Abstract
The article argues that constitutionalism and populism are fundamentally antithetical, contending that conflict-driven populism offers greater potential for egalitarian politics than consensus-oriented constitutionalism. Through an examination of early English and British radical movements—the Levellers and the Chartists—as well as of the establishment of the notion of public opinion from the eighteenth century onwards, the article demonstrates how reliance on the constitution, as idiom and strategic horizon, constrained political imagination, normalized conflict, and ultimately limited demands for social transformation. Drawing on Tom Nairn’s and other progressive historians’ work, the article suggests that constitutional frameworks suppress class antagonism, whereas progressive populism can revitalize political agency. It concludes that a more openly conflictual, populist orientation may have advanced working-class interests more effectively than entrenched constitutional discourse.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
