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Abstract

This study conceptualizes terrorist acts as performance of violence. It concentrates on how Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lida’awati Wal Jihad, a transnational terrorist group commonly known as Boko Haram, stages dramatic spectacles to generate public fear and anxiety by deploying the news media to publicize its activities. Predicated on a conceptual framework consisting of performance theory, news media–terrorism nexus and newsworthiness, the study illustrates how terrorist groups and media organizations exploit each other’s affordances to actualize tactical and strategic goals. The author asserts that terrorist groups command the attention and gaze of diverse audiences by generating newsworthy, conflictual, consequential and impactful contents for news organizations. The study concludes that Boko Haram’s activities are illustrative of terrorism as the communication of symbolic messages through the performance of violence.

Keywords

Boko Haram Chibok girls newsworthiness Nigeria performance terrorism

Introduction

Terrorism and the news media have a conflicted symbiotic relationship. As communication platforms, the news media validate and verify acts of terrorism by providing a dais for terrorist groups to perform violence, which generates consequential, conflictual, impactful and newsworthy content for news media organizations. While the ever-evolving media ecosystem has enabled terrorist groups to engage directly with their audiences, traditional news organizations are still ‘major battlefields for the propagation of information and, through them, terrorists can achieve their goal of inflicting terror beyond the locations of their attacks’ (Ette and Joe, 2018: 394). Miller (1982) perceptively observed that:

Terrorism and the media are entwined in an almost inexorable, symbiotic relationship. Terrorism [can write] any drama – no matter how horrible – to compel the media’s attention . . . Terrorism, like an ill-mannered enfant terrible, is the media’s stepchild, a stepchild which the media, unfortunately, can neither completely ignore nor deny. (cited by Grobbelaar, 2023: 10)

Though framed against the backdrop of traditional mainstream news media (legacy media), Miller’s observation still resonates despite advances in communication technologies routinely challenging the gate-keeping role of journalists. While citizens and terrorist groups can construct and disseminate their own narratives, the news media play critical roles in legitimizing such narratives. Thus, terrorist groups are still dependent on the news media for the amplification of their messages, and in return generate content to meet the expectations of media audiences. Against this backdrop, the relationship between terrorist organizations and the news media remains symbiotic because ‘the news media need newsworthy events to create news platforms that companies are willing to support with advertising, and terrorism can aid in achieving that goal’ (Zhang et al., 2013: 467). Although the news media are referred to frequently in this article, unlike in many other works on this area, they are not the focus of the study, rather, the concern here is with terrorist acts. Consequently, the relevance of the news media in this article lies in their symbiotic relationship with terrorism and the ways in which they construct a stage for the performance of terrorism and not on their coverage of the phenomenon.

This article examines three historic terrorist attacks in Nigeria to highlight elements of performance in the activities of Boko Haram,¹ a transnational terrorist group that claimed responsibility for the incidents. These three were selected specifically for their symbolic relevance, as explained later in the article. The article categorizes the different attacks as dramatic spectacles performed to capture public attention and communicate Boko Haram’s symbolic messages to diverse audiences. ‘Spectacle’ in this context refers to ‘a historical event that looks like a political drama, theatre, or even a play’ (Matusitz, 2015: 161). It is what Stoneman (2007: 115) refers to as ‘a mode of communication charged with enormous subjectifying power’. Giroux (2007: 13), referring specifically to the paradigm-shifting event of September 11, 2001, observes that ‘the distinctive mark of the gruesome and horrible attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon is that they were designed to be visible, designed to be spectacular.’ These views support an understanding of terrorist attacks as performances of violence staged to capture the gaze and attention of audiences or, as Giroux puts it, ‘the spectacle of terrorism has colonised the gaze and imagination of millions of people’ (p. 14).

Methodologically, the article is grounded on a case study approach and concentrates on three historic acts of terrorism: the bombing of the Nigeria Police Force headquarters in June 2011, an attack on the United Nations building in August of the same year and the abduction of almost 300 girls from a secondary school in Chibok, a rural town in north-eastern Nigeria in 2014. As a research strategy, a case study facilitates the exploration of the dynamics of events or issues within a single setting to illuminate their key features. It entails a ‘detailed examination of a small sample of interest’ (Gray, 2018: 262). This study seeks to answer two key questions: RQ1: How did Boko Haram’s attacks illustrate terrorism as the performance of violence? RQ2: Why was Boko Haram’s campaign of violence effective in engendering oppressive fear? Boko Haram is the main unit of analysis, and the three critical incidents are subordinate units. Two of the attacks occurred in Abuja, a high-security zone and Nigeria’s capital city, while one happened in a rural town in Borno state in the northeast, the operational base of Boko Haram. The attacks in Abuja received maximum media coverage in real time, but the third event, the abduction of schoolgirls, did not attract immediate media attention due to the time of occurrence. The girls were abducted at night when there were no self-validating sources to verify and provide information to the media. To gain traction, visibility and recognition for the attack, Boko Haram had to provide evidence of the abduction and, thus, it became the primary definer of the incident (Hall et al., 1978). As a result, coverage of the abduction was retrospectively framed against the backdrop of Boko Haram’s perspective of the incident.

This article is organized in five main parts. Following this introductory section, part two outlines the theoretical framework that underpins the discussion and a third section focuses on Boko Haram, its core messages and three of its historic attacks. In the fourth section, the article identifies features of performance in the selected attacks. The final section pulls together key arguments and highlights how the study adds to an understanding of the activities of Boko Haram as the communication of fear through the performance of violence.

Theoretical framework

Terrorism, performance, news media–terrorism nexus and newsworthiness

Terrorism may be one of the most prevailing socio-political threats of modern times and a recurring motif in conflict research, but it still lacks definitional certitude. As a result, it remains a contested concept, hence suffering from what Gillani (2017) refers to as ‘definitional dilemma’. ‘Terrorism’ is also a politicized concept with a pejorative image. Hoffman (2006: 23) contends that it is ‘a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one’s enemies and opponents, or those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore’. Jenkins (1974: 1) asserts that the definition of terrorism is dependent on a point of view – it is something ‘bad guys do’. The ‘use of the term implies a moral judgement and, if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint’ (Jenkins,1974, as cited by Hoffman, 2006: 23). Terrorism, Jenkins (1974: 2) argues, is functionally ‘a campaign of violence designed to inspire fear – a campaign to terrorise’. It can also be understood as:

an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons . . . The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message generators. (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 28)

Hoffman (2006: 43) conceptualizes terrorism as ‘the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change’. To the US State Department (2004: xii), terrorism is ‘premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience’.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that, despite years of debate and contention, views of what constitutes terrorism are yet to converge. However, there is a shared understanding of fear and anxiety as two critical derivatives of the phenomenon with many scholars, including Jackson (2011),Schmid (2004), Wilkinson (1997), Schmid and Jongman (1988) and Jenkins (1974) conceptualizing terrorism from this perspective. To Schmid (2004: 382), terrorism is ‘an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action’ and to Wilkinson (1997: 51), it is a mediated form of violence ‘designed to create a climate of extreme fear’. Against the backdrop of the definitional dilemma of the concept, Gillani (2017: 256) proposes that it ‘should be defined as a fear-generating political activity that psychologically influences an audience by means of targeting or threatening to target non-combatants with a credible threat of harm’. Terrorist attacks,Graaf (2011) notes, contribute to fear in society. In summary, fear and anxiety are embedded in terrorist activities, which have become ubiquitous spectres of contemporary society in many countries.

For this study, terrorism is operationalized from two standpoints: firstly, it is conceived as ‘violence or its threat intended as a symbolically communicative act in which the direct victims of the action are instrumentalized as a means to creating a psychological effect of intimidation and fear in a target audience for a political objective’ (Jackson, 2011: 123). This definition encapsulates a view of terrorism as a form of violence that communicates symbolic messages targeting specific audiences. Secondly, terrorism is understood as ‘the public performance of violence’ (Juergensmeyer, 1997: 17) with the aim of obtaining tangible goals. These two perspectives accentuate the oppressive fear and intimidation that terrorism educes, and the impact of the performance element of terrorist acts. On that premise, Boko Haram’s acts of terrorism can be understood as performance staged in public and captured by the news media to generate fear and anxiety. This understanding acknowledges the centrality of the news media to the mission of terrorist groups. As Jenkins (1974: 4) observed, ‘terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and international press . . . Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims. Terrorism is theater.’ Put differently, the direct victims of terrorist attacks are ‘merely instrumental, the skin of a drum beaten to achieve a calculated impact on a wider audience’ (Schmid and De Graaf, as cited by Nacos, 2002: 10). The theatre metaphor sums up the performance aspect of terrorism.

Performance, as Akpojivi (2023: 165) observes, evokes diverse understanding but, in the context of this study, it is understood as ‘doing things . . . and people’s engagement and interpretation of “what is done”’. Societal needs and dictates, Akpojivi argues, facilitate performance and determine its effectiveness in addressing social problems. ‘Knowledge of societal ills and the need to address such ills will lead to performance from social actors to capture the problem and bring about change’ (p. 165). Although Akpojivi was interrogating social movements in Africa as performance, his observation is applicable to terrorism given that terrorists also seek to bring about change in society, albeit change that furthers a cause and embeds an ideology: in the case of Boko Haram, a commitment to the eradication of secular systems of government and the creation of a caliphate that will foist an extremist Islamic way of life into its territory (Bukarti, 2020). In summary, performance is conceptualized in this study as Boko Haram’s strategy to dramatize messages to audiences in pursuit of its strategic goals.

Understanding of terrorism from the perspective of performance shifts attention away from its strategic goals, root causes and individual mindsets, and focuses ‘instead on the ways in which terrorist acts attempt to indirectly influence strategy by making a symbolic statement’ (Aly, 2014: 61). As Aly argues, the significance of a terrorist activity is dependent on perception and interpretation given to the act. Consequently, ‘the performative power of terrorism relies on the capacity of the act to generate constructions of meaning that align with or prefer the terrorists’ intended meanings and, indirectly, achieve the terrorists’ strategic goals’ (p. 61). However, the communication of that message is dependent on the media’s verification and validation capacity. Without the media, messages would be limited to immediate victims of terrorist attacks and those within their field of influence.

From a performance perspective, Boko Haram’s attacks can be constructed as theatrical events that create impact beyond their locations because the media provide the stage for such performances. As Farnen (1990: 100) observes, ‘What we know as terrorism is actually a media creation; mass media define, delimit, delegitimise and discredit events that we have not actually seen, but that we all instantly recognise as terrorist acts.’ This is not to suggest that terrorist acts are primarily motivated by a need for media visibility but to underscore how mediatization enables terrorists to achieve their strategic goals. Farnen’s observation pre-dates the momentous event of 9/11 and contemporary experiences of terrorism challenge the conceptualization of terrorist acts as out of sight incidents. However, the role of the news media in documenting manifestations of terrorism remains valid and uncontested ‘because most people only experience terrorism through mass-media accounts’ (Chermak and Gruenewald, 2006: 431).The news media are not just transmitters of messages scripted by terrorists but they also provide a stage for the performance of terror, grant access to a ‘worldwide audience, and select from the terrorist events the “dramatic features of a good story” that best resonate with the public’ (Graaf, 2011; Weimann, 1983: 38). As Wilkinson (1997: 53) notes:

for so long as terrorists commit acts of violence the mass media will continue to scramble to cover them in order to satisfy the desire of their audiences for dramatic stories in which there is inevitably huge public curiosity about both the victimisers and their victims.

The capacity of the news media to amplify and magnify terrorist acts and messages enables them to provide an arena for the performance of terrorism and for terrorist groups to generate a spectacle for media coverage. From this standpoint, a terrorist act ‘becomes a type of theatre . . . a performance to be seen. Electronic communications (television in particular) allow the immediate worldwide exposure of the terrorist spectacle’ (Matusitz, 2015: 161). Juergensmeyer (2000) asserts that the words used to describe terrorist acts suggest they should be viewed as ‘performance violence’ arguing that such acts are dramatic and ‘conducted with an awareness of particular settings, appropriate timings, and the various audiences’. Terrorist acts, he observes, ‘are dramas designed to have an impact on the several audiences they affect’ (p. 2000: 160). This is achievable through news media intervention.

The news media–terrorism symbiosis guarantees media coverage of terrorist activities. Bauman (2015) acknowledged this connection when he observed that:

With minimum cost of a gun and ammunition, someone can commit a violent act that the whole world will know and watch in real time with tremendous interest. The media know how to use it. One violent act and then several weeks of high ratings as a result of repeated use of gory images amplify the drama.

As platforms for the performance of violence, the news media reconstruct terrorist acts as spectacularized events through the way in which they define, frame and package terrorist attacks and messages.

The news media–terrorism nexus hinges on the newsworthiness of terrorist activities. It is worth pointing out that the concept of ‘newsworthiness’ is applied specifically here to explain why terrorist acts receive prominence in news coverage. For that purpose, this article appropriates a framework of newsworthiness proposed by Shoemaker and Cohen (2006), which explains why and how news organizations cover certain events and the way in which those events are framed. The framework identifies two constructs that predicate newsworthiness: deviance and social significance. These two factors encapsulate the classic determinants of news coverage proposed by Galtung and Ruge (1965) and Harcup and O’Neill (2016), particularly, magnitude, unexpectedness and negativity. Shoemaker and Cohen (2006: 2) assert that ‘people – and journalists! – are most interested in two general pieces of information about an event: how intensely deviant and socially significant it is.’ They argue that a combination of these two factors accentuates newsworthiness, especially when an event reflects both at a high level. Against this backdrop, a terrorist act is distinctively newsworthy due to its inherent deviancy and social significance. As Juergensmeyer (1997) argues, terrorist attacks challenge the power and legitimacy of society. Boko Haram’s activities exemplify this understanding.

As forms of communication, terrorist acts exploit the media’s propensity for events that are newsworthy due to their impact, unexpectedness, consonance and negativity, among other factors, because most terrorist attacks are unexpected dramatic events with great shock value that capture headlines (Fletcher, 2006: 909). Essentially, without the media, a terrorist attack would be a distant event and the impact limited to real-time witnesses, if any. Terrorists orchestrate events that are newsworthy and the media in turn benefit from terrorist acts by packaging compelling accounts of such events to attract audiences to boost their reach and influence. As noted earlier, terrorist acts are newsworthy because they are deviant events that have social significance (Shoemaker and Cohen, 2006). Boko Haram’s acts of terrorism have political, social and economic significance. The sites of attacks examined in this study illustrate all dimensions of significance of the group’s activities.

In the next section, the article presents a brief overview of Boko Haram and three historic attacks on symbolic targets in Nigeria to illustrate terrorism as performance of violence.

Boko Haram and the public performance of violence

For many years, Boko Haram operated in relative obscurity, was dismissed by the Nigerian government as a domestic problem in the north-eastern part of the country and relegated to the periphery of socio-political discourses. However, following violent attacks on symbolic targets, it gained media visibility locally and internationally, and consequently became successful in staging public performance of violence beyond its heartland and area of operation.

Just like the concept of terrorism, Boko Haram is a contested phenomenon. Starting from its origin and identity, connection/relationship and place within the global terrorist movement and Islamic radicalism, the group projects a shadowy public profile. As a result, it has generated a plethora of reports and studies, all seeking to contribute to knowledge about the group. Researchers have proposed a variety of explanations for its emergence, growth, evolution and mission (Abubakar, 2012; Bukarti, 2020; Ette, 2016; Matfess, 2016; Oriola, 2017; Walker, 2012) and although some claims about the group have been disputed and challenged, there is a shared framework of understanding of its mission and tactics.

Believed to have been founded by a radical Muslim cleric, Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram operated for many years in Maiduguri, in north-eastern Nigeria, without attracting a great deal of media attention because it did not initially project itself as a terrorist group. Although Yusuf was committed to the propagation of extremist Islamic ideology, the introduction of sharia law and the establishment of a caliphate in northern Nigeria, his activities were primarily limited to recruitment of followers, indoctrination and teaching of radical and extremist Islamic ideology. The group staked a claim on a commitment to defend a fundamentalist version of Islam. According to Bulama Bukarti, an analyst with a lived experience of the group, Boko Haram from its embryonic stage was committed to launching a jihad to eradicate secular and Western systems, and to replace them with a puritanical Islamic government (Bukarti, 2020). The group’s rejection of a Western way of life and values is embedded in its popular label, ‘Boko Haram’, which translates from Hausa, the most widely spoken language in northern Nigeria, as Western-style education is sacrilege and forbidden. Officially, it self-identifies as Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Iidda’awati wal Jihad, a tag that underscores a commitment to the propagation of Prophet Mohammed’s teachings and jihad. However, the ‘Boko Haram’ label is its best-known identity marker ‘mainly because the public prefers it partly as a way of ridiculing the group and partly because it seems to fit into the group’s outward ideological outlook’ (Abubakar, 2012: 98). To Andrea Brigaglia (2012: 28), the Boko Haram label is a nickname that ‘captures all the stereotypes that have daily currency in islamophobic discourses’: obscurantism, primitivism and the essentialist ferocity of Muslims.

In its early years, Boko Haram projected itself as a socio-religious movement and a ‘kind of para-government, offering help paying bills; support for the unemployed, widows, and children; and a sense of belonging that filled the gap left by the absent’ state (Matfess, 2016). That image changed in July 2009 when the group launched an anti-government uprising during which its leader, Yusuf, was arrested and killed while in police custody. His death changed the narrative and trajectory of the group’s activities. First, members went underground to regroup and in December 2010 re-emerged under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf’s deputy. Second, with Shekau at the helm, the group became more radicalized, more tactically organized and transitioned into extensive jihadism. Third, Shekau, unlike Yusuf who had focused on railing against Western-style education and way of life to support his call for a more fundamentalist version of Islam, engaged in direct brutal attacks on people and places that did not conform to the group’s interpretation of the Koran. Within a short time, the group’s campaign of violence:

wrought havoc in Africa’s Lake Chad region, which comprises northern Nigeria, southeastern Niger, far northern Cameroon and western Chad. The Boko Haram movement has killed a conservative estimate of 18,000 people, displaced millions, and caused a large-scale humanitarian crisis. In 2014, it was recorded as the world’s deadliest terror group, killing 6,600 in that year alone. (Bukarti, 2020).

As its reach expanded beyond Nigeria, Boko Haram left a trail of devastation in many communities, including the displacement of over two million people (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2022). However, following the death of Shekau in May 2021 and Nigeria’s claim that it has ‘technically won the war’ against Boko Haram (BBC News, 2015: para 1), the group appears to be in disarray. Despite the confusion over its current capability to inflict terror on a massive scale, Boko Haram remains a security threat because even the mere mention of its name evokes oppressive fear across Nigeria. To some extent, Boko Haram is a condensational symbol of terrorism, especially as opportunistic groups are said to be arrogating its identity to terrorize and orchestrate violence.

Before the current state of uncertainty about its capability and reach, Boko Haram had demonstrated uncanny ability to attack Nigeria’s national security infrastructures. It regularly targeted military facilities and other security agencies and routinely repelled counter attacks during raids. The group also introduced suicide attacks into the insecurity milieu of Nigeria. The next section provides a summary of three historic attacks on symbolic targets.

Performances of violence

Nigeria Police headquarters, Abuja

On 16 June 2011, Boko Haram detonated a vehicle bearing an improvised explosive device in a parking space of the headquarters of the Nigeria Police Force, in Abuja. The driver of the vehicle and two other people were killed, and more than 30 vehicles destroyed. Hafiz Ringim, the Inspector-General, was believed to have been the intended target – a few days before the attack, he had pronounced the imminent defeat of the group. Boko Haram’s deployment of a suicide bomber was a vivid mockery of the paramount security officer of the country. The attack was symbolic at several levels: it was a dramatic strike at the heart of the country’s security establishment, the first instance of suicide bombing in Nigeria and a demonstration of the group’s growing operational capabilities. As the explosion boomed around the city and blasted a large plume of smoke into the skyline, it flung a net of fear and anxiety across Nigeria. Local and international news organizations reported how ‘A suicide bomber blew up a police headquarters in the Nigerian capital Abuja’ (France24.com, 16 June 2011), as a ‘powerful bomb claimed by Boko Haram explodes inside police car park’ (Al Jazerra.com, 16 June 2011). The BBC reported that ‘everybody was scared, and people began to run around’ (BBC News, 2011). In a statement released to the media, Boko Haram declared: ‘We are responsible for the bomb attack on the police headquarters in Abuja which was to prove a point to all those who doubt our capability’ (BBC News, 2011).

United Nations headquarters, Abuja

On 26 August 2011, about two and half months after the attack at the police headquarters, a vehicle loaded with explosives rammed into the United Nations building in Abuja, exploded and destroyed several floors. The blast killed 23 people and injured more than 100. News organizations reported how a ‘powerful blast destroyed the lower floors of the building (BBC.com) when ‘a suicide bomber driving a vehicle packed with explosives rammed the main United Nations building’ (Murray and Nossiter 2011),when a car bomb ripped through the UN building (Al Jazeera.com, 26 August 2011). Again, Boko Haram claimed responsibility, saying it attacked the UN building because the US and the UN represent unbelief and support the Nigerian government to persecute Muslims in the country (Marama, 2011).

Abduction of schoolgirls, Chibok, Borno State

On 14 April 2014, Boko Haram fighters raided Government Secondary School, Chibok, a rural town in Borno State, north-eastern Nigeria, at night and carted away about 276 girls in military trucks. Initially, the Nigerian government did not acknowledge the abduction and some political elites claimed it was a hoax. Patience Jonathan, wife of the president, suggested the incident was a fabrication and a smear campaign to discredit her husband (Faul, 2014). After days of denial, the government finally admitted that a raid had indeed taken place but asserted the girls had been rescued by the military. This claim was soon retracted. After almost three weeks of uncertainty, Boko Haram provided evidence of the abduction, a video in which Shekau, speaking in a mixture of Hausa, English and Arabic gloated:

Just because I took some little girls who were in Western education, everyone is making noise. Let me tell you, I took the girls. We are against Western education, and I say Western education should end. I repeat, I took the girls, and I will sell them off. There is a market for selling girls. I will sell them in the market by Allah. I will marry off a woman at the age of twelve. I will marry off a girl at the age of nine. (theguardian.com, 6 May 2014)

A week later, the group released another video, which showed the girls, dressed in hijabs and long Islamic robes, sitting in a clearing in a wooded area. They were guarded by masked armed men. Unlike the other terrorist attacks, there had been no spectacle of thunderous blasts and plumes of smoke to announce the event. Consequently, there was no media coverage of the abduction. Boko Haram had to stage a performance in the woods to create a spectacle and communicate its message.

Discussion

The three incidents highlighted above were selected to illustrate terrorism as public performance of violence. Although terrorist attacks are generally newsworthy, these events received extensive media coverage due to a combination of two critical factors: deviance and social significance. Deviance underpinned the attacks statistically as they were different from the average terrorist acts and normatively because they broke social norms and brought about social change. The attacks also had political, economic, cultural and public significance (Zhang et al., 2013). Each attack occurred at a symbolic site and marked a trajectory in the capabilities of Boko Haram. The attack sites were ‘theatres of performance that carry symbolic meaning both as the targets of destruction and as spaces for the constant reinterpretation of individual and collective perceptions of terrorism’ (Aly, 2014: 61).

While the attack on the police headquarters had received international media coverage, it was the strike on the UN building that earned Boko Haram global visibility. It confirmed audacity and growing confidence in its capabilities. In a way, it was an attack on the world because the building provided offices for international diplomats, foreign workers and 26 UN humanitarian and development agencies (Ette, 2016). The brazen attack also signalled a change in the trajectory of the group as it transitioned from a domestic terrorist group to a transnational security threat. As Ero (2011) observed, ‘the bombing of the UN in Abuja effectively propelled the group from a domestic Islamist fundamentalist cause to an instrument of international political terror.’ The attack had ramifications for international organizations operating in Nigeria. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon described the bombing as ‘an assault on those who devote their lives to helping others’ (Al Jazeera, 2011) while Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan said it was a ‘despicable assault on the UN goal of global peace and security’ (Channel4.com). Again, as a thunderous blast spewed billows of thick black smoke into the Abuja skyline and reverberated around the city, Boko Haram successfully engendered fear and anxiety across the country. As the international broadcaster Al Jazeera (2011) noted, if the terrorists could breach the security of ‘one of the heavily guarded buildings in Nigeria’, they could wreak havoc on soft and less secure domestic targets. This observation was validated three years later with the abduction of the schoolgirls.

To understand why and how Boko Haram is successful in staging public performance of violence, it is necessary to locate its attacks within an operational context. This entails recognizing that Boko Haram is not a new Islamic fundamentalist group in Nigeria. Rather, it is yet another expression of violent religious fervour associated with a ‘spontaneous movement of an increasingly militant and fundamentalist Islam that had been spreading rapidly throughout Nigeria’s desperately poor north since the 1970s in response to the failure of the post-colonial state’ (Hansen, 2020: 305). Boko Haram is an expression of radicalism driven by the socio-political and economic environment in which it operates. Paradoxically, the social system Boko Haram seeks to overthrow adjudges the group deviant while the level of corruption in the society fuels and inflames public grievances and breeds radical responses. As a result, Boko Haram’s rhetoric about rampant government corruption and the corrupting influence of the West evokes intense fundamentalist piety and appeals to Muslims who are receptive to calls for purification and a mission to defend Allah and a way of life rooted in Islamic values.

From that standpoint, Boko Haram has been effective in communicating its claim that the Nigerian state is against Islamic values and should therefore be held in contempt by pious Muslims. In other words, Boko Haram spectacularizes violence on behalf of Allah. Just like other Islamist groups, Boko Haram seeks to dismantle ‘the existing Western-dominated world order and replace it with a jihadist vision, through subversion, terrorism and insurgency’ (Kilcullen, 2005: 600). The group publicizes its mission through the media, thus reinforcing the view that ‘terrorists exploit the media to achieve political recognition, present their cause, transmit messages and demands to the government, and induce fear in the general public’ (Keinan et al., 2003: 150).

At another level, Boko Haram has displayed variance with previous fundamentalist groups through its tenacity and audacity to wage an asymmetrical war against the government for many years. Its seemingly enduring power can be attributed to the influence of the media and the media ecosystem of its time. Unlike previous groups that operated when coverage of violent acts was routinely a reconstruction of events by mainstream news media, Boko Haram’s attacks are often reported in real time on social media platforms and websites of legacy media. For instance, the attacks on the police and UN headquarters received media coverage in real time. But, unlike the bombing incidents, the abduction of the Chibok girls lacked a sense of immediacy and intense media coverage due to the time and location of the incident. The performance element was ‘staged’ in the woods by Boko Haram but, prior to that, the event was marked by intrigue, ambiguity and suspense, thus highlighting features of a performance.

In conformity with the perception of terrorism as public performance of violence, the group maximized the potential of the media to magnify and amplify its messages in ways that previous groups were incapable of doing. That achievement is a response to changes in global media ecology. As Weimann (1983: 38) observed: ‘While the terrorists may write the script and perform the drama, the “theater of terror” becomes possible only when the media provide the stage and access to a worldwide audience. In some cases, terrorists may appear to be “programming” the media’ in order to inflict fear not only on their direct victims but also on their audiences. Boko Haram’s ability to manipulate the media has empowered the group to spawn oppressive fear beyond its area of operation. Given that its attacks are notable for being indiscriminate, the group has been successful in peddling fear and heightening a sense of insecurity in the country through its activities. The attacks are designed to create an impact on diverse audiences and, through the news media, the terrorists successfully colonize gazes for their performance.

As an Islamic extremist group, Boko Haram’s goal was the establishment of a caliphate in northern Nigeria and the implementation of sharia law. However, it shows no sympathy or respect towards fellow Muslims who do not observe and propagate its extremist views. Consequently, even people of the same faith are not spared. From that standpoint, Boko Haram communicates messages to three distinct audiences – the government, the public and its supporters. The group performs to elicit certain forms of audience response: fear, anxiety and inspiration. To the government, the message is defiance and contempt, to the public, threats of terror, and to its supporters, assurance of its capabilities and tenacity to fight for its cause. This multi-layered communication is made possible by the media for, without the media amplifying and magnifying Boko Haram’s activities, effort invested in them would be wasted and meaningless. As Gillani (2017: 131) observes:

Without media, terrorism will have no effective medium to communicate with its target audience, and without communication, all terroristic violence essentially runs the risk of not only being ineffective but also meaningless. Given this important role that media plays, the theatrical understanding of terrorism can be said to incorporate not three but in fact four essential elements: the terrorist actor, the terrorist act (or its threat), an audience, and a medium to communicate (or simply media).

The bombing of the UN house, for example, communicated its disdain for Western way of life. It was also a ‘bold statement not only to Nigeria, but to the international community’ (Ero, 2011). Attacking high-profile buildings in Nigeria’s capital city – and one of the most secured locations in the country – illustrated a growing confidence in its capability and raised questions about security apparatus in Nigeria. This was particularly critical in the spectacular attack on the police headquarters shortly after the Inspector-General boasted that the days of the terrorist group were numbered. If Boko Haram could take the fight to a major symbol of the country’s security structure, where could it not strike?

The drama of the attack on the UN building was summed up by Mike Zuokumor, Police Commissioner for Abuja region: ‘A vehicle, loaded with explosives, drove against traffic, entered the exit gate, smashed it, got to the second gate, smashed it, went to the reception and detonated, and the man inside the vehicle died’ (RFE/RL, Radio Free Europe, 2011). The police officer’s description evokes scenes in a gritty action film and captures images of a daredevil actor. The main difference is that the attack, unlike a movie, was not for entertainment; it was to cause havoc, inflict fear and provoke a reaction from the government.

Out of the three incidents outlined in this article, the abduction of the Chibok girls was probably the most effective as a performance. The girls were kidnapped at night, meaning the performance had no immediate audience, unlike the bombing incidents, therefore Boko Haram had to stage-manage a performance that required visuals and icons of fear to demonstrate the incompetence and impotence of the state to protect vulnerable citizens. However, the abduction was not strictly a ‘public performance of violent power’, it was the staged presentation of the girls that created an atmosphere of terror and reinforced a pervasive sense of insecurity. The abduction story was dramatic at several levels, starting with the government’s initial indifference to the girls’ plight and the ways in which the event was confirmed. Even the number of victims was contentious. There were contested accounts of happenings surrounding the abduction as those who were responsible for taking care of the girls sought to absolve themselves from blame. Following confirmation of the incident, the girls’ ordeal provoked global outrage and intense worldwide concern. It triggered a hashtagged campaign, #bringbackourgirls, which won the support of international political leaders and celebrities, who called for their release. Several countries offered to help in a rescue mission. The abduction ‘brought the world’ together just as was the case in the bombing of the United Nations building in 2011.

From the theatre-of-terror perspective, the abduction was choreographed to attract media attention. While the bomb attacks earned the group media visibility, the kidnapping was not just strategic but instrumental as well. The abduction was more ‘newsworthy’ because, unlike a bomb attack, which had lost its power to shock due to repeated occurrences, the kidnapping had the potential to generate more coverage and thus ensured a steady supply of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ (Edgerton, 1996). Moreover, the abducted girls evoked an emotional response and symbolic resonance that guaranteed continuous media visibility. The abduction was also a seminal event and emblematic of Boko Haram’s war against social structures of the state in general and Western education and way of life in particular. The girls’ presence in a Western-styled educational institution had flouted the ideological stance of Boko Haram and snatching them away from their school communicated a powerful message to the government and parents who dared to reject the terrorists’ worldview. Given that the girls symbolized the future, the abduction was also an attack on the social fabric of the state. Thus, the attack conveyed a message that went beyond the immediate targets of Boko Haram’s action.

The group staged a spectacle of violence using textual and verbal tactics, and theatrical engagement with script preparation, cast selection, sets, props, roles and stage management. As Weimann (2005: 381) observed, ‘Just like compelling stage plays or other performances, the media orientation in terrorism requires full attention to detail in order to be effective.’ These were utilized to varying degrees in the three attacks. In the bombing cases, the production process was minimalist. The cast was limited – just one main character, the suicide bombers who drove explosives-laden vehicles into targets. The Chibok girls’ abduction incorporated more theatrical elements, such as ‘“excitable speech” – like insults or hate speech’ (Graaf, 2011: 25). Shekau, leader of the group, in a monologue, mocked and harangued the Nigerian government and world leaders over their concern for the victims. ‘I abducted your girls. I will sell the women in the market by Allah’, he threatened (BBC News, 2014). His performance was not only dramatic, but it was also emotionally powerful in communicating and imposing terror, especially to the parents of the kidnapped girls.

For props, Shekau often appeared in videos wearing military khaki camouflage and fatigue uniforms that conferred the impression of a commander leading a battle-ready army. But, given that the Nigerian Criminal Code outlaws the use of combat uniforms by non-members of the military, Shekau and his fighters were being subversive and deviant by wearing camouflage and fatigue uniforms. Their use of masks and balaclavas also identified them as outliers. In the videos of the Chibok girls, a flag associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) flustering in the background also served as a prop to reinforce Boko Haram’s claimed association with an international terrorist organization. Overall, the three terrorist acts underpinned the conceptualization of terrorism as a public performance of violence.

Conclusion

This article explains why Boko Haram’s activities can be understood as public performance of violence mediated by the news media. It also outlines the ways in which the performance is effective in engendering oppressive fear. Driven by a case study approach, the study examines three of Boko Haram’s momentous attacks in Nigeria to elucidate elements of performance. The attacks were chosen because they marked a change in the trajectory of the group’s growth and reach. One was the first case of suicide bombing in Nigeria, while two attacks propelled the group from a domestic threat to an instrument of international terror and cemented its notoriety as a terrorist group.

One recurring message in Boko Haram’s performance was its seeming invincibility. On several occasions, Shekau showed up and derided the Nigerian government soon after it announced his demise, thus reinforcing the impression that he could outwit the national security apparatus in the country. The sites of all the attacks were symbolically significant and emblematic of the fragility of the Nigerian state. The bomb attacks sites generated performative power because of what they represented. As targets, they legitimized Boko Haram’s claim of invincibility. Abducting the Chibok girls reinforced the group’s determination to delegitimize Western-style education. Together, the attacks engendered oppressive fear and highlighted insecurity in the country.

It is worth noting that Boko Haram depends on a Western system of communication to achieve its strategic goals of dismantling existing Western secular systems and governments, and replacing them with a puritanical Islamic government. This is ironic given that its success in the performance and communication of symbolic messages to targeted audiences is dependent on Western ideas and technologies, which it seeks to destroy. As noted frequently in this article, without communication technologies, Boko Haram’s reach and impact would be limited. On that premise, the study concludes that the activities of the group illustrate terrorism as mediated public performance of violence. Its dependence on the news media reinforces the peculiar interconnection of terrorism and news organizations. A mutually beneficial connection and symbiotic relationship is evident in the way in which the media and Boko Haram facilitate the actualization of their tactical and strategic goals. Over time, Boko Haram has honed its capability to exploit the publicity-generating affordances of the news media to achieve its goals of communicating symbolic messages to different audiences.

Given the historic nature of the case studies, it is worth noting that, while Boko Haram has generated a broad range of studies since 2009 when it gained significant media visibility, this study draws attention to its activities as spectacularized violence and makes a significant contribution to the literature on the group. It adds another level of understanding of the terrorism–news media nexus from the perspective of performance. According to the International Terrorism Guide website, Boko Haram ‘remains resilient’ and a threat to ‘Western and regional interest’ (dni.gov). Although the status of the group is hazy at the time of this study, its portfolio of performances of violence continues to inflict oppressive fear and trigger anxiety. For instance, in April 2024, UNICEF reported that more than 1,680 Nigerian school children have been abducted since the kidnapping of the Chibok girls (Umoru and Alechenu, 2024). As an embodiment and condensational symbol of terrorism in Nigeria, Boko Haram is a phenomenon that cannot be ignored.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to anonymous reviewers and the editorial team for their helpful feedback. An earlier version of this paper was presented as a webinar in the School of Performance and Cultural Industries, University of Leeds, on 7 December 2020. I am thankful for feedback from Dr Nicolas Salazar Sutil and other participants. Thank you to Dr Joanne Sayner of Media, Culture and Heritage, Newcastle University, for feedback on this version.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Mercy Ette:

Notes

Author biography

Mercy Ette is a Senior Lecturer in Journalism and Media at Newcastle University and a Visiting Research Fellow in the School of Performance and Cultural Industries, University of Leeds, UK. She holds a PhD in Communication Studies from the University of Leeds. Her research focuses on journalism and conflict/terrorism, gender and politics, media and democracy. She has published in leading academic journals including International Journal of Press/Politics, Media, War & Conflict, International Communication Gazette, Gender, Place and Culture, Journal of African Media Studies and Journal of Asian and African Studies.

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