In this contribution, based on a simple theoretical approach, we try to show that the number of teams that is optimal to a monopoly league, being a cartel of clubs and acting in the interest of the participating or insider clubs only, is smaller than the welfare optimal number of teams in a league, which also takes into account the interests of the spectators.
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