Are educational governance reforms in a post-conflict society conforming to global standards? Examining the application of education convergence theory in an internationally supervised and politicized context

Abstract

This article examines whether and to what extent educational reforms in a post-conflict society conform to “global (regional) standards,” and explores the meaning of inconsistencies observed in the process of global reform transfer. Among the nations of the world, nowhere is the influence of external forces on educational reforms more evident than in post-conflict nations under close international supervision. A case study of post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina revealed that not only policies but also national legislation conformed to European democratic norms, while the externally-induced and somewhat contradictory reforms of centralization and decentralization did not materialize in practice. Ultimately, policy–practice gaps and changeability of global reform models may be expected since they leave room for strategic interactions between national and international actors based on the pragmatic considerations of both parties to achieve their own mandates and purposes.

Introduction

Post-conflict societies tend to adopt a number of educational reforms, since crisis is often seen as an opportunity for social transformation (INEE, 2010). In shaping educational reforms to facilitate such a transformation, often to a more democratic society, international agencies play an influential role to the extent that they not only help draft government policy papers but also national legislation. As such, education reforms in post-conflict contexts are expected to closely adhere to so-called “global standards,” a central claim of education convergence theory used to explain global reform transfer.

The process of reform convergence has been explained by sociological neo-institutionalism, an influential perspective in comparative and international education, which stresses the role of international donor and professional communities in diffusing particular models (Meyer and Ramirez, 2000). In the words of John Meyer and Francisco Ramirez, “professional models of the education system have intensified over time, with worldwide professional and organizational integration” and they have been “institutionalized in concrete world organizations such as the World Bank, UNESCO, and other parts of the UN system, the OECD, other world and regional organizations” (Meyer and Ramirez, 2000: 116–117).

Among the nations of the world, nowhere is the influence of external forces on educational reforms more evident than in post-conflict nations under close international supervision. The momentum of social transformation and the embryo stage of state formation invite the active involvement of international agencies in post-conflict reconstruction. These agencies’ active involvement is often facilitated by the powerful roles accorded to them, including a mandate to supervise, monitor or even directly administer necessary reforms. As such, they can provide unique insights when we examine the claim of education convergence theory. This study investigates the extent to which education convergence theory can explain the phenomenon of educational reforms in the post-conflict nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), with a focus on governance reforms. By illustrating the potentials and limitations of the theory, as well as exploring its assumptions, it is hoped that the study contributes to the discussion around global reform transfer.

Theoretical perspectives

Global education convergence

Global education convergence is elucidated by neo-institutionalism, a useful lens to analyze the education reform process around the world. Neo-institutionalism explains the process by which nations adopt international norms (Boyle et al., 2002). According to neo-institutionalists, standardization occurs globally, in the field of education as well as elsewhere (Meyer and Ramirez, 2000). From the perspective of organizational theory, institutionalism generally explains that organizations need to conform to the mainstream to increase their legitimacy (Marion, 2005). Neo-institutionalism in comparative and international education is an extension of this idea, explaining that the structure of education around the world looks increasingly similar because policy-makers see the adoption of global models as the only legitimized option (Meyer and Ramirez, 2000).

The phenomenon of system convergence has also been discussed within the more familiar discourse of globalization. Globalization refers to “the tendency for similar policies and practices to spread across political, cultural and geographical boundaries” (Dimmock, 2002: 38). The global models, including those defining the forms of education management, emanate from Western industrialized nations (Dimmock, 2002). These models, expressed as “world culture,” are claimed to be rooted in rationality and universalism, thus facilitating the homogenization of institutions around the world (Baker and LeTendre, 2005). Education as an institution is deeply affixed to the global norms and rules (Baker and LeTendre, 2005).

While globalization may often involve homogenization through free trade and economic activities operated by multinational corporations, the claimed convergence of educational systems occurs in a more organized fashion – through a network of international and professional bodies. The multilateral agencies engaged in educational assistance, such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Bank, provide the legitimacy for a set of particular educational reforms that supposedly address or solve problems in policy-importing nations. These international organizations represent a “more direct and organized mechanism for diffusion” (Meyer and Ramirez, 2000: 118). According to this thesis, national governments around the world are conforming to an identical set of standards presented by these international bodies.

Importantly, neo-institutionalism stresses that national policy-makers adopt global standards voluntarily, a point of difference between neo-institutionalism and the dependency model of educational transfer. Dependency theory describes the transfer of norms and practices from the core to peripheral nations as the exploitation of the poor by the rich capitalist class (Arnove, 1980). In contrast, neo-institutional scholars claim that the role of external actors is to provide nations with support in the form of legitimacy, rather than authoritarian imposition by dominant interests (Meyer et al., 1997). This claim implies that the cross-border ideas today are less exploitative and more “universal,” thus more easily accepted by those on the receiving end. For example, the increase in girls’ school enrolment around the world and the declining effects of gender in mathematics education testify to the acceptance of egalitarian principles that professional and scientific educational discourse espouses (Baker and LeTendre, 2005; Meyer and Ramirez, 2000).

National case studies have provided evidence that education isomorphism indeed appears to occur. Valdiviezo (2009), analyzing the case of bilingual intercultural education in Peru, indicates that the states develop policies in accordance with prevailing global agendas in order to gain respect from the international community and secure financial support. Policy convergence occurs not only in aid-recipient nations but in industrialized nations as well. In Ireland, for example, the national government has adopted anti-racism and intercultural policies partly because it wants to project a positive image of the nation in the eyes of the international community in its attempt to attract tourists and multi-national companies (Bryan, 2009). The cases of Peru and Ireland support the claim made by neo-institutionalists that the policy transfer cannot be solely explained by the dependency theory, and that national leaders’ decisions to adopt global models are motivated by their desire to be seen as conforming to the global standards.

Importantly, the education convergence theorists’ claim regarding the universality of global education models and the national leaders’ voluntary acceptance of such models indicates their belief in education convergence extending beyond the policy level. It has been asserted that the isomorphic pressure is powerful enough that “today we can walk into almost any public school around the world and be able to understand what is going on” (Baker and LeTendre, 2005: 4–5). This homogenization is expected to permeate all levels of reform, from policy to implementation.

The claimed isomorphic pressure is applied to the shaping of education governance as well. Decentralized governance of education is said to be a global phenomenon that reflects neo-institutionalism theory, as shown by the following quote: “Nothing better illustrates the globalization of education than the ongoing trend towards the decentralization of education in many countries. From Argentina to Zambia, national governments are reducing their involvement in education and looking to local communities” (Shields, 2013: 71). Convergence of education systems is so apparent that “it is easy to predict the organization of a newly emerging nation’s administration without knowing anything about the nation itself” (Meyer, 1981 cited in DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 152). In short, global education convergence scholars generally believe that national contexts are becoming less important determinants in shaping education systems in a globalized world. Global models of education indeed reflect “a stateless world society” (Bromley et al., 2011: 542). To what extent this claim holds true is an empirical question which is examined by the present study in the context of a post-conflict nation where its education system is directly affected by international norms and standards.

Critique of education convergence theory

Although neo-institutionalism attempts to describe and explain education homogenization around the world, critics have pointed out extensive variations when it comes to policy implementation (Anderson-Levitt, 2003; Rui, 2007; Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe, 2006). Drawing upon the Cuban’s distinction between “policy talk,” “policy action” and “policy implementation” (Cuban, 1998 cited in Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe, 2006), referring to policy rhetoric, legislation, and actual practice respectively, Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe (2006) insist that global convergence only occurs at the level of policy talk and very rarely at the level of implementation. Various case studies have indeed shown that local actors resist or modify global models of educational reforms. For example, school teachers and inspectors in Guinea defied the opportunity to gain greater autonomy brought about by a new reform (Anderson-Levitt and Diallo, 2003). In other cases, global models were combined with local norms and practices, and transformed to become something original. Ouyang’s study illustrates a Chinese education model that combines both Western and traditional approaches to pedagogy for language teaching (Quyang, 2003). This echoes the description by Phillips and Ochs (2003) of the “internalization” stage of policy appropriation that includes the synthesis of existing systems and external ideas. In short, nation-states do not adopt global models mechanistically, since their education systems are likely to be affected by “economic resources, policy-making processes, and national values” (Fowler, 1994: 94).

Most notably, gaps between policy rhetoric and implementation have been found in the developing world. Generally speaking, developing nations are said to lack characteristics assumed in Western industrialized nations, including political stability, democratic traditions, accessible information, and relatively incorrupt civil servants (Smith, 1985 cited in Dyer, 2002: 47), the lack of which could cause policy implementation to deviate from policy intention. Post-conflict nations may have additional factors that further affect the enactment of policies, such as deep political cleavages as a consequence of war and undeveloped or disrupted civil society. It is then important to critically examine more than the policy documents in order to ascertain the degree of education isomorphism in such conditions.

More fundamentally, a question has been raised as to whether a consistent global model indeed exists that facilitates educational isomorphism. Anderson-Levitt challenges the claim of global convergence by pointing out the “conflicts within nations and even within very same reformers” with regards to the models they advocate (Anderson-Levitt, 2003: 13). Even “global reformers” such as UNESCO and the World Bank, supposedly belonging to the same network of international organizations that provide international norms and standards, may have different policy agendas (Anderson-Levitt, 2003), creating “contestation amid consistency” in policy making at international levels (Vavrus, 2004: 150).

The inconsistency of global models may be a result of the lack of strong evidence proving their efficiency and effectiveness. Institutionalists acknowledge this point. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that the isomorphic processes in organizations proceed even without the clear evidence that their outcomes promise increased organizational efficiency. Ramirez and Boli (1987), for their part, claim that state-sponsored mass education has spread based on the premise of its perceived, rather than actual, effects on nation-building. This reaffirms their claim that, for national policy leaders, legitimacy gained through the adoption of global models founded on supposed universalism and rationality have more value than the models’ actual effects.

Paradoxically, universalism and rationality, claimed by education convergence theorists as drivers to diffuse global models, seem to have created somewhat contradictory education governance models. For example, both centralized and decentralized models have been supported by similar reasons at different times. As an illustrative point, reformers during the Progressive Era in the USA argued that centralized governance would increase the efficiency of educational services, while international organizations today advocate decentralization to achieve the same purpose (Tyack, 1993). Some contend that, in reality, a mixture of decentralization and centralization occurs, such as in the domain of the school curricula (Astiz et al., 2002). This point indicates the difficulty in identifying and defining a single governance model that supposedly travels across nations and facilitates the harmonization of education systems. As we shall see in this paper, the case of BiH illustrates such ambiguity around the so-called “global models.”

Context of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina, a former republic within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is a mosaic of multi-ethnic groups. The three dominant ethno-national groups share a Slavic heritage but are divided primarily by their religious affiliations: Bosniaks (Muslims), Serbs (Orthodox Christians) and Croats (Catholics), accounting for 43.5%, 31.2%, and 17.4% respectively of the population of around 3.8 million, according to the last available census dating back to 1991 (United Nations, 2011). These three groups were involved in intense military confrontation during the 1992–1995 Bosnian war that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. BiH became an independent state in 1995 but continues to be a divided society to the present day.

The present governing system of BiH is indeed a reflection of the social divisions. The Dayton Peace Agreement of 14 December 1995, which has served as the state’s constitution, was formulated based on democratic principles, but it sanctioned the ethnic divisions (Guzina, 2007). After the war, the country was divided into two “Entities,” namely the Bosniak–Croat Federation of BiH (FBiH) and the Serb-dominant Republica Srpska (RS), along with Brčko, an autonomous municipality. FBiH is further divided into 10 cantons, mostly along ethno-national lines. The two Entities, ten cantons and one municipality each have their own education ministries or departments and have tended to manage education based on their ethno-centric agendas.

Since the end of the Bosnian war, international supervision has been an important element of BiH policy-making. At the conclusion of the war, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was set up and given a considerable degree of power by the Dayton Agreement to supervise and monitor a wide range of civil activities. OHR’s extensive power includes the removal of elected officials whose behaviors and actions it deems counter to the principles of the Dayton Agreement. In 2002, the OHR transferred its education mandate to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Since then, the OSCE has taken on the task of ensuring equal education access to all ethnic groups and improving the quality of the education system (Du Pont, 2005). In 2011, the OSCE established two sections dealing with education, the Diversity and Inclusion in Schools Section and the Education Institutions and Legislation Section. These fields of responsibility indicate the extensive involvement of the organization in BiH educational reforms. As such, the international community’s role in BiH education reforms has been characterized as “leadership,” while other sectors are categorized as “lobbying” or “laissez-faire” (Domm, 2007).

The involvement of the OSCE in the education sector also symbolizes the regional character of global intervention in post-conflict reconstruction. The OSCE is funded mainly by European nations and staffed by personnel from the region. The organization works with other European agencies, such as the Commission of European Communities and the Council of Europe (CoE), in its effort to align BiH education with “European standards,” as this paper explains later. As the majority of the BiH population aspires to have their nation join the European Union (EU), these European agencies generally enjoy support from the local populace for their involvement in the development of BiH education (OSCE, 2006a). This regional, presumably well-coordinated and coherent, network of organizations can exert considerable influence on domestic affairs with the support of the mighty OHR and the general populace. This can lead us to suppose that the international policy recommendations or prescriptions are consistently and unfailingly implemented in BiH.

Methodology

This paper adopts a case-study approach by focusing on the particular national context of BiH, and considers the potentials and limitations of global convergence theory to explain education governance reforms in the post-conflict environment. The post-conflict BiH has been characterized by intransigent ethno-nationalistic politics and extensive international supervision. At the broader level, European integration provides an additional yet important background in analyzing the applicability of the theory to the BiH education reform context. Therefore, BiH represents a post-cold war reality of internal conflicts and global governance, as well as regional integration. Since neo-institutionalists’ claims are mostly based on the First World nations and the Third World nations colonized by the First World (Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe, 2006), this case study could provide a unique opportunity to examine the theory’s fundamental assumptions and applicability in a unique context.

One aspect of the study compared official documents produced by European regional bodies and BiH national authorities, and investigated the extent to which BiH education reform policies and legislation conform to European norms and standards. Documents include key papers published by three major European agencies active in the education reform process in BiH, namely the OSCE, the European Commission (also known as the Commission of European Communities) and the CoE, as well as national policy and legal documents published by BiH education authorities. In searching the documents and reports, on-line search engines were used as a primary method to locate them. The researcher recorded the norms, values and standards mentioned by the European agencies and BiH national authorities when they discussed the nation’s education reforms. Their rhetoric was then compared to determine whether and to what extent convergence occurred at the levels of policy and legislation.

In discussing the extent of reform convergence during the implementation phase, the study also used reports published by international bodies that evaluated the reforms. The researcher reviewed all the evaluative reports of BiH education available in the three organizations’ respective websites. Although their evaluation studies are not necessarily extensive and complete, they provide useful insights into whether and to what extent the reforms have been implemented. In addition, the author’s own 2011 field research on the nature of school governance in BiH informed the present study (see for details the Komatsu, 2014). The data collected from the secondary school directors throughout BiH contained information about the implementation status of a decentralization reform that had been introduced in 2003. This information was used in the present study to assess the extent to which the implementation was conforming to European standards. Having noted policy-implementation gaps, the discussion section of this paper critically examines the observed phenomena of education reforms by alluding to the roles and motives of the external and domestic policy actors who influenced the dynamics of policy transfer in this post-conflict context.

Evidence

Convergence in policy rhetoric

The analysis of the documents published by the OSCE, the European Commission and the CoE reveals that “European standards” are consistently stressed as the desired policy goals or benchmarks against which these organizations assess the progress of BiH educational reforms. For example, the OSCE compares the budget allocation to education in BiH (approximately 5%) with those of other European nations, such as the Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland and Poland, when it evaluates the nation’s commitment to the education sector (OSCE, n.d.a). The OSCE’s insistence that BiH follows European standards was even more clearly pronounced when the organization assisted with the drafting of BiH national policy and legislation documents, as explained later in this paper. As we shall see in this sub-section, the European agencies’ insistence on regional standards placed considerable pressure on BiH policy-makers to harmonize their education systems with the regional/global norms, resulting in the acceptance of global reforms for their policy rhetoric and legislation.

Similarly, the European Commission, an executive organ of the EU that plays a crucial role in determining BiH’s entry into the EU, examines the democratic progress in BiH against the political and economic criteria of European standards. The 2009 report published by the Commission measures progress in BiH against the Copenhagen (European) political criteria, which requires the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (Commission of the European Communities, 2009). The report cites political obstructionism as one of the major obstacles hindering BiH from meeting the criteria.

In education, the European Commission has supported a BiH legislative framework using various regional normative agreements and standards including the Bologna Process, the Lisbon Convention on Higher Education, and the Copenhagen Process on vocational education and training (IIEP, 2011). The 2009 report of the European Commission points out the slow progress in reforming the education sector in line with these normative documents. The report prescribes the actions needing to be accomplished to meet European standards, as shown in the following text: “Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to continue its efforts, in particular for the full implementation of the Framework Laws, establishing a National Qualification Framework and developing quality assurance, addressing the issue of education meeting the needs of the labor market, and developing the lifelong learning concept. … Overall, preparations in the area of education and research have started, but progress is slow and needs to be stepped up” (Commission of the European Communities, 2009: 43–44).

Prior to the transfer of supervision from the OHR to the OSCE, one of the European organizations most heavily involved in BiH education reforms was the CoE. The CoE was established in 1949 to facilitate cooperation among European nations to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law (CoE, n.d.a). For many post-socialist nations, joining the CoE is a gateway to eventual entry into the EU. In 1999, the CoE pressured the representatives of the three constituent peoples in BiH, namely Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, to delete ethno-centric expressions from textbooks as they were not compatible with the European norms.

Since then, the CoE has been involved in various educational reforms, facilitating the alignment of the nation’s educational policies with European standards. The CoE published a booklet “Learning and Teaching about the History of Europe in the 20th Century” and encouraged its member states to teach history from multiple perspectives. The CoE suggests that understanding history through an “us” and “them” mentality is not compatible with European values (CoE, n.d.b). In order to support BiH education, the CoE, together with the OSCE and the Georg Eckert Institute, produced the Guidelines for Writing and Evaluation of History Textbooks for Primary and Secondary Schools (CoE, n.d.c). In addition, the Directorate of Youth and Sports within the CoE declared that the rights of BiH young people need to be universally protected and “can be adopted and adapted from best practice in European youth policy” (CoE, 2005: 1).

The nature of “European standards” so frequently referenced in these European agencies’ documents is rooted in the idea of liberal democracy. The norms underlying these European standards can be traced back to the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, adopted by the European governments in 1990. The three principles — human rights, democracy and rule of law — are cited as the guiding norms for European nations (OSCE, 1990). The end of the Cold War created the opportunity for European states to adopt basic social principles upon which the members’ behaviors are judged legitimate and newcomers’ membership in European regional agencies is determined (Schimmelfennig, 2002).

The European standards advocated by the European agencies have been transcribed into BiH national policy and legal documents, suggesting that reform policy alignment does occur at the levels of policy rhetoric (“policy talk”) and even national legislation (“policy action”). Two important documents that are meant to shape education in BiH, the Education Reform Strategy paper and the Framework Law of Primary and Secondary Education (hereafter Framework Law), are indicative of this direction. Both documents were drafted with the intense involvement of the European agencies, particularly the OSCE. The Strategy paper was published in 2002 and the Framework Law was subsequently adopted by the BiH national assembly in 2003, coinciding with the period when the OSCE was designated by the OHR as the responsible body for facilitating educational reforms in BiH. The publication of these documents and the designation of the OSCE as the lead agency for BiH education reforms should be understood as a move towards further alignment of BiH education with European standards.

The Education Reform Strategy paper, a primary BiH education policy document, is full of expressions promising new reforms to improve education based on European standards. The Strategy paper is said to provide direction for educational reforms in BiH incorporating “European pedagogical, organizational standards and norms” (OSCE, 2006b: 14). The need for policy alignment is most clearly pronounced in its Preamble. The Preamble ends with the following: “We encourage everyone involved in the process of education reform to show how, together, we can move Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its young people, decisively towards the highest European standards” (Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2002: 14). Also in the Preamble, the paper declares that the BiH education system has “fallen behind the rest of Europe” (Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2002: 7). This reminds us of the claim by Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe that post-Soviet nations often voluntarily borrow international models of education for the fear of falling behind internationally (Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe, 2006: 14). These statements clearly show that educational reform policies in BiH are meant to follow European models of education.

This “policy talk” was later translated into “policy action” in the form of the Framework Law of Primary and Secondary Education. Indeed, the adoption of the Framework Law was one of the post-accession commitments to the Council of Europe (OSCE, n.d.b). The failure to achieve it would have made BiH lose its credibility in the eyes of the European community. It is then evident that the pressure is significant enough for BiH authorities to adopt and express European norms in their policy documents and legislation.

This paper next turns to a discussion of education’s organizational standards as described in the Framework Law, and examines their alignment with the reform standards up to the level of implementation. In order to improve system efficiency and social cohesion in the post-conflict BiH, two opposite education governance reforms, namely centralization and decentralization, were introduced under the guidance of and pressure from the external European agencies. The introduction of two reforms simultaneously empowering both the state-level agency and the service-delivery institutions (schools) suggests the complexity – or ambiguity – of “global reform models.” The study also reports that a wide discrepancy was found between policy and implementation with regard to these two governance reforms.

Further centralization

Since the establishment of the Entity and cantonal system decreed by the Dayton Peace Agreement, the international community has been calling for the harmonization of the BiH education system. In the eyes of both internal and external observers, the fragmented system has only contributed to economic wastage (UNDP, 2003), the segregation of children (Kreso, 1999, 2008) and the reinforcement of ethno-centric education in schools (UNDP, 2003; OECD, 2001). The latter two concerns are articulated in an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development report as: “The decentralizing logic of Dayton has made education a hostage to latent nationalism in BiH. Politically, education is seen largely as a vehicle for creating three separate national histories, languages and cultures, rather than as a way to develop a common State identity” (OECD, 2001: 11). In short, the international community has attributed the lack of administrative efficiency and underdevelopment of social cohesion to the decentralized and ethno-regional system of education governance.

In 2007, the state-level Education Agency was launched as a centralization reform to better coordinate the education sector, thus facilitating administrative efficiency and social cohesion. The creation of the Education Agency had already been foreseen in the Framework Law drafted with the European regional agencies’ support. Before the establishment of the Education Agency, it was the Conference of Ministers of Education that was solely responsible for coordination of the education sector (OSCE, n.d.b). While the Conference of Ministers of Education still remains the primary coordinating body, the Education Agency is expected to strengthen the coordination and systematization of the education system by establishing state-level learning objectives and standards. In addition, the Education Agency is mandated with developing a common core curriculum. These tasks are meant to facilitate the integration of school systems so that “children spend more time learning together than learning apart” (OSCE, 2008: 2).

A review of official documents suggests that the creation of the Education Agency was justified on the grounds that it was in accordance with European principles, suggesting that the reform policy aligns with European models of education. The 2007 Law on Agency for Pre-school, Primary and Secondary Education, which established the Education Agency, states that the Education Agency is expected to “make the educational standards (of BiH) comparable to the standards of European countries” (Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2007: Article 10). The European Commission argues in its report, under the section titled “European standards,” that the development of a common educational textbook for all children is a critical area of educational reforms in BiH and stresses that state-level institutions, including the Education Agency, play crucial roles in harmonizing educational systems in the country (Commission of the European Communities, 2009). These documents suggest that it was imperative for BiH to adopt the centralization reform as the country was preparing to submit its candidacy to join the EU as a functioning and cohesive state entity.

On the surface, the development of the state-level agency indicates a move to more system integration and eventual harmonization of school curricula; however, the move has not yet brought real changes to education governance in the country. Most strikingly, the role of the Education Agency has not yet been clearly defined, even years after its establishment. Moreover, the Education Agency faces chronic understaffing and limited budget (Commission of the European Communities, 2009). The OSCE has been pressuring BiH regional leaders to delegate their power to the Education Agency so as to “ensure that the Agency is substantive and meaningful, and can ensure state-wide standards of education for all children” (OSCE, 2008: 2). In reality, however, Entities and cantons maintain discretionary power over education in their respective regions (OSCE, n.d.b). At the time of my field research in BiH in 2011, I did not find strong evidence that the centralization reform had been implemented so as to facilitate the harmonization of education systems. As an example, the approval for my research, which distributed a questionnaire to all BiH secondary schools, had to be sought separately from each of the 12 regional authorities.

Further decentralization

Another reform intending to provide education system standardization is, paradoxically, further decentralization. The 2003 Framework Law provided greater autonomy to schools by creating school boards (Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003). With the promulgation of the Framework Law, school boards were established to represent the interests of diverse ethnic groups within a local school community and to reflect their views on school management. School directors are to be appointed by the school boards, rather than by the regional education ministers who used to select them based on political and ethnic affiliation.

The introduction of a decentralization reform was, just as the aforementioned centralization reform, justified on the grounds that it would follow European standards. The Education Reform Strategy paper declares that education needs to be depoliticized, and that BiH education is governed by the notion of democratic and participatory school management (Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2002). The OSCE reaffirms that such a notion of school management is in accordance with European organizational standards and norms (OSCE, 2006b). The OSCE then argues that democratic and participatory school management ensures that school resources are used rationally and that inter-ethnic relations are improved as a result of inclusive governance (OSCE, 2006a). This comparison of the BiH policy paper and OSCE’s reports make it clear that BiH education policies are designed to reflect European democratic norms that stress efficient allocation of resources and social cohesion.

It should be recalled, however, that the efficiency and social cohesion arguments were also used to justify the establishment of the state-level Education Agency. This reminds us of Tyack’s (1993) argument that centralization and decentralization can be promoted for the same reasons. One may argue that centralized governance benefits from the economies of scale, while others may advance that decentralized governance utilizes resources more wisely since the local actors better understand the local needs. As for social cohesion, one may contend that centralized governance creates a cohesive society by creating common curriculum, while others may insist that school-based management can better enhance social cohesion by the deliberative process where diverse groups discuss their concerns at the grass-roots level.

Similar to the centralization reform, the decentralization policy aligns with European standards not only at the level of “policy talk,” but also at the level of “policy action.” The promulgation of the Framework Law that introduced school-based management is a testimony to this point. Reform convergence at the level of legislation may suggest that education isomorphism occurs deep within the nation’s education system. Based on a study of policy transfer from donors to aid-recipient nations, Therkildsen (2000) argues that the legislation of a policy in policy-importing nations shows the national authority’s political commitment since its drafting and approval are less influenced by external donors. Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe (2006) argue in a similar vein that a huge gap is likely to exist between policy talk and policy action since the national policy leaders treat the former as a means of addressing the international donors. In the case of BiH, however, the legislative process itself is also influenced by external actors, exemplified by the OHR’s power to revoke any laws they judge as contrary to the Dayton Peace Agreement. This indicates a post-conflict reality where supra-national bodies deeply affect national policies beyond policy rhetoric. Still, it is prudent to note that the legislation does not necessarily signify the political commitment of BiH national authorities to implement their pronounced policies.

Empirical evidence, in fact, suggests a clear lack of political commitment by BiH national leaders to implement the decentralization reform. An evaluation conducted by the OSCE indicates that the reform has faced considerable obstacles during its implementation. First, despite the passing of the 2003 Framework Law which mandates the alignment of Entities, cantonal and Brčko’s by-laws with the national Framework Law, no regional governments took action to modify their regional laws by the specified deadline of 1 January 2004, with the minor exception of the Brčko district. Three cantons – Canton 10, Central Bosnia Canton, and West Herzegovina Canton – were particularly reluctant or slow to amend their laws to align with the Framework Law. After political pressure and financial sanctions, the OHR imposed the harmonization of by-laws in these cantons on 7 July 2004 (OSCE, 2006b).

Second, even in the regions that amended their by-laws to introduce the new system of school board autonomy, the policy implementation appears to have deviated from the spirit of decentralization. An OSCE study found considerable variance among regions and schools in terms of the degree of autonomy enjoyed by their school boards. In some cantons, ministries of education maintain their power by installing their representatives as members of school boards and by influencing school board decisions. In others, education ministries kept tight control over the school director appointment process or became obstructive with regard to the implementation of school board decisions (OSCE, 2006b). These findings were confirmed by my 2011 study, which generally found a lack of local ownership over school management. For example, the study found that government representation outweighed the local stakeholders in seven out of twelve regions (Komatsu, 2014).

Discussion and conclusion

Several implications can be drawn from this study that can contribute to the discussion around education convergence and reform transfers. Most strikingly, the reform adoption phenomenon in post-conflict BiH demonstrates the applicability of global convergence theory in dichotomy: homogenization at the policy and legislative levels on the one hand, and divergence in implementation on the other. The supposedly well-coordinated network of European organizations is expected to produce a consistent reform package. Also, as these organizations possess considerable power to influence BiH education, their proposed reforms are expected to be implemented as they were envisaged. However, the study showed otherwise.

The analysis of policy documents and evaluative reports published by international organizations and BiH authorities shows that the national alignment of educational reforms to global or “legitimatized” standards indeed occurs, appearing to support neo-institutionalists’ claim of global education isomorphism. This finding is not very surprising given the extensive involvement of European regional agencies in the BiH policy-making process. Whether international donors are seen as exploitative, or simply influential, their presence cannot be ignored in the analysis of education policy and governance in post-conflict contexts. The tight alignment of policies and legislation to global standards is indeed a reflection of “post-national” policy-making and the ever-growing influence of global governance on domestic reforms.

On the other hand, the paper also showed that the alignment of “policy talk” and “policy action” to global norms did not necessarily translate into the alignment of practices related to these norms. While European standards were reflected in the policy documents and state-level legislation, the study reports that the BiH policy elites faltered in their implementation. The behaviors of ethno-nationalistic leaders in BiH illustrate this point. Their insistence on ethnically separate education administrations and segregated schooling seems to contradict the secular values that European standards espouse. It is not surprising, then, that the reforms that intended to create a central coordinating body and local school autonomy have not been very successful.

This finding reaffirms the claim made by critiques of neo-institutionalism that national contexts do matter in shaping education systems. Even with the strong presence of the international community, BiH political leaders managed to implement global reforms in ways that fit their own interests and values. These leaders could exploit information asymmetries existing between national authorities and external actors (Schimmelfennig, 2002), even in an environment closely monitored by external agencies. This shows that reform implementation still lies in the hands of national authorities who can subvert the reform spirit.

National contexts matter, particularly in the case of governance reforms. Perhaps this is so because these global ideas are often democratic in nature, and as such, they potentially threaten the power and interests of policy leaders. The derailment of democratic reforms may be particularly noticeable in an often politicized post-conflict environment where elites’ competition to seize power is acute. It is also necessary to point out that a strong civil society would naturally monitor and facilitate the implementation of democratic reforms, thereby advancing democratic governance, but former socialist states emerging from conflict may lack this tradition.

This study also suggests the need for further discussion of the “global models” of education governance. The models are not very clearly defined, even by the supposedly tight circle of EU agencies. As noted, BiH policy-makers adopted both centralization and decentralization reform policies at the same time. This case accentuates the contradiction of the global models, each of which espouses norms and values such as autonomy, participation, competition, efficiency, self-determination and nation-building derived from the same source, namely modernization. These values can, however, be represented in different kinds of governance systems, sometimes in contradictory forms. Perhaps such contradiction is inevitable when one considers the incongruity that exists even among so-called “global norms” (Finnemore, 1996). For example, autonomy and nation-building (or social cohesion), as well as efficiency and participation are some of the relationships that may be characterized by resulting tension and trade-offs.

Ultimately, the policy implementation gaps and the inconsistencies of global models may be expected since they leave room for strategic interactions between national and international actors based on the pragmatic considerations of both parties to achieve their own mandates and purposes. As an illustration, the European agencies may be adopting a strategy of gradual phases to assist BiH in becoming an EU member. BiH was accepted into the CoE as soon as the national Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education was adopted. The implementation of the Framework Law was treated as a post-membership commitment. BiH national leaders, for their part, made a compromise to accept the Law, possibly to increase their political legitimacy among their domestic constituents (Komatsu, 2013), but they have largely ignored implementing it thus far.

Also, multiple “global models” may allow international actors to engage in flexible policy discussions. External experts in BiH may cite European values and norms when recommending a variety of educational reforms for depoliticizing education, thereby improving efficiency and enhancing social cohesion. In this case, the seeming inconsistency between these reforms does not matter as long as they pursue the same goals. These experts may not be in “contestation” of ideas (Vavrus, 2004), as described previously, but strategically use these ideas to recommend various models in order to negotiate effectively with national policy leaders. A volatile and politicized post-conflict environment may require such flexibility. These observations indicate that reform transfer in the post-conflict context is indeed a complex phenomenon involving strategies and negotiation between policy exporters and importers. Future studies may choose to empirically examine the perspectives, behaviors and actions of these policy actors, which will undoubtedly enhance our understanding of global reform transfer.