The aim of this article is to make a conceptual contribution regarding the occurrence of arguing and bargaining in international negotiations and to loosening the unitary-actor assumption underlying state behavior. To explain the occurrence of arguing and bargaining, Esser (2001, 2004) used the frame-selection model developed for individual actors. Arguing and bargaining are seen as frames–fixed combinations of supreme aims, norms, behavioral routines, and symbols. Once activated, a frame largely determines an actor's behavior. Similar to the mechanism proposed by March and Olsen (1998), actors choose a frame given the symbolic information in the situation, but also given the utility associated with a frame. Formally modeling the choice of arguing and bargaining as frames, Esser (2004) treats states as unitary actors and derives several statements about the occurrence of each mode. The additional contribution of this article is the loosening of this assumption and the derivation of its implications. The frames adopted by states are conceptualized as those frames dominant among the individuals involved in any particular negotiation, be it by being members of delegations or national policy networks. There are fundamental differences between the frame of a person and the frame of a state. Further, each component of a state's frame results from a different aggregation process. Only for some frame components, like interests, an established aggregation process exists. This accounts for the differences in the occurrence and effectiveness of arguing and bargaining at the international level.
Arregui, J. , Stokman, F. and Thomson, R. (2004). “Bargaining in the European Union and Shifts in Actors' Policy Positions,”European Union Politics5: 47–72 .
2.
Axelrod, Robert (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books .
3.
Becker, Gary S. (1976). The Economic Approach to Human Behavior. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press .
4.
Berger, Peter L. and Luckmann, Thomas (1993). Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. Frankfurt: Fischer .
5.
Beyers, Jan (2005). “Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The Case of Council Officials,”International Organization59: 899–936 .
6.
Böhringer, Christoph (2003). “The Kyoto Protocol: A Review and Perspectives,” ZEW Discussion Paper No. 03-61. Mannheim: ZEW .
7.
Bonham, G.M. , Sergeev, V.M. and Parshin, P.B. (1997). “The Limited Test-Ban Agreement: Emergence of New Knowledge Structures in International Negotiation,”International Studies Quarterly41: 215–240 .
8.
Cameron, David R. (1995). “Transnational Relations and the Development of European and Monetary Union,” in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
9.
Cederman, Lars-Erik and Daase, Christopher (2003). “Endogenizing Corporate Identities:The Next Step in Constructivist IR Theory,”European Journal of International Relations9: 5–35 .
10.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999). “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,”International Studies Quarterly43: 82–114 .
11.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2005). “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,”International Organization59: 801–826 .
12.
Christiansen, Thomas (2002). “The Role of Supranational Actors in EU Treaty Reform,”Journal of European Public Policy9: 33–53 .
13.
Cohen, Raymond (2000). “Meaning, Interpretation and International Negotiation,”Global Society14: 317–335 .
14.
Crawford, Neta C. (2002). Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization and Humanitarian Intervention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
15.
Eising, Rainer (2002). “Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining EU Electricity Liberalization,”International Organization56: 85–120 .
16.
Elgström, Ole and Jönsson, Christer (2000). “Negotiation in the European Union: Bargaining or Problem-Solving?”Journal of European Public Policy7: 684–704 .
17.
Elster, Jon (1989). “Social Norms and Economic Theory,”Journal of Economic Perspectives3: 99–117 .
18.
Ely, Jeffrey C. and Välimäki, Juuso (2003). “Bad Reputation,”Quarterly Journal of Economics118: 785–814 .
19.
Esser, Hartmut (2001). Soziologie–Spezielle Grundlagen. Band 6: Sinn und Kultur. Frankfurt and New York: Campus .
20.
Esser, Hartmut (2004): “Die ‘Logik’ der Verständigung. Zur Debatte um ‘Arguing’ und ‘Bargaining’ in internationalen Verhandlungen,” in Franz U. Pappi , Eibe Riedel , Paul W. Thurner and Roland Vaubel (eds), Die Institutionalisierung internationaler Verhandlungen. Frankfurt: Campus .
21.
Evans, P.B. , Jacobson, H.K. and Putnam, R.D. , eds (1993). Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press .
22.
Falkner, Gerda (2002). “How Intergovernmental are Intergovernmental Conferences? An Example from the Maastricht Treaty Reform,”Journal of European Public Poliy9: 98–119 .
23.
Fearon, James and Wendt, Alexander (2002). “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” in Walter Carlsnaes , Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage .
24.
Gehring, Thomas (1996). “Arguing und Bargaining in internationalen Verhandlungen. Überlegungen am Beispiel des Ozonschutzregimes,” in Volker von Prittwitz (ed.), Verhandeln und Argumentieren. Opladen: Leske und Budrich .
25.
Grüner, Hans P. (2004). “Informationsaggregation in internationalen Verhandlungen und Organisationen,” in Franz U. Pappi , Eibe Riedel , Paul W. Thurner and Roland Vaubel (eds), Die Institutionalisierung internationaler VerhandlungenFrankfurt: Campus
26.
Guttman, Joel M. (2003). “Repeated Interaction and the Evolution of Preferences for Reciprocity,”Economic Journal113: 631–656 .
27.
Habermas, Jürgen (1982). Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Band 1: Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung, 2nd edn.Frankfurt: Suhrkamp .
28.
Hopmann, P. Terrence (2001). “Bargaining and Problem Solving: Two Perspectives on International Negotiation,” in Chester A. Crocker , Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds), Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press .
29.
Hosli, Madeleine O. (2000). “The Creation of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): Intergovernmental Negotiations and Two-Level Games,”Journal of European Public Policy7: 744–766 .
30.
Joachim, Jutta (2003). “Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women's Rights,”International Studies Quarterly47: 247–274 .
31.
Jönsson, Christer (1990). Communication in International Bargaining. London: Pinter .
32.
Keck, Otto (1995). “Rationales kommunikatives Handeln in den internationalen Beziehungen,”Zeitschrift Für Internationale Beziehungen2: 5–48 .
33.
Keck, Otto (1997). “Zur sozialen Konstruktion des Rational-Choice-Ansatzes,”Zeitschrift Für Internationale Beziehungen4: 139–151 .
34.
Kotzian, Peter (2003). Verhandlungen im europäischen Arzneimittelsektor. Initiierung– Institutionalisierung–Ergebnisse. Baden-Baden: Nomos .
35.
Lange, Andreas and Vogt, Carsten (2001). “Cooperation in International Environmental Negotiations due to a Preference for Equity,” ZEW Discussion Paper No. 01-14. Mannheim: ZEW .
36.
Lewis, Jeffrey (1998). “Is the ‘Hard Bargaining’ Image of the Council Misleading? The Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Local Elections Directive,”Journal of Common Market Studies36: 479–504 .
37.
Lewis, Jeffrey (2003). “Institutional Environments and Everyday EU Decision Making: Rationalist or Constructivist?”Comparative Political Studies36: 97–124 .
38.
Lewis, Jeffrey (2005). “The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in the European Union,”International Organization59: 937–971 .
39.
McDermott, Rose (1998). Risk-Taking in International Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press .
40.
March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P. (1989). Rediscovering Institutions. New York: Free Press .
41.
March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P. (1998). “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,”International Organization52: 943–969 .
42.
Martin, Lisa L. and Simmons, Beth (1998). “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions,”International Organization52: 729–757 .
43.
Mautner-Markhof, Frances , ed. (1989). Processes of International Negotiation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press .
44.
Milner, Helen V. (1997). Interests, Institutions and Information. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press .
45.
Mintzer, Irving M. and Leonard, J. Amber , eds (1994). Negotiating Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
46.
Moravcsik, Andrew (1997). “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,”International Organization51: 513–553 .
47.
Moravcsik, Andrew (1999). “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation,”International Organization53: 267–306 .
48.
Müller, Harald (1994). “Internationale Beziehungen als kommunikatives Handeln. Zur Kritik der utilitaristischen Handlungstheorien,”Zeitschrift Für Internationale Beziehungen1: 15–44 .
49.
Müller, Harald (1995). “Spielen hilft nicht immer,”Zeitschrift Für Internationale Beziehungen2: 371–391 .
50.
Müller, Harald (2004). “Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations,”European Journal of International Relations10: 395–435 .
51.
Payne, Rodger A. (2001). “Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction,”European Journal of International Relations7: 37–61 .
52.
Powell, Robert (2002). “Bargaining Theory and International Confl ict,”Annual Review of Political Science5: 1–30 .
53.
Raiffa, Howard (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press .
54.
Risse, Thomas (2000). “‘Let's Argue’: Communicative Action in World Politics,”International Organization54: 1–39 .
55.
Saretzki, Thomas (1996). “Wie unterscheiden sich Argumentieren und Verhandeln? Definitionsprobleme, funktionale Bezüge und strukturelle Differenzen von zwei verschiedenen Kommunikationsmodi,” in Volker von Prittwitz (ed.), Verhandeln und Argumentieren. Opladen: Leske und Budrich .
56.
Sbragia, Alberta (1994). “From ‘Nation-State’ to ‘Member State,’” in Paul M. Lützeler (ed.), Europe After Maastricht: American and European Perspectives. Providence: Berghahn Books .
57.
Schimmelfennig, Frank (2000). “International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment,”European Journal of International Relations6: 109–139 .
58.
Schimmelfennig, Frank (2005). “Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe,”International Organization59: 827–860 .
59.
Sebenius, James K. (1983). “Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties,”International Organization37: 281–316 .
60.
Sjöstedt, Gunnar (2003). “Norms and Principles as Support to Postnegotiation and Rule Implementation,” in Bertram I. Spector and I. William Zartman (eds), Getting It Done: Post-Agreement Negotiation and International Regimes. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press .
61.
Smith, Michael (2003). “The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Post-Modern Policy Framework?”Journal of European Public Policy10: 556–575 .
62.
Surel, Yves (2000). “The Role of Cognitive and Normative Frames in Policy-Making,”Journal of European Public Policy7: 495–512 .
63.
t'Hart, P. , Stern, E.K. and Sundelius, B. , eds (1997). Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press .
64.
Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel (1981). “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,”Science211: 453–458 .
65.
Wendt, Alexander E. (2004). “The State as a Person in International Theory,”Review of International Studies30: 289–316 .
66.
Young, H. Peyton (1991). “Negotiation Analysis,” in H. Peyton Young (ed.), Negotiation Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press .
67.
Young, Oran R. (1999). “Comment on Andrew Moravcsik, ‘A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation,’”International Organization53: 805–809 .
68.
Zartman, I. William and Berman, Maureen R. (1982). The Practical Negotiator. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press .
