Abstract
This research explores how international status inconsistencies influence states’ propensity to initiate conflict. Drawing on prospect theory and social identity theory, the authors argue that discrepancies between a state’s expected and actual recognition—termed status inconsistency—skew decision-makers’ perceptions of risk, particularly when states perceive themselves to be in the “domain of losses.” Re-operationalizing the Volgy et al. framework, the study quantifies recognition, behavior, and capabilities for all states from 1995 to 2010 to construct a continuous measure of status inconsistency. The paper quantitatively models a state’s expected recognition; the authors assess both the magnitude and trajectory of these inconsistencies. Empirical findings show that underachieving states—those receiving less recognition than warranted—are significantly more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes, especially when their status is declining. Conversely, overachieving states are risk-averse and less likely to engage in conflict. The trajectory of inconsistency moderates these effects: improving trends dampen conflict proclivity even among underachievers. The paper concludes that recognition discrepancies affect not only whether a state uses force but also the intensity of that force. Importantly, the authors find that conflictual behavior does little to increase recognition, suggesting that underachieving states might pursue conflict ineffectively. This framework offers a novel empirical approach to understanding foreign policy risk behavior and provides critical insights for policymakers and strategic planners, particularly regarding the motivations of declining powers and the conditions under which seemingly irrational conflicts emerge.
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