Lebanon and Syria: Navigating Their Shared Histories and Destinies in the Post-Assad Era

Abstract

In late 2024, and within the span of nearly two weeks, the political landscape in Lebanon and Syria was dramatically transformed with the Hezbollah–Israel ceasefire agreement and the rapid collapse of the Assad regime in early December. New administrations were formed in both countries soon after, which in turn set expectations of improved relations between Lebanon and Syria. However, in the spring of 2025, clashes erupted on the porous Lebanese–Syrian border—a border that remains ambiguous and subject to demarcation due to decades of sour Lebanese–Syrian relations. The clashes were a symptom of a larger issue resultant from the short-sighted, highly securitized approach adopted by the now-deposed Assad regime that fomented skepticism and stoked tensions between the two states. This is further exacerbated by Israel's repeated aggressions against, incursions into, and occupation of territory in both countries. These dynamics continue to threaten the prospects of lasting peace in bilad al-Sham (commonly translated as “the Levant”) and underscore the reality of the situation: two countries joined at the hip, long bound by a shared history, navigating their shared destinies in a post-Assad future. Moving forward, Lebanon and Syria must reset their relations and work together for regional peace and prosperity.

Introduction

Over two decades ago, slain journalist and academic Samir Kassir famously stated: “When the Arab spring starts in Beirut, it will herald the blooming of roses in Damascus” (Abi Akl, 2020). At the time, Lebanon was reeling from a 29-year Syrian military intervention and the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Al-Hariri. The ensuing Cedar Revolution in Lebanon came less than four years after the 2001 Damascus Spring had shown signs of political renewal in Syria. Disappointingly, however, nothing much came of it at the time. Nevertheless, Samir Kassir's words remain just as relevant over 20 years later.

Lebanon and Syria have a rather unique and special relationship—a relationship characterized by a shared history and destiny ¹ that has often been weaponized and undermined by the Assad regime as part of its internal and regional political calculations. For a considerable period of time, major decisions concerning Lebanese sovereignty were taken in Damascus or at its station in the Beqaa Valley. Diplomatic relations were not officially established between the two states until 2008 (Black, 2008), and decades of Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs had made many in Lebanon wary of Syria. Nonetheless, there are long-standing and historic ties between both peoples that should guide their governments’ approaches to bilateral relations going forward.

This briefing will highlight this special relationship between Lebanon and Syria by briefly unpacking the shared histories and destinies of both countries as they navigate their newfound geopolitical realities. It argues that, as both countries reel from the devastation of instability and conflict, there is an opportunity for a reset in Lebanese–Syrian relations that moves away from the mistakes of the past as they both look to the future. This reset must prioritize cooperation in recovery and development in order for sustainable peacebuilding to take root in both countries.

Shared Histories: A Troubled Relationship Between Kin

The complex and intertwined relationship between Lebanon and Syria is a tapestry woven from the threads of proximity, common struggle, and a shared history—a relationship which Élizabeth Picard referred to as one between intimes étrangers (or “intimate strangers”) (Picard, 2016). This relationship did not rupture when these two countries gained independence in the 1940s. In fact, their struggle for independence cut through the borders imposed by the French mandate. Fares Al-Khoury, born and raised in Hasbaya, Lebanon, became one of the founding fathers of the modern Syrian state (Sa’adeh, 2011). Several prominent founding members of the pro-independence National Bloc in Syria were from modern-day Lebanon, namely from Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon (Moubayed, 2020). Additionally, both states shared a central bank until 1964—the Banque de Syrie et du Liban (Makdisi, 1975).

More recently, however, this shared history has been punctuated by decades of occupation, domination, and military and political interventions (Picard, 2016). Syria's direct involvement in post-independence Lebanon most notably came in 1976 with Hafez Al-Assad's securitized decision to intervene in the Lebanese civil war (Kabalan, 2025). What started as a “peacekeeping” mission turned into an extended period of Syrian military and political hegemony spanning 29 years, ending only in April 2005 after the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Al-Hariri—an act widely attributed to the Assad regime—sparked the Cedar Revolution.

During this 29-year period, which came to be known as Pax Syriana (Hinnebusch, 1998; El-Husseini, 2012), Syrian influence in Lebanese politics had grown so significantly that it dictated presidential elections and cabinet formations, influenced legislation, and had embedded its security apparatus across the country (Salloukh, 2006; El-Husseini, 2012). Effectively, during this period, Ghazi Kanaan, and later Rustum Ghazaleh, was the de facto Governor of Lebanon and ruled from the Syrian military intelligence's Lebanese headquarters in Anjar in the Beqaa Valley. Additionally, Syria and Lebanon signed various bilateral agreements in the aftermath of the Taif Agreement—most notably the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination in 1991—that further institutionalized the former's grip on the latter (El-Husseini, 2012; Aboultaif, 2016).

This unequal dynamic imposed by Al-Assad—both father and son—on Lebanon was shortsighted. It led to deep-seated resentment and skepticism on both sides of the eastern mountains of Lebanon (the Anti-Lebanon mountain range), with many in Lebanon viewing Syria as an occupying force, while some in Syria considered Lebanon merely a province (El-Husseini, 2012; Aboultaif, 2016; Al-Bunni, 2025; Moubayed, 2025). Moving forward, it is critical that both countries—mainly Syria—recognize this legacy and past as they build their diplomatic ties and move toward closer collaboration.

Certainly, these feelings of resentment and skepticism did not fade with the Syrian withdrawal in April 2005, as it was confined to the Syrian military, and the Assad regime's influence continued to be wielded through its political allies who formed what came to be popularly known as the March 8 Alliance. Simultaneously, Syria continued to serve as the conduit and critical artery for arms shipments headed toward Hezbollah in Lebanon. This strengthening partnership was the preamble to Hezbollah's intervention in Syria on the side of the Assad regime following the 2011 revolution.

The influx of displaced Syrians who fled the Assad war machine since 2011 and sought refuge in Lebanon—estimated at a total of 1.5 million—further worsened Lebanese–Syrian relations (Karam, 2023). At first, Syrian refugees were welcomed by many (Anouti & Enna, 2023; Fakhoury & Aitken, 2023). However, the political discourse in Lebanon on this subject rapidly deteriorated to futile discussions characterized by heavy undertones of anti-Syrian discrimination as the situation in Syria worsened. Surveys in Lebanon showed that Syrian refugees were perceived as a security risk (Fakhoury, 2017) and a burden on Lebanon (Anouti & Enna, 2023). These feelings were certainly exacerbated as Lebanon grappled with a deteriorating economic and security reality.

Syrian refugees also came to be used as a political bargaining chip by some elements of the Lebanese political establishment, particularly those allied with the Assad regime, to lend credence to the image that Syria was once again safe enough for their return (The Syrian Observer, 2023). Various members of the Lebanese political establishment also repeatedly invoked the threat of demographic imbalance to warn against the continued presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon (Al Jazeera, 2023; Anouti & Enna, 2023).

Gebran Bassil, former Lebanese foreign minister, son-in-law of former president Michel Aoun, and head of the Free Patriotic Movement, even called for blackmailing the European Union with a large influx of Syrian refugees in return for financial reward (Musarea, 2024). Syrian refugees fleeing the Assad regime's violence found themselves paying for the latter's crimes in Lebanon as well as for its deteriorating economy (The New Arab, 2018; Karam, 2023).

Thus, the refugee crisis is an example of an issue of mutual concern that must be addressed through coordinated regional peacebuilding frameworks that, in this case, prioritize the humane and dignified return of refugees and move away from the harmful populism that has plagued public discourse over the past 15 years. To this end, the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 provides a golden opportunity for a reset in Lebanese–Syrian relations despite the shadow cast by the legacies of the past.

Lebanese–Syrian Relations Since Late 2024

On November 27, 2024, Hezbollah and Israel signed a ceasefire agreement, which was meant to end nearly 14 months of hostilities. Less than two weeks later, the Assad regime collapsed. This is no coincidence, as a weakened—but as the 2026 war of choice on Iran showed, not defeated—Hezbollah could not do much more than watch on as its fatigued ally in Damascus rapidly crumbled under the weight of a surprise offensive in the north.

What came after was a newfound geopolitical reality in the Levant ² region, with new administrations assuming power in Beirut and Damascus soon after. In Lebanon, army chief Joseph Aoun was elected as president in January 2025 to fill a position that had been vacant since October 2022. A month later, then-President of the International Court of Justice Nawaf Salam was elected premier. These two appointments came with high hopes, both domestically and internationally, for much-needed reforms, with the question of Hezbollah's arms and the implementation of the November 2025 ceasefire agreement with Israel dominating the public discourse in Lebanon.

In Syria, Ahmad Al-Sharaa, formerly Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham and of Al-Nusra Front before that, was named transitional president. The new administration in Damascus was faced with many pressing and immediate challenges, such as reconstruction, economic recovery, and a political transition to a republic the contours of which are yet to be fully revealed. The results of the transitional government's efforts to address these challenges will not be seen for years at least after the publication of this briefing. The same can be said in the case of Lebanon, with recurrent conflict repeatedly casting a cloud of uncertainty over the country's future. However, what this briefing argues for is that Lebanon and Syria must work together to confront these challenges because both states—their histories and their destinies—are linked to one another. Parallels can be drawn between both contexts that emphasize this point, and the neglect of this interconnectedness has the potential to lead to conflict between the two countries.

This was evident in March 2025 with the cross-border violence that erupted along with parts of the porous frontier between Lebanon and Syria after an alleged attack by Hezbollah left three Syrian soldiers dead (The New Arab, 2025b). Following several days of shelling, seven Lebanese citizens and three Syrian citizens were killed, in addition to 52 injured (Al Jazeera, 2025). Clashes briefly broke out again in April 2025 and March 2026, with the transitional Syrian government accusing Hezbollah of firing artillery shells at Al Qusayr in Homs and Serghaya in the Damascus countryside (Al-jnaidi & Abu Shamala, 2025; Abdallah, Abdallah & Robledo-Davis, 2026).

During the 2025 clashes, Lebanese and Syrian officials, including Aoun, Salam, and Al-Sharaa, made several acknowledgements of the importance of coordination on issues of mutual concern, in this case on border security (Burjawi & Asmar, 2025; Reuters, 2025). This was seen again during the war on Iran in March 2026, when Lebanese fears following a Syrian military deployment along with the border were eased with a call between Aoun and Al-Sharaa shortly afterward (The Syrian Observer, 2026). However, this rather limited engagement was underwhelming given the immense challenges facing the two states.

Both administrations face the challenge of extending the state's control over the entirety of its territory amid recurrent conflict and foreign intervention, particularly by an increasingly and openly expansionist Israel. Additionally, both leaders are keen to show their people and the US and Israeli governments alike that they are able to end the free reign of nonstate armed groups within their borders, enforce the state's monopoly on arms, implement much-needed reforms, and safeguard their countries’ best interests.

For instance, Al-Sharaa has repeatedly emphasized his goal to extend the central government's monopoly on arms to the rest of Syria, and perhaps more implicitly to sever the supply routes to Hezbollah that once flowed freely through the country. In the view of the new administration in Damascus, the 2025 and 2026 border clashes were a stark reminder of the security threat posed by Hezbollah, given the group's rather active role in supporting its ally Bashar Al-Assad in the past (Jawhar, 2025).

Similarly, and under immense international pressure, ensuring the Lebanese state's monopoly on arms and the disarmament of Hezbollah was the key objective outlined by both Aoun and Salam upon assuming their offices in early 2025. To this end, the Lebanese army had worked to expand its presence south of the Litani River, taking over positions and outposts held by Hezbollah in the process. However, the outbreak of renewed conflict in March 2026, along with the Israeli military's continued aggression against and occupation of southern Lebanon and Hezbollah's refusal to disarm, will complicate the government's plans in this regard.

Another issue which has received far less attention in the public discourse despite being squarely within the context of Lebanese-Syrian relations has been the question of over 2000 Syrian detainees held in Lebanese prisons, which “the Lebanese authorities treat as both a security and judicial issue, while Damascus considers it a sovereign, humanitarian issue and a test of Beirut's position toward the new Syrian government” (Jawhar, 2025). This, along with Hezbollah's arms and the question of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, could stand as immediate obstacles in the face of reset of Lebanese–Syrian relations. Once again, these issues of mutual concern underscore the urgent need for sustainable peace initiatives, open channels of dialogue and communication, and a reset in ties to safeguard the stability and prosperity of both countries.

The future of Lebanese–Syrian relations stands at a crossroads between opportunity and peril. With the Assad regime gone and an increased emphasis on state sovereignty in both countries, there is an opportunity for Lebanon and Syria to jointly pave a path toward shared peace and prosperity. The threat of peril, however, lies in a continued securitized approach to Lebanese–Syrian relations, which will only foment the existing mistrust. This could lead to renewed, more widespread cross-border violence and will likely further complicate efforts on areas of mutual interest.

Shared Destinies: Navigating the Path Forward

The reality is that Lebanon and Syria, along with Jordan and Palestine, have a shared interest in one another's prosperity—peace and conflict are inextricably linked in bilad al-Sham. Conflict in one may spill over into another, and instability in one may spread to the other. Genuine peace and prosperity cannot be realized for all so long as one of these countries is occupied, unstable, or in conflict. As such, it is no coincidence that upheaval in both Lebanon and Syria came hand in hand.

Conversely, any action or policy that serves to harm the security of any of the states—such as through smuggling (arms and drugs), occupation, or interference in one's internal affairs—would also harm the collective security of the four countries altogether. The continued Israeli occupation of and aggression against Lebanon and Syria—an extension of its occupation of and aggression against Palestine—is a poignant example of this, and every incursion or attack carried out further risks the expansion of conflict in the region (Asmar, 2024).

This highlights the interconnectedness of regional peace and security and the need for joint peacebuilding efforts that address both internal and external sources of instability. This also emphasizes the need for a reset in Lebanese–Syrian ties moving forward. An early, and symbolic, example of what this reset may hold in store is the transitional Syrian government's acknowledgement of the Syrian state's involvement in the assassination of various prominent Lebanese politicians, such as Rafic Al-Hariri, Bachir Gemayel, and Kamal Jumblatt (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2024; L’Orient Today, 2025a).

Therefore, regional cooperation based on such a reset and aimed at collective peacebuilding and sustainable development is critical to ensuring that the benefits of stability are shared across borders, and officials have repeatedly affirmed this point in several meetings and conferences held since early 2025 (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2024; Petra News Agency, 2025; SANA, 2025; Weldali, 2025).

The benefits of closer cooperation and coordination extend beyond the immediate borders of Lebanon or Syria. For instance, both states stand to gain considerably from economic integration, freedom of movement, and complementary recovery and development plans going forward. These benefits can be further amplified when such cooperation is conceived and actioned within a regional framework of Levantine solidarity between these two countries and Jordan and Palestine. The agreement between Jordan, Syria, and Türkiye to revive the historic Hijaz Railway would be one such materialization of this understanding (The New Arab, 2025a). Another would be the Jordanian–Syrian agreement on boosting trade via their ports straddling the Mediterranean and Red Sea (Almamlaka, 2026).

Perhaps the area in which Lebanon and Syria could benefit the most in the immediate term is the energy sector. In recent years, both states have attempted to address the challenges facing their energy sectors, primarily through agreements with Jordan in 2021 and 2022 to tackle Lebanon's energy crisis (Middle East Monitor, 2022). However, these initiatives had not materialized, largely due to the sanctions regime imposed on Syria at the time.

Following the transformative shifts in Beirut and Damascus in late 2024, these regional initiatives once again gained traction. In November 2025, the energy ministers of all three states met in Amman to explore cooperation in the energy sector, where Jordan reaffirmed its readiness to meet Lebanon and Syria's energy needs pending the rehabilitation of Syrian infrastructure (Jordan News, 2025; L’Orient Today, 2025b; SANA, 2025).

In January 2026, Jordan signed separate energy deals with Lebanon and Syria (Enab Baladi, 2026; Petra News Agency, 2026). That same month, Syria received its first delivery of gas via Jordan (Middle East Monitor, 2026). These steps must be coupled with a wider, long-term effort to rebuild Lebanon and Syria's energy capabilities and are examples of the necessity of bilateral and regional cooperation going forward.

Moreover, the endeavor to rebuild energy capabilities can be a pillar of a wider, complementary, and more comprehensive recovery, reconstruction, and development plan for both Lebanon and Syria. Given the interdependence of their economies, this idea has been put forth as a natural step in renewed or reset Lebanese–Syrian ties (Karam, 2025). To this end, the voluntary return of Syrian refugees will be important to both countries and would undoubtedly have a positive impact on their bilateral relations. Additionally, Lebanese experiences and lessons learned from postconflict reconstruction efforts in the past can play a crucial role in Syria, which in turn could provide a much-needed boost to its economy.

Such a plan can be further supported by other states in the region through technical assistance, investments, and donor conferences, to name a few, with Jordan potentially playing a leading role within a Levantine framework of cooperation and solidarity. Despite the regional focus thus far being on Syria, the region would greatly benefit from extending this focus to Lebanon based on the interconnectedness between both states and the understanding that peace and prosperity are inextricably linked in the region.

As such, what Lebanese–Syrian relations need is a reset—a reset based on this understanding of their shared histories and destinies. Ties between Lebanon and Syria cannot and should not hinge on ad hoc understandings and reactionary agreements after the fact (Jawhar, 2025). Rather, they should be premised on intrinsic values that acknowledge their commonalities and must be situated within the common geographical framework of bilad al-Sham.

To act or pretend that what happens in Damascus does not have any bearing on what happens in Beirut, and vice versa, highlights a flawed approach to and understanding of the region. For instance, it can even be argued that a weakened Hezbollah and the collapse of the Assad regime may lead to a possible return to Lebanese politics for Saad Al-Hariri in time for the next legislative elections. ³ During his speech on the 20^th anniversary of the assassination of his father, Saad Al-Hariri claimed victory over the Assad regime and saluted the Syrian people to a sea of waving Lebanese, Syrian, and Future Movement flags (Houssari, 2025). Thus, the winds of change in Damascus may be incredibly consequential for the political dynamics of Lebanon, and vice versa.

Conclusion

There is far more that unites Lebanon and Syria than what divides them, and their historic relationship is far more significant than to be confined to the legacy of the Al-Assad dynasty. As both countries continue to suffer from the same causes of instability and conflict—be it historical legacies of colonialism or foreign interventions—there is an imperative for closer coordination and collaboration, particularly on issues of early recovery, postconflict reconstruction, security, peacebuilding, and development. Such collaboration will not only rebuild their economies but also nurture the social cohesion and political stability necessary for long-term peace.

Their roadmaps for recovery must be coordinated and integrated. Both Lebanon and Syria must work together on trade liberalization and growth, postconflict reconstruction, seamless cross-border travel and transportation, the expulsion of any and all foreign powers present in or occupying their respective territories, and the safe and voluntary—emphasis on voluntary—return of displaced Syrians. Additionally, a comprehensive land and maritime border demarcation agreement with an emphasis on joint efforts toward border security will be important to the future of Lebanese–Syrian relations. Such issues of mutual concern must dictate the agenda going forward for both countries.

To this end, Lebanese–Syrian relations must be reset. Both states need to acknowledge that they are interdependent—kin, really—and should focus on mutual cooperation within the common geographical framework of bilad al-Sham. By focusing on collaborative peacebuilding and development, Lebanon and Syria can pave the way for a more peaceful and prosperous future for both their peoples and the wider region. Here, the past—both burden and bridge—anchors the possibilities and perils of their shared destinies.