Six Lessons for a Cogent Science of Implicit Bias and Its Criticism

Abstract

Skepticism about the explanatory value of implicit bias in understanding social discrimination has grown considerably. The current article argues that both the dominant narrative about implicit bias as well as extant criticism are based on a selective focus on particular findings that fails to consider the broader literature on attitudes and implicit measures. To provide a basis to move forward, the current article discusses six lessons for a cogent science of implicit bias: (a) There is no evidence that people are unaware of the mental contents underlying their implicit biases; (b) conceptual correspondence is essential for interpretations of dissociations between implicit and explicit bias; (c) there is no basis to expect strong unconditional relations between implicit bias and behavior; (d) implicit bias is less (not more) stable over time than explicit bias; (e) context matters fundamentally for the outcomes obtained with implicit-bias measures; and (f) implicit measurement scores do not provide process-pure reflections of bias. The six lessons provide guidance for research that aims to provide more compelling evidence for the properties of implicit bias. At the same time, they suggest that extant criticism does not justify the conclusion that implicit bias is irrelevant for the understanding of social discrimination.