Authors Reply: Empathy and Creativity: Dangers of the Methodological Tail Wagging the Conceptual Dog

Abstract

The three commentaries on “Why We Should Reject the Restrictive Isomorphic Matching (RIM) Definition of Empathy” mostly concurred with our critique of that widely adopted definition of empathy. Yet, commenters also raised important questions relating to the clarity and operationalizability of our recommended alternative: returning to a classical conceptualization of empathy as a dynamic, functionally oriented, multi-faceted unfolding process. To help contextualize these issues, we provide an extended analogy between empathy research and creativity research, areas of study which are conceptually linked and have faced similar conceptual and methodological obstacles. In doing so, we highlight the challenge of (a) distilling empathy down to a firm operationalizable definition without (b) losing sight of the general meaning and real-world value of the construct.

“Empathy” emerged as a widely known concept term in the 1950s, heavily due to the efforts of sociologists and psychotherapists (e.g., Carl Rogers, Leonard Cottrell, Rosalind Dymond Cartwright). For these popularizing pioneers, “empathy” was initially conceived as a way therapists could come to richly understand the inner experiences and perspectives of their clients, or as a way sociologists could better “see the world through the eyes” of those they interviewed, observed, or read. To these scholars, the ones particularly responsible for making “empathy” a household name, the term meant much more than simply feeling the same emotion that another person is feeling in a fleeting moment; it implied quasi-experientially understanding the other person's inner subjective perspective more holistically, broadly, and dynamically. As “empathy” became a popular, though vaguely defined, term among laypersons, it retained much of this broader conceptualization. For example, when President Obama frequently called for greater empathy, such as from citizens or Supreme Court justices, the goal was not merely for, say, a politically liberal person to generate a fleeting emotion that matched the momentary frustration of a more conservative person; it was for human beings to step more fully into one another's shoes, so as to more richly understand and appreciate one another's broader perspectives. The longstanding challenge of this holistic, dynamic view of empathy, though, is that it is (a) difficult to distill down to a firm operationalizable definition without (b) losing sight of the general meaning and real-world value of the construct.

Our overarching concern, one shared by Dr. Main (2022; also see Main et al., 2017), is that, out of a desire to reduce “empathy” to something that can be easily operationalized, many empathy researchers have inadvertently limited the definition of “empathy” in ways that lose sight of its real-world functional value. In particular, the primary aim of our article (Murphy et al., 2022) was to disavow the restrictive isomorphic matching (RIM) definition of “empathy,” which narrowly encompasses only static moments of isomorphic emotion-matching between observer and target. We speculated that the rise of this functionally incoherent and excessively narrow definition may be a case of “the tail wagging the dog,” with empathy being re-defined to better align with trending concepts (e.g., mirror neurons) and methodologies (e.g., brain scans). Instead, we recommended returning to the kind of classic conceptual definitions offered by leading theorists in the 1950s–1970s, which are much better aligned with the dynamic and functional nature of empathy; our own proto-Rogerian conceptualization was little more than a restatement of such classical definitions.

Main (2022) and Zahavi (2022) largely concurred with our primary argument regarding the incoherence and harm of the RIM definition; Marsh (2022) also agreed that the RIM definition is problematic and overly restrictive. Main (2022; also see Main & Kho, 2019) argued for a greater emphasis on the relational, interpersonal elements of empathy and also for greater appreciation of the way in which varying cultural factors will influence the functional meaning of empathy across different contexts. Zahavi and Marsh both criticized our conceptual definition for being too complex and/or difficult to operationalize; these are roughly the same complications acknowledged by Rogers and other classical theorists regarding their own conceptual definitions, and we must admit our restatement does little to eliminate such complications. Marsh helpfully reviewed the empirical literature highlighting the value of distinguishing among empathy process components and briefly introduced a possible replacement definition that is far less restrictive than the RIM definition. All three commenters contributed deeply valuable insights.

Tension between holistic functional meaning and clarity of operationalization is not unique to defining the empathy construct. It is present in the conceptualization of many complex multi-faceted constructs, such as emotion regulation, schizotypy, intelligence, psychopathy, mindfulness, and creativity. The same kinds of debates we see in empathy research occur in regard to such other complex multi-faceted constructs: what facets should and should not be included in emotion regulation?; is antisociality central to psychopathy or merely a down-stream consequence of the other facets within the construct?; should we stop talking about mindfulness as a general construct and, instead, consider the individual dimensions within it as fully separate constructs?; if we can't easily operationalize creativity in neuroimaging studies, should we redefine it more narrowly? In particular, the push to define empathy narrowly, so as to only encompass one facet-level phenomenon, is analogous to trying to define any of these other kinds of constructs in terms of only one narrower aspect, such as defining “schizotypy” as only encompassing constricted affect or “emotion regulation” as only encompassing emotion suppression.

In this response to the commentaries, we will offer an extended analogy between creativity and empathy, to provide a broader intellectual context for these kinds of definitional debates. In our article (Murphy et al., 2022), we made a few passing comments comparing the conceptualization of empathy to that of creativity. For instance, we argued (p. 172) that:

Momentary states of isomorphic matching may be some of the primitive building blocks of this process, but empathy is much more than only such moments … just as “Eureka” moments may be part of the creativity construct, [but] creativity cannot be reduced to or even adequately encapsulated in such moments by themselves.

Similarly, we explained (p. 168) that empathy is:

a multi-faceted unfolding process, somewhat similar to creativity, in which observation, imagination, inferential reasoning, and emotional sensing/experiencing dynamically interact to sympathetically understand the inner perspective of another. As with creativity, the intrapersonal process of empathy cannot be reduced to a narrow static moment; moreover, there is probably no uniform temporal sequence in which the various components emerge sequentially or simultaneously.

Here we will expand upon the analogy/homology. Creativity and empathy, in addition to relating to some of the same psychological processes (e.g., imagination), suffer from some of the same kinds of conceptual and methodological challenges as research topics.

Like Cottrell’s (1950) American Sociological Association presidential address bemoaning the lack of research attention to empathy, Guilford’s (1950) American Psychological Association presidential address aimed to spur research attention to the topic of creativity. Guilford perceived creativity as having been neglected to an “appalling” degree: “an area in which psychologists generally, whether they be angels or not, have feared to tread” (p. 444). As with empathy research, the subsequent work done in the 1950s–1960s was critical to expanding scientific interest and shaping research on the topic (see Barron & Harrington, 1981).

Much as Cottrell, Dymond, and Rogers openly acknowledged that empathy was a difficult construct to define and operationalize, Guilford acknowledged that creativity research faced stubborn conceptual and methodological hurdles inherent in the nature of the topic. Like empathy, bona fide creativity is very difficult to elicit and/or measure in a controlled scientific manner (e.g., “to most neuroscientists, the prospect of looking for creativity in the brain must seem like trying to nail jelly to the wall,” Dietrich & Kanso, 2010, p. 822). Moreover, they are both difficult to distinguish from sibling and neighboring constructs. As a result, with both constructs, most research has focused on more tractable, narrower facets or correlates.

As with empathy research, methodological tools in creativity research have sometimes been accused of creating a “tail wagging the dog” dynamic, with “creativity” being conflated with or reduced to whatever this or that popular method seems to cleanly capture. For instance, many researchers have focused on the specific construct of “divergent thinking,” which is the ability or tendency to generate multiple proposed solutions to an open-ended problem. This narrower construct is pleasingly tractable to operationalize; simple pencil-and-paper tests for divergent thinking have been in use for more than a century. Yet, as Dietrich and Kanso (2010, p. 823) lamented, this useful facet-level domain:

morphed from a first crack at this hard-to-pin down phenomenon into the standard conception of creativity, dominating theoretical and empirical work ever since. Once established, tests of divergent thinking became, for the sake of convenience, tests of creativity; and findings using these scales were often discussed, without badly needed qualifying remarks, as if applicable to creativity in general.

Explicitly or implicitly defining creativity solely in terms of divergent thinking loses sight of the fact that creativity also often requires convergent thinking, insight into the nature of a problem itself, and other facet-level elements. Moreover, sometimes creativity can manifest primarily through convergent thinking, with relatively little divergent thinking (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). Analogously, empathically understanding another person typically requires more than just emotion-matching; effortful perspective-taking, emotion regulation, and other elements are often necessary for the empathic process to achieve its functional outcomes. As explained by Rogers and others (see Murphy et al., 2022, for further discussion), empathic understanding also often requires refraining from matching the emotions of the other person, such as remaining calm and caring when a therapy client is experiencing shame or fear.

Restricting empathy to only encompass moments of isomorphic emotion-matching is analogous to restricting the construct of creativity to only encompass moments of divergent thinking. In both cases, a complex multi-faceted construct is narrowed down to an easier-to-operationalize facet, but at the cost of (a) losing sight of the big picture functions that motivate layperson and scholarly interest in the topic, (b) inadvertently leading the construct into reductio ad absurdum risks (e.g., if a person experiencing a psychotic episode manifests nonsensical divergent thoughts, should that count as “creativity”?), and (c) reducing a dynamic, multi-faceted process to a transient, limited occurrence (e.g., divergent thinking often needs to dynamically interact with convergent thinking to produce anything of use, Barron & Harrington, 1981).

How do different definitions of empathy cohere with or not cohere with the big-picture functional value motivating interest in the construct (e.g., gaining deeper understanding of the inner perspectives of others)? In our article, we advocated for a stronger focus on functional value when conceptualizing the term “empathy.” For example, we explained how the RIM definition of empathy is inconsistent with the functional value of empathy from three different perspectives: as a spontaneously elicited phenomenon, as a cognitively effortful phenomenon, and in an unfolding process motivated by approach/avoidance. Main (2022), in supportive comment, strongly concurred with this focus on functional benefits.

Focusing on functional value when defining a construct, though, does come with real costs and risks. For example, doing so inevitably means that the content of the term will become less clearly delineated and more open to debate: functional for whom, and for what purposes? As Main points out, for instance, the functional meaning of empathy will change depending on the specific interpersonal and broader cultural contexts of this or that interaction or relationship.

Moreover, bringing a functional value focus into conceptual definitions inevitably creates risks of circularity. The nature of the phenomenon can become conflated with the real-world benefits we hypothesize it to have, such as if we presume that all altruistic people must be highly empathic, that all poets must be highly creative individuals (cf. Barron & Harrington, 1981), or that empathy is “whatever callous people lack” (Marsh, 2022, p. 186).

Finally, given that adaptive human activity typically relies on a variety of distinguishable internal processes converging and interacting, focusing on functional value will tend to necessitate bundling a collection of distinguishable narrower phenomenon together in a dynamic fashion. Yet, in the absence of extensive theoretical and empirical work that effectively assembles the collection into a coherent multi-faceted construct, the collection will be little more than the kind of slapdash umbrella or mongrel concept that Zahavi (2022) warns us against.

Despite these valid concerns, it is common for complex multi-faceted psychological constructs, such as empathy and creativity, to be conceptualized in relation to functional value. The pragmatic benefits of doing so often greatly outweigh the inevitable costs. As we learn and refine our understanding of narrower facet-level phenomena, a continued higher-level focus on function helps us connect them with one another and keeps us from inadvertently veering off into irrelevancies or even absurdities.

For comparison, consider the most widely adopted definition of creativity (see Runco & Jaeger, 2012): “Creativity is the ability to produce work that is both novel (i.e., original or unexpected) and appropriate (i.e., useful or meets task constraints) …” (Sternberg & Lubart, 1996, p. 677, emphasis added). This definition is bipartite, with form (novelty) as the horsepower of the conceptual chariot and function (appropriateness) as the guiding charioteer. This definition does not specify the facet-level processes that creativity does or does not encompass, much as classical 1950s–1970s conceptual definitions of empathy generally do not specify the facet-level processes that are or are not included in the empathy construct.

The criterion of being appropriate or useful greatly complicates this higher-level definition of the creativity construct. It also necessitates that creativity will encompass a wide collection of distinguishable lower-level facets, given that novelty or divergent thinking in isolation will often be unlikely to result in anything of practical value. These conceptual complications are a necessary price, though, for the construct to maintain functional coherence. A monolingual Oklahoman randomly pecking on a Mandarin-lettered keyboard will produce novel text, and a person suffering from psychosis may produce substantial divergent thinking, yet viewing such novelty or divergence as “creativity” would lose sight of the functional point.

The main higher-level function of empathy is not merely to feel or understand what another person is thinking or feeling, but also to sympathetically appreciate why the person is experiencing those thoughts and feelings. This powerful “seeing the world through someone else's eyes” is the point of empathy both from a classical Rogerian perspective and as the term is broadly used in lay discourse. Achieving that functional goal involves a “complex unfolding process of imaginatively experiencing the subjective consciousness of another person, sensing, understanding, and structuring the world as if one were that person” (Murphy et al., 2022, p. 177).

There are many facet-level phenomena that relate to this higher-order function. Zahavi, drawing particularly on the brilliant phenomenology of Edith Stein (also known as Saint Teresa Benedicta of the Cross), astutely enumerated some of them: simulating how oneself would feel if in the situation of the other; automatic contagion; other-oriented motivation; imagination; direct perception; awareness of the “otherness” of the target's emotions; and more cognitive inferential aspects of theory of mind. We do not mean to imply that any of these lower-order facet-level constructs are unimportant. Rather, we insist that none of them in isolation should be referred to as “empathy” and we caution against language that, without proper qualification, implies that findings about one of them in isolation apply to the higher-level construct of empathy.

In her comment, Marsh (2022, p. 185) suggested that an adequate and non-restrictive definition of empathy is “the attempted representation, or simulation, of another's subjective internal experiences.” This umbrella definition, helpfully depicted in Marsh’s Figure 1, would seem to encompass many of the different facet-level processes Zahavi distinguishes between, such as projection, inferential reasoning, imagination, and intuitive Steinian empathy. Although Marsh's definition seems to definitionally reduce empathy to a fleeting state experience, Marsh acknowledges that the functional outcome of empathy (understanding) may often require more sustained and/or dynamic processing: “Thus, failures of empathy often simply mean more information, time, and/or effort is needed to bridge the gap between minds, rather than that the observer is fundamentally uncaring, insensitive, unimaginative, or unobservant.” (p. 186). We greatly appreciate that Marsh offered an alternative definition of empathy and value the opportunity to engage in a conversation about how we can achieve our common goal of operationalizing and scientifically testing our hypotheses about this important construct.

Although Marsh disagrees with our advocating a return to a proto-Rogerian conceptualization of empathy, it is important to emphasize that she does not endorse the RIM definition. Marsh's proposed definition differs from the RIM definition in multiple respects. Whereas the RIM definition restricts empathy to affective content, Marsh's definition applies to any internal states, even ones that are purely cognitive (e.g., “Fred believes there are more doors than windows in the world”). Whereas the RIM definition restricts “empathy” to only instances in which an observer and a target are in affective synchrony, Marsh's definition explicitly places manifestations of synchrony (affective, physical, physiological) outside the empathy construct. Whereas both the RIM definition and a proto-Rogerian definition require that the empathizing observer is consciously aware of the distinction between their own internal state and the internal state of the other, Marsh's definition requires no conscious awareness of any self-other distinction. Finally, whereas both the RIM definition and a proto-Rogerian definition require some degree of emotion recognition accuracy on the part of the observer, Marsh's definition requires only an attempt at representing the state of the other. In sum, at least as we understand Marsh's definition, it includes any attempt at representing any subjective internal experience of another person as “empathy,” regardless of whether the attempt is automatic or deliberate, regardless of whether it is accurate or inaccurate, regardless of whether synchrony occurs, and regardless of whether there is any kind of conscious awareness on the part of the empathizer. If our understanding of Marsh's definition is correct, then it strongly differs from both the RIM definition and from more classical conceptualizations of empathy.

As with defining creativity, our overarching view is that a definition of empathy should not lose sight of the higher-level function motivating interest in the construct. Our main worry about Marsh’s (2022) proposed definition is that, like the RIM definition, it reduces empathy to a fleeting state, by placing process-facilitating elements outside the definition, and it does not focus on the functional value of the construct. If empathy is merely any attempted representation of any subjective internal state of another, such as if a TV viewer makes an automatic, inaccurate, uncharitable representation of the motivation of an athlete kneeling in support of civil rights, that would be inconsistent with the meaning of empathy in most academic, clinical, and lay discourse. Similarly, although Marsh acknowledges empathy may often require more than a fleeting momentary experience to achieve functional outcomes, we would suggest that a definition of empathy should incorporate the unfolding process leading to functional outcomes.

In considering the conceptualization of empathy, we encourage our fellow researchers to shift their focus away from narrow static moment investigations and toward work that will more fruitfully relate to the dynamic and functional meaning of the construct. Thus, we side with Main (2022, emphasis added, p. 183): “It is only by appreciating empathy as dynamic and interpersonal, and employing measures that capture its flexible and dynamic nature, that we can develop a more comprehensive and functional understanding of this process fundamental to human interaction.” It is time to shift more of our brainpower in this direction, such as by conducting more naturalistic assessment work with dyads (e.g., Spencer et al., 2018) and expanding the use of multi-faceted experience sampling methods (e.g., Depow et al., 2021).