Aside from adducing little data that bear on our original concerns (pervasive “audience effects” in the encoding of identifiable “disgust expressions”/lack of morally induced disgust versus moral disgust differentiation), Chapman and Anderson (2011) fail to muster a convincing body of evidence for the founding premise of their empirical endeavor—disgust is a bona fide “basic emotion” whose theoretically predicted FM pattern is a goosebump-like, metaphor-resistant readout capable of being effectively analyzed within the “expression programs” canon, leading us to reaffirm that our favored alternative, the “moral disgust as a metaphor” interpretation, is as consistent with all the pertinent data (including theirs), if not more so.
Chapman, H.A., & Anderson, A.K. (2011). Response to Royzman and Kurzban. Emotion Review, 3, 272-273.
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Royzman, E., & Kurzban, R. ( 2011). Minding the metaphor: The elusive character of moral disgust. Emotion Review, 3, 269-271.
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