validation mechanisms, bargaining has often been described as the mere strategic display of promises and threats. This paper maintains that a closer and more in-depth analysis of bargaining interactions will show that they, like arguing ones, are also based on empirical, normative and contextual validation mechanisms.

The first thing that it is crucial to address is how, at first glance, promising and threatening seem very different concepts. John Odell echoes this view when he writes that definitions of bargaining in IR are problematic, since they merge coercive elements such as threats and reason-giving elements such as promising (Odell, 2010: 628). Promise-based and threat-based bargaining need, therefore, to be examined separately.

Promise-based bargaining can be depicted by the following, ideal-typical statement:

[Subject A tells B: “If you do X, I promise I will do Y for you.”]

For this offer to be well-received by B, the promise needs to be credible: B needs to believe that Y will likely take place in the future (Saretzki, 2009: 158). Credibility, however, is not the only attribute that A’s promise requires to be convincing. A is promising something to B to change B’s behavior. However, B’s behavior can only be changed if A demonstrates that Y in exchange of X would be advantageous for B. This consideration, however, challenges the claims according to which bargaining is a structurally dyadic interaction that does not rely on validation mechanisms.

Indeed, A can try to convince B of the displayed promise’s convenience only by appealing to sources both actors recognize as valid—there could be, for example, scientific, reliable evidence showing that Y in exchange for X is advantageous for B. In other words, A’s promise needs to rely on some form of mutually accepted knowledge demonstrating that doing X for Y is in B’s interest. The conclusion is that promise-based bargaining statements can be effective only if they rely on a form of empirical validity, assessed through a common frame of reference. This in turn would imply that, similarly to arguing interactions, the empirical validity of a bargaining statement can only be assessed in presence of a “mutually accepted external authority” (Ulbert and Risse, 2005: 353).

At this point, someone could advance the following critique: “the fact that a speech act casting a promise is later followed by other speech acts illustrating why the promise made is advantageous does not necessarily imply that bargaining is relying on validation mechanisms.” To address this critique, it is necessary to examine another, ideal-typical example.

[Subject A tells B: “If you do X, I promise I will do Y for you. The deal proposed is advantageous to you because Z”].

In this example, one could observe that while the first sentence—a promise—could be categorized as bargaining, the second sentence—which explains why the promise is advantageous—might instead be categorized as arguing. This would be in line with the assumption that arguing speech acts are used to support bargaining ones, but that this does not imply that bargaining relies on arguing’s mechanisms of validation (Holzinger, 2004: 207). It is however important to point out that validation mechanisms inherent to promises or threats do not necessarily need to be made explicit in subsequent interactions. Validation mechanisms can in fact also be implicitly present. When promising something, the speaker can automatically imply that the promise is advantageous. ⁷

There is another important consideration to make. Earlier sections have shown that the literature generally assumes that arguing statements rely on normative validity by appealing to certain moral principles (Müller, 2004: 397). However, normative validity may not necessarily be a feature that is present only in arguing speech acts. Indeed, empirical studies have often shown that, during international forums, actors who blatantly admit to act to maximize their own gains are most likely to be isolated and marginalized (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005: 171). One could then argue that bargaining statements must rely on some form of normative validity, which usually coincide with the defense of the national interest in the context of state interactions.

Indeed, actors participating in an international forum are states’ representatives, with the mandate of defending and protecting their government and people. In democracies, the government or the administration is legitimized by national elections, and the first duty of state representatives is “to implement the dutiful role of defending the will of the people in their countries” (Müller, 2004: 415). The logic is not very different in the case of authoritarian states: the Communist Party of China, for instance, traditionally legitimizes its power and authority by claiming to be the promoter of China’s wealth and prosperity, and the defender of the country’s unity and independence (Zheng, 2004: 51–56). While some might argue that considering the defense of the national interest as a base for normative validity might be problematic, actors participating in a forum could respond that protecting national security and their citizens is an ethical, objective and absolute duty to be observed by all forum participants. To quote Müller: “Diplomats are expected by their peers and their supervisors to represent the interests of their country. Representing faithfully and loyally views and interests is the very diplomatic identity [. . .]. There is nothing sinister about this” (Müller, 2004: 415). Furthermore, the fact that promotion and representation of national interest is considered to be “a universally held norm” grounds any normative validity of bargaining in a mutually accepted external authority, and therefore in a triadic interactional structure.

Getting back to the previously examined, ideal-typical promise-based bargaining statement:

[Subject A tells B: “If you do X, I promise I will do Y for you”].

In promising Y, A attempts to show that Y is advantageous to B by appealing, as previously shown, to some type of empirical validity, and it does so by referring to some mutually accepted external authority. By providing reliable evidence confirming the advantageousness of Y, A might also be trying to convince B that sealing this deal would be in B’s national interest. Bargaining interactions, therefore, equate the morality of a certain policy with its conformity with the national interest. Starting from this assumption, it is possible to claim that bargaining interactions rely on normative validity. ⁸

Finally, it has previously been said that subjects using arguing statements might attempt to validate their claims based on contextual validity, by showing how their proposals are consistent with past behavior and the general context in which actors are. Similarly, this section has already explained how, for bargaining claims to be accepted, the promises made must be credible and likely to take place in the future. Therefore, when A promises Y to B in exchange for X, not only has A to prove that Y is advantageous for B (empirical validity), or that doing X for Y would promote B’s national interest (normative validity), but also that Y is a credible promise (contextual validity).

Validation mechanisms in threat-based bargaining

Promise-based bargaining needs to rely on empirical, normative, and contextual validation mechanisms in order to be effective, and it needs to rely on a mutually accepted external authority that would work as a shared frame of reference in which to assess the effectiveness of such validation mechanisms. To what extent can we claim that threat-based bargaining follows a similar dynamic? The following ideal-typical statement could describe threat-based bargaining:

[A tells B: “If you do not do X, I threaten that I will do Y to you”].

A is using a threat to change B’s behavior. A’s threat does not aim to convince B that X would lead to a situation preferable to the status quo. The interaction described above is not focused on finding common gains; it is instead an attempt to coerce B to do something against B’s will. On a closer look, however, it is possible to claim that, even when making a threat, A is taking into account B’s preferences, and engages in an interaction relying on empirical, normative and contextual validation mechanisms.

Indeed, for the threat to be effective, A must convince B that Y is against B’s interests, and that it is empirically advantageous for B to do X, avoiding the damage that Y presents (empirical validity). Furthermore, A can only show that to B by providing reliable evidence and using external authority as a common frame of reference. While threatening B, A could rely, for instance, on scientific evidence—or any form of mutually accepted knowledge—to prove why the threat is so ominous for B. Similarly, B needs to be convinced that doing X in order to avoid Y is in B’s national interest, and that, consequently, B’s moral duty is to do X (normative validity). ⁹ Finally, A’s threat is effective only if there is evidence that the threat will be enacted if necessary (contextual validity). Threat-based bargaining, then, is also an interaction that relies on empirical, normative, and contextual validation mechanisms. Such validation mechanisms need to be assessed through a commonly accepted external authority—that is, a shared frame of reference.

It might be useful to support the conclusions drawn in the previous paragraph by considering an example of negotiation and assess with a greater degree of clarity whether bargaining in general—and threat-based bargaining in particular—can rely on empirical, normative, and contextual validation mechanisms. ¹⁰ However, this is problematic because diplomatic language adopted in international forums is far from being explicit. Statements are most times shaped according to certain coded and pre-established formulations, which might change depending on the diplomatic framework delegates are interacting in. One could examine diplomatic statements and establish whether they are examples of bargaining—and whether those bargaining acts of speech are relying on validation mechanisms—only in presence of a method, a coding scheme, that would “read between the lines” of diplomatic language and categorize certain statements according to the interaction they convey. The problem is that, in absence of a reliable and empirically applicable method to distinguish arguing from bargaining, based on revised definitions of the two interactions, this is impossible. Perhaps a case supporting the findings of this paper could instead be examined by following an interpretivist path and analyzing an example of threat-based bargaining that is considered a classic case in the discipline of international relations: the dialogue between Melians and Athenians. ¹¹

In this text, Thucydides describes the moment in which the Athenians ask the Melians to surrender and to pledge allegiance to Athens. The Athenian delegation threatens that if the neutral island of Melos refuses to pledge allegiance to Athens it will face total annihilation. During negotiations, the Melians ask the Athenian delegation the following question: “And how could we benefit from being slaves as you would from being masters?.” To this, the Athenians respond: “Because submission would save you from suffering the most terrible fate, while we would profit from not destroying you” (Thucydides, 2013: 380). The Athenians based their threat on empirical validity, trying to show it was advantageous for Melos to surrender, because consequences of their resistance would be extremely disadvantageous.

In putting this claim forward, the Athenians relied on normative validity as well. Firstly, the Athenian delegation argued that acting in such a repressive way against the Melians was in the interested of Athens’s empire, and that the duty of those representing Athens was to pursue the interests of the polis. Secondly, Athenians also claimed that it was in the interest of the Melian delegation to surrender; that they had the moral duty to surrender in order to save the lives of their own people. Indeed, Athenians answered the Melian invocation of fairness and rightfulness in the following way: “[w]hat we will demonstrate is that we are here for the benefit of our own empire and that what we have to say is also for the safety of your state. We want to rule you without any troubles to ourselves and we want your safety to benefit us both” (Thucydides, 2013: 380).

Finally, the Athenians’ threat to the Melians also relied on contextual validity. Indeed, the Athenians were determined to show the Melians that the threat was consistent with Athens’s past behavior, and that it was likely to be carried out if necessary: “You should be aware”—Athenians said in response to Melians’ mention of a possible Spartan’s intervention— “that never once the Athenians abandoned any siege through fear of a third party” (Thucydides, 2013: 383).

In other words, the Athenians cast a threat relying on empirical, normative and contextual validation mechanisms, and did so by appealing to a mutually accepted external authority. As is has been already pointed out, the external authority characterizing a type of interaction relying on validation mechanisms can also be represented by a shared conviction or established knowledge—whatever “allows actors to relate to some intelligible system of reference” (Saretzki, 2009: 163). In the dialogue between Melians and Athenians, an intelligible system of reference is built on the shared understanding that negotiations concerned the very survival of the people inhabiting Melos. Athenians urge Melians to “face facts and negotiate to save your city,” and Melians immediately admit that the meeting “is indeed about the question of survival” of Melos (Thucydides, 2013: 379).

The Athenians’ threats always refer to that commonly established principle, and imply that, given the mutual understanding that the discussion is about the survival of the Melians, the latter should submit and be spared “from suffering a most terrible fate” (Thucydides, 2013: 380). That the issue at stake is the Melians’ survival is often highlighted by the Athenians, for instance, when they advise that “the question you must consider is rather one of self-preservation—that is, not resisting those who are far stronger than you” (Thucydides, 2013: 381). On the other hand, the Melians do not challenge this fundamental assumption. The only thing they do is claiming that survival could be achieved through resistance as well (Thucydides, 2013: 381–383).

Although this particular example of threat-based bargaining did not convince the Melians, ¹² who were exterminated (Thucydides, 2013: 385–386), and although the Athenians’ threat to the Melians did not occur within an international forum, this classic scenario is a perfect example of how threats work in the context of international negotiations, and how threat-based bargaining needs to rely on empirical, normative, and contextual validation mechanisms, and needs to appeal to some type of external authority, like arguing and promise-based bargaining.

Bargaining as a reflexive speech act

Previous sections developed the claim that bargaining, exactly like arguing, relies on empirical, normative, and contextual validation mechanisms, and is characterized by a triadic structure in which the validity of speech acts is assessed through an intelligible and commonly accepted frame of reference. In claiming so, the traditional ways of distinguishing arguing from bargaining have been challenged. Furthermore, previous attempts to differentiate arguing from bargaining have often claimed that these two interactions can be distinguished based on “procedural differences.” While arguing is defined as a “process [. . .] characterized by an exchange of arguments that is based on a common frame of reference that is adjusted in the course of communication,” bargaining is described as a “sequential” speech act in which there is no “exchange of arguments” (Ulbert and Risse, 2005: 353). If, however, one accepts that bargaining is a speech act which relies on validation mechanisms and that can be validated by appealing to a mutually accepted external authority, there is no reason why actors engaging in bargaining cannot exchange arguments “based on a common frame of reference that is adjusted in the course of communication” (Ulbert and Risse, 2005: 353). Actors can endlessly debate whether a certain deal is in their national interest, and delegations can argue about the best course of action to ensure their safety. It is, therefore, necessary to dismiss even the “procedural differences” between arguing and bargaining and treat both types of interaction as procedurally “reflexive.”

This consideration can be supported, once again, by Thucydides’ dialogue between Melians and Athenians. This whole dialogue is focused on establishing whether the Athenians’ claim is true—that is, whether submission is the only way the Melians have to ensure their survival. During the dialogue, the Melians contest Athenians’ claims, and argue that survival could be ensured through resistance as well, arguing that chance, or the gods, or a Spartan intervention might be intervening factors leading to a Melian victory (Thucydides, 2013: 381–382). However, every counterclaim advanced by the Melian delegation is immediately countered by the Athenians, which reiterate that the only possible way to ensure the survival of the island is to submit. It is possible to see that the two delegations engage in a continuous back-and-forth to test the validity of the Athenians’ threat, and that they do so by basing their claims on “a common frame of reference that is adjusted in the course of communication” (Ulbert and Risse, 2005: 353)—that is, that negotiations are focused on the survival of Melos. It is possible therefore to conclude that bargaining acts of speech are reflexive types of interactions, rather than sequential ones.

Here below there is an additional, ideal-typical example of how bargaining types of interaction can be characterized by a reflexive procedure.

[Subject A: “If you do not do X, I will do Y against you.”

Subject B: “If you do Y, I will do Z (which will neutralize Y.)”

Subject A: “If you do Z, I will do W against you (which will neutralize Z.)”]

The two subjects in this example are displaying a series of bargaining interactions, casting promises and threats. Yet, from here it is possible to assess the reflexive nature of bargaining. When subject B is promising to do Z in reaction to Y, B is implying that A’s threat Y is not ominous, and therefore not convincing. Furthermore, when subject A is threatening W as a reaction to Z, A is attempting to show that B’s attempt to neutralize Y is not effective. In this example there is clearly a back-and-forth based on bargaining statements, in which both actors are assessing how ominous is subject A’s threat.

Conclusions

The current literature examining international forums distinguishes arguing and bargaining types of interaction based on the presence/absence of validation mechanisms. Arguing is a type of interaction that relies on empirical, normative and contextual validation mechanisms. Such mechanisms are assessed by using some kind of mutually accepted external authority as a common frame of reference—and this in turn makes arguing a structurally triadic and procedurally reflexive type of interaction.

Bargaining, on the other hand, is defined as the strategic display of promises and threats. The current literature sees bargaining as an interaction that does not rely on validation mechanisms, since it bases its effectiveness uniquely on the speaker’s credibility and the likelihood of the made promises and threats. Starting from this assumption, the literature claims that bargaining does not rely on validation mechanisms, it does not require the presence of a mutually accepted external authority, and it is consequently considered a structurally dyadic and procedurally sequential speech act.

This paper has pointed out that this way of distinguishing arguing from bargaining is deeply problematic. Promises and threats made during a forum can only be convincing if the speaker can show that the promises made are advantageous to the listener, or, if threats displayed are ominous. This, however, can only be done by resorting to empirical, normative and contextual validation mechanisms. Validation can only succeed if interlocutors appeal to some type of mutually accepted external authority through which to assess the validity of their claims—and this means that bargaining, exactly like arguing, is based on validation mechanisms, and is characterized by a triadic structure and a reflexive procedure.

Understanding arguing and bargaining as both relying on similar validation mechanisms and being structurally and procedurally similar explains why, when authors tried to distinguish arguing from bargaining, they found that arguing was “omnipresent.” The characteristics considered to be arguing’s hallmarks are also critical features of bargaining, and, since it is impossible to distinguish one object from another by examining features they both have, the two acts of speech looked almost indistinguishable in the empirical realm.

This last passage leads to a critical juncture. Either one concludes that there is no significant difference between arguing and bargaining and that it is therefore useless to try to distinguish one from the other, or one maintains that a difference exists but that the current way of defining the two speech acts is ineffective. This paper takes the latter path. This assumption is based on the notion that a case in which delegates are promoting a certain policy by, for instance, portraying it as being in the common interest of humankind, is very different from a case in which a delegate is urging someone to give in to a threat for the sake of national interest. There are unequivocal, self-evident differences between arguing and bargaining types of interaction. Being able to reliably and systematically distinguish them could improve our understanding of inter-state negotiations, because it could enable more effective cross-case comparisons, and thus help address fundamental questions concerning international forums. The necessary conclusion is that, although arguing and bargaining differ, how they have been defined and distinguished is problematic. Thus, if one wants to distinguish one from another clearly, it is necessary to re-define these two acts of speech. Such a process of redefinition should start from the premise that arguing and bargaining are characterized by similar validation mechanisms, but that these validation mechanisms function differently. Arguing interactions might attempt to establish their empirical, normative and contextual validities on different bases than bargaining interactions. A closer analysis of the internal dynamics of these two types of interaction, and of the functioning of arguing’s and bargaining’s validation mechanisms, could lead to a more effective and empirically testable theoretical model of social interactions within international forums.