From Conflict Transformation to Peace-Centered Development: Finding Meaningful Pathways

Abstract

Despite widespread agreement on the interdependence of peace and development, the concept of peace-centered development, which places peace at the core of development policy and practice, remains underexplored and is rarely integrated with conflict transformation in practice. Using a multi-method qualitative approach that integrates critical literature review, in-depth country case studies and comparative analysis, we reveal why implementation of conflict transformation alone often falls short in fragile situations and how embedding it within broader development strategies can unlock simultaneous gains in peace and development. We uncover the value and practice of peace-centered development and propose a new framework for connecting conflict transformation with peace-centered development, providing insights to policymakers and practitioners working at the intersection of violence, poverty, and sustainable development.

Keywords

conflict transformation peace-centered development decentralization reforms postconflict societies institutional innovation conflict legacies

Introduction

Conflict transformation targets the deep societal structures and relationships that sustain violence, moving beyond conflict-handling approaches such as prevention and management to confront injustice, mend broken social contracts, support trauma recovery, and restore trust (Lederach, 2003). In practice, however, it often remains confined to the boundaries of conflict issues and is rarely systematically employed as a means to embed peace within development strategies (Ernstorfer et al., 2022; McCandless, 2021). This narrow operationalization limits its transformative potential and leaves unresolved the question of how conflict-vulnerable societies can move from transforming conflicts to achieving peace-centered development (PCD) (Anstey, 2017).

There are compelling reasons for conflict transformation to move beyond its narrow focus on conflict itself and become a core component of how peace and development are understood and pursued. In many fragile settings, conflict drivers, such as economic deprivation and weak institutions, are inseparable from the drivers of underdevelopment. Addressing these drivers solely through conflict transformation risks overlooking the broader structural reforms, such as building democratic institutions and advancing socioeconomic well-being, that are essential for achieving lasting peace and development (Gawerc, 2023). Integrating conflict transformation with PCD can provide a broader perspective, addressing both immediate conflict dynamics and the deeper social, economic, and political foundations necessary for sustainable progress (McCandless, 2021). This integration is particularly needed in contexts where repeated cycles of violence and poverty reinforce each other, and where isolated interventions have proven insufficient in breaking these patterns.

Despite this need, the concept of PCD remains insufficiently defined and underoperationalized, notwithstanding its rich theoretical foundations (Lopera-Arbeláez & Richter, 2024). Policy decisions in less developed and conflict-affected countries increasingly prioritize peace and development; however, the idea of PCD itself is rarely unpacked and largely absent from mainstream sustainable development discourses (Milton & Alhamawi, 2024). PCD is also rarely integrated with conflict transformation, leaving unresolved how development can enable change that is peaceful, just, and rooted in local realities. These gaps help explain the limited presence of PCD ideals in frameworks guiding international assistance and national policy on conflict, peace and development, such as the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States and the United Nations Sustaining Peace Agenda, which reference peace and development but do not provide systematic guidance for understanding PCD and integrating it with conflict transformation (Nussbaum et al., 2012). Consequently, designing interventions that intentionally connect conflict transformation with PCD in vulnerable contexts remains challenging, as no framework currently exists to operationalize this linkage (Olsson & Moore, 2024).

In this article, we introduce PCD as development that is socially and economically just and peaceful, inclusive in its design and delivery, and that leverages the insights revealed through conflict—such as systemic grievances, structural injustices, and institutional fragility—to illuminate context-appropriate opportunities for strengthening collective well-being. PCD places peace as a central objective, not as an add-on; it is development that “does no harm” and is judged by its contribution to peace, not just by social or economic outcomes (Gledhill et al., 2021; Simangan et al., 2025). PCD's significance, relevance, and contributions in development contexts are elaborated in Section 4. Following Warnecke and Franke (2010), we argue that overcoming fragility and delivering peace and development simultaneously requires deliberately merging conflict transformation with PCD. Although conflict transformation is needed in fragile settings, it is insufficient on its own (Mitchell, 2002). Without integration into broader development strategies, its impact is often limited and short-lived (Maddison, 2017).

Conflict transformation (CT) is well studied, but peace-centered development (PCD) remains underexplored. In this article, we identify novel CT-to-PCD pathways by studying countries with histories of conflict and fragility. Bridging CT and PCD enables development in fragile settings—when intentionally designed with peace at its core—to foster social healing, trust and well-being.

This article focuses on identifying pathways from conflict transformation to PCD. It is organized around three objectives: first, to advance understanding of what PCD means, its relevance and how it can be operationalized; second, to synthesize lessons from countries that have attempted to center peace within their development strategies; and third, to propose a framework illustrating pathways from conflict transformation to PCD. We contend that understanding how to bridge conflict transformation and PCD is vital for policymakers and practitioners who regularly prioritize standalone programs and siloed conflict-handling approaches that risk entrenching inequality, fostering sectoral disunity, and wasting resources.

To realize these objectives, we applied a multimethod qualitative approach covering in-depth reviews of policy documents, scholarly articles, and practitioner reports across the interdisciplinary fields of conflict, peace, security, and development. We complemented this with comparative case study analysis, focusing on countries where interventions such as livelihood rehabilitation, community reconstruction, and environmental stewardship have enabled a shift from crisis management to proactively embedding peace in development initiatives. We distill transferable lessons from country cases and propose a framework that captures the multidimensional processes required to move beyond surface-level conflict transformation to context-responsive PCD. In doing so, we contribute to ongoing debates on repositioning peace as a key indicator for development progress in fragile situations (see Ramphele, 2024; Schmeidl et al., 2025), offering a synthesis that brings together dispersed and fragmented insights into a coherent set of operational pathways linking conflict transformation with PCD.

Following this introduction, we present in Section 2 an overview of our methodological approach. Section 3 reviews key concepts and understandings of conflict transformation, while Section 4 discusses the meaning and relevance of PCD, outlining essential steps for its operationalization. Section 5 examines the experiences of three countries—Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Colombia—that have made efforts to integrate peace as a goal within their development strategies. Drawing on lessons from these countries, Section 6 presents a framework that illuminates pathways from conflict transformation to PCD. Section 7 concludes by summarizing the main insights and briefly noting the potential for practical application of the proposed pathways framework.

Methodology

We applied a multimethod qualitative approach integrating literature review, in-depth country case studies, and comparative analysis and synthesis. We conducted searches in Scopus, Web of Science and Google Scholar, retrieving academic articles, policy documents, and practitioner reports across the interdisciplinary fields of conflict, peace, security, and development. The search was intentionally open-ended without restrictions on publication date. An initial title-and-abstract screening ensured the inclusion of foundational works and recent advances, as well as diverse country experiences. We targeted studies on conflict transformation and the peace-development nexus, and studies on Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Colombia—countries that have attempted to embed peace in their development strategies through interventions such as livelihood rehabilitation, community reconstruction, and environmental stewardship.

We reviewed full texts using a simple coding frame (see Naeem et al., 2023), extracting conceptual and operational insights most relevant to conflict transformation and PCD. This process informed the country-level interventions and lessons we selected and synthesized. The references cited in this article reflect the corpus we retrieved and reviewed and represent current literature on conflict transformation, peace-development, and the three case-study contexts.

The selection of Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Colombia was purposive, based on three criteria: (a) prolonged conflict with recognized transitions toward social cohesion; (b) explicit embedding of peace objectives within national development strategies; and (c) rich, accessible documentation of their experiences enabling in-depth analysis. Each country exemplifies a distinct pathway: livelihood rehabilitation (Sierra Leone), community reconstruction (Rwanda), and environmental stewardship (Colombia)—interventions widely recognized as facilitating conflict transformation and contributing to peace and development (World Bank, 2018). Other cases identified in the literature (e.g., Nepal, Liberia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) served as negative cases, as similar interventions failed there due to entrenched elite contestation, aid capture, or ongoing external threats. Accordingly, our selection reflects cases that illuminate distinct pathways toward peace and development, rather than striving for statistical representativeness.

Our case analysis followed a two-stage procedure: within-case and cross-case (see Table 1). Within each case, we mapped conflict contexts, identified the prioritized pathways, and traced actions taken to embed conflict transformation within national development strategies, guided by three questions: (a) What conflict drivers and transition milestones shaped the context? (b) Which interventions linked peace and development? (c) Through what mechanisms did the interventions contribute to shifts toward PCD?

Table 1.

Analytical Lens Used Across the Selected Cases.

Task 1: Exploring country cases (within-case analytical procedure)

Context: Background on country conflict dynamics and transition periods

Pathways: Country transitions from transforming conflict toward PCD, including the pathways prioritized

Integration: Country-specific actions during times of embedding conflict transformation into broader development strategies

Results: Highlights of country-level conflict transformation and PCD outcomes

Challenges: Outline of country setbacks

Task 2: Comparative analysis and synthesis of lessons (cross-case analytical procedure)

Cross-case findings: Common patterns and differences across the selected cases

Country-specific lessons: Highlights of how and why country transitions happened

Transferable lessons: Outline of generalizable lessons and the implications for policy and practice

In Sierra Leone, we examine postcivil war demobilization and reintegration, and related livelihood rehabilitation for ex-combatants and vulnerable groups. In Rwanda, we focus on postgenocide trust-building through community reconstruction (including the Gacaca courts and the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission), combining traditional justice with state-led reconciliation and policy reform. In Colombia, we consider provisions of the peace accords that opened space for development via environmental stewardship, including ecosystem restoration, rural livelihood recovery, and reconciliation in former conflict zones.

For the cross-case comparative phase, we used a simple matrix to juxtapose cases by type of primary intervention (i.e., pathway domain), integration of peace within development strategies, inclusiveness of participation, and observed PCD-relevant outcomes. We derived transferable lessons by identifying patterns recurring across at least two cases (e.g., cross-sectoral coordination, innovation in justice mechanisms, and inclusive leadership) and noting contextual divergences that helped explain variations in performance. In assessing “success” and the degree of “integration of peace,” we considered whether peace objectives were (a) explicitly articulated in national development strategies and sectoral plans, (b) institutionally embedded through laws, policies, or dedicated agencies, and (c) associated with sustained improvements in both relational (e.g., trust and social cohesion) and material (e.g., access to livelihood opportunities) outcomes.

We examined the evidence emerging from these procedures using process tracing, cross-case pattern matching, and temporal sequencing to develop the pathways framework presented in Section 6. We applied process tracing descriptively and inferentially to identify sequences linking CT processes (e.g., demobilization, power-sharing, truth-telling, land reform) through specific interventions to PCD (Boonstra et al., 2023). Pattern matching involved assessing whether similar sequences appeared across at least two cases (e.g., livelihood rehabilitation linked to reduced tensions or community reconstruction linked to rebuilt trust) (Vargas-Bianchi, 2025). Temporal sequencing ensured that reported shifts followed, rather than preceded, the interventions, helping to distinguish intervention-enabled changes from contemporaneous factors (e.g., aid inflows and regime change) (Casper & Wilson, 2015). Alternative interventions (e.g., digital inclusion and food systems governance) surfaced in the literature but were excluded due to insufficient cross-case evidence of a CT and PCD link. Throughout, we do not claim causality; rather, we identify pathways supported by consistent patterns across sources. We recognize that published academic, policy, and practitioner sources may miss local contestations and divergent development perspectives. However, triangulating these secondary sources with cross-case comparisons enabled us to identify robust patterns in CT–PCD relations.

Conflict Transformation: Conceptual and Operational Overview

Conflict transformation is commonly approached from two complementary viewpoints. First, conflict is a normal and inevitable feature of human interaction; although its destructive manifestations can be prevented or redirected, conflict itself cannot be eradicated (Jarman, 2016). Second, conflict can be transformed from destructive to constructive forms through deliberate changes in relationships, institutions, and norms, delivering beneficial outcomes for humans and society (Adams & Iwu, 2015; Appiah-Thompson, 2020). We adopt the second viewpoint, acknowledging that transformation requires efforts to address the underlying drivers of injustice and promote social equity and cohesion (Austin et al., 2011).

Notably, moving conflict toward constructive forms requires treating it as a condition carrying both energy and intelligence that, if intentionally harnessed, can drive positive social change (Friis, 2015; Kriesberg, 2010). The energy embedded in conflict may surface through deep-seated grievances, heightened emotions and collective trauma—forces that, if left unaddressed, can drive escalation and destructive outcomes. Conflict transformation thus hinges on redirecting these forces (rather than suppressing them) through, for example, inclusive dialogue, collaborative problem-solving, and collective action toward equitable and peaceful outcomes.

Similarly, the intelligence revealed through conflict becomes visible when crises expose systemic weaknesses and injustices within societies, creating openings for innovation, policy reform, or institutional transformation. When intentionally engaged, both the energy and intelligence that emerge through conflict can act as catalysts for addressing the structural drivers of violence and underdevelopment, helping to “midwife development” in societies undergoing transitions (Funk & Said, 2004).

Building on these insights, we frame conflict transformation as the deliberate redirection of the energy and intelligence revealed through conflict toward outcomes that promote justice, inclusion and sustainable peace. It is the intentional process of altering the underlying structures, systems, and relationships that drive and sustain conflict (Boege, 2006; Lederach, 2003). Unlike approaches focused on prevention or management, conflict transformation addresses both immediate issues and deeper relational and systemic factors, aiming for societal change at personal, relational, cultural, and structural levels (Miall, 2004; Constantinou, 2015).

We apply this framing to our case analysis in Section 5. In Sierra Leone, transformation efforts redirected ex-combatant energy (expressed through unresolved grievances, anger, and trauma) toward livelihood security pathways, while also drawing on intelligence revealed via conflict (highlighting gaps in demobilization, reintegration, and economic opportunities). This combination of redirected energy and conflict-revealed intelligence shaped the design and implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) measures, complemented by targeted livelihood rehabilitation. In Rwanda, genocide-related energy (manifested in demands for justice) and intelligence revealed via conflict (indicating justice deficits and the need for truth-telling) were channeled through the Gacaca courts. These cases illustrate how localized interventions can redirect the energy and intelligence inherent in conflicts toward broader societal transformation.

Even when conflict transformation yields positive relational and institutional shifts, these gains often remain fragile if not anchored in broader development practices, particularly in contexts shaped by elite capture and socioeconomic inequalities (Paffenholz, 2009; Warnecke & Franke, 2010). Peace-centered development (PCD), discussed in Section 4, offers one possible way to respond to this limitation by ensuring that the momentum generated through conflict transformation is consolidated, expanded, and protected from reversal. Conflict transformation provides a power-aware, justice lens for redirecting conflicts, while PCD institutionalizes these shifts through development practices that support equitable resource distribution, amplify marginalized voices and reinforce inclusive governance. Together, they mutually reinforce sustained, scalable peace, and development.

Peace-Centered Development: Meanings, Relevance, and Operationalization

Here, we clarify the meanings of peace and development, and examine the scholarly positioning, relevance, and practical application of PCD. Peace denotes both the absence of direct violence and the presence of justice, dignity, trust, and social cohesion (Leckman et al., 2014). Development refers to multidimensional improvements in social, economic, and environmental well-being (Mensah, 2019). Conventional development practice has often separated or sequenced these two concepts, assuming that development will automatically produce peace; however, empirical research shows that development can deepen inequalities or trigger new conflicts (McCandless, 2021). PCD emerged in response to this shortcoming. Rather than treating peace as a hoped-for outcome of economic reform or growth, PCD positions peace as a central development objective, one that shapes and is shaped by development choices, priorities, and outcomes (Gledhill et al., 2021).

PCD builds on, but remains distinct from, other development paradigms such as conflict-sensitive development (CSD), the Triple Nexus, locally-led development, and people-centered development. CSD emphasizes risk mitigation and the avoidance of harm, but rarely operationalizes peace as integral to development's core logic (Schmeidl et al., 2025). The Triple Nexus prioritizes coherence among humanitarian, development, and peace actors, yet its peace component remains underdeveloped in practice and lacks a peace-first decision logic for navigating tradeoffs (Brown et al., 2024; Howe, 2019; Norman & Mikhael, 2023). Locally-led and people-centered development emphasize participation and community agency but, in fragile settings, they frequently reproduce elite capture and structural exclusion (Mortimore, 2016; Singh, 2024).

These different ways of conceiving and pursuing development—including technocratic, linear, and growth-first approaches (see Alenda-Demoutiez, 2022)—have long been criticized for narrowing development to managerial or technical fixes, depoliticizing interventions by sidelining social justice, reinforcing exclusion, and prioritizing economic outputs over local legitimacy (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Ferguson, 1990; International Alert, 2004). Such critiques question whether mainstream development practice can adequately engage with the structural and relational conditions that drive fragility, emphasizing the need for alternatives that take power, equity, and inclusion seriously.

PCD adopts CSD's conflict analysis logic but moves beyond harm avoidance to intentionally advance peace as a core development logic. It retains people-centered development's emphasis on community agency and inclusive design, applying a justice lens to sustain peace in contexts marked by local power asymmetries. PCD also aligns with the Triple Nexus ambition for coherence but diverges by making peace substantive within development processes rather than a peripheral coordination objective.

The relevance of PCD is most apparent in fragile and conflict-affected settings, where exclusion, resource capture, and institutional fragility routinely undermine both peace efforts and development investments, leaving progress vulnerable to reversal without sustained peace (World Bank & United Nations, 2018). As “development” increasingly unfolds amidst growing instability, resource pressures, and shifting power relations (Scoones & Stirling, 2020), business-as-usual approaches grounded in technocratic and growth-first logics have become insufficient. Much as climate change prompted the rise of climate-compatible development (Stringer et al., 2014), contemporary conflict events demand development practice that actively contributes to peace, justice, and equity, rather than reproducing depoliticized or exclusionary tendencies.

PCD meets this requirement by recognizing political economy constraints from the outset, embedding peace goals into development planning, implementation and assessment, and specifying safeguards—such as participatory rule-making with binding authority, transparent allocative decisions, and redistribution-aware targeting—to mitigate elite capture (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018). Through such mechanisms, PCD redistributes decision-making power, broadens meaningful participation, and steers resources toward marginalized groups and the institutions that support their inclusion (Gledhill et al., 2021). In doing so, it provides the institutional, socioeconomic, and procedural foundations through which the transformative gains associated with conflict transformation can take root, scale, and endure.

Operationalizing PCD involves integrating conflict sensitivity and peace pillars into development interventions (Schmeidl et al., 2025; Woollard, 2013), typically following four flexible steps (see Figure 1). This often begins with a conflict sensitivity assessment to identify potential harms before an intervention is approved or designed (FAO, 2021; Paffenholz, 2005). Tools such as “Do No Harm” (Goddard, 2009), “Leave No One Behind” (United Nations, 2022), and Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments (Barasa-Mang’eni, 2014) already guide such assessments in humanitarian-development-peace contexts. Within PCD, these tools help identify exclusion risks, allocative inequalities and perceptions of safety, trust, and inclusion; as Haider (2014) argues, using such tools should be standard practice to ensure that development supports peace.

Figure 1.

Practical steps for operationalizing peace-centered development.

Development interventions can be designed to maximize peace-positive gains. For example, infrastructure that connects divided communities can reduce tensions; livelihood and skills programs can rebuild trust and lessen grievances, particularly among youth and marginalized groups (Lemon & Pinet, 2018); and where interventions risk exacerbating conflict, they can be complemented with dialogue platforms or inclusive governance processes (Wam, 2010). Integrating peace and development goals within project objectives and monitoring frameworks is also essential (Gledhill et al., 2021). A food security intervention, for example, can address nutritional needs while also reducing competition through shared resource management and community Dialogue (Evaldsson, 2005). Throughout PCD operationalization, regular monitoring of conflict–peace dynamics is vital. Feedback from community monitoring groups or independent evaluators can reveal whether interventions are reducing or heightening tensions and support timely adjustments (Interpeace, 2021). For example, a new agricultural program in a conflict-affected area may require careful assessment of land allocation risks, inclusion of all groups in planning, embedding peacebuilding activities (such as equitable distribution of farming tools), and tracking not only yields and incomes but also changes in trust, justice, and social harmony (McAllister & Wright, 2018).

Table 2 presents hypothetical scenarios illustrating how PCD can be operationalized in practice. While combining the four steps outlined in Figure 1 is essential, their effectiveness depends on strong leadership and institutional commitment, robust partnerships, active citizen participation, flexible financing, and effective knowledge and learning systems. Together, these steps help ensure that conflict sensitivity is embedded, local voices shape decisions, interventions remain adaptable, and continuous learning strengthens the practice of PCD.

Table 2.

Illustrative Scenarios Depicting Peace-Centered Development in Practice.

Step	Scenario 1: Integrating Conflict Sensitivity into Rural Infrastructure Development in Northern Nigeria	Scenario 2: Co-Creating Livelihood and Social Cohesion Programmes in Eastern DRC
	Narrative: Imagine it is 2027, and Nigeria is launching a rural roads project in Borno, a location affected by violence and displacement. Before construction begins, the project team conducts a conflict sensitivity analysis with local leaders, women's groups, and youth representatives. Analysis reveals previous road projects increased tensions by connecting only some communities, leaving others isolated and fueling grievances.	Narrative: It is 2030, a development agency is partnering with local authorities and civil societies in eastern DRC to launch a livelihood program for ex-combatants and at-risk youth. Recognizing the risk of inadvertently fueling new tensions, the agency is making conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding central to the project's design and delivery.
1. Mandate conflict sensitivity analysis	Conflict sensitivity analysis through wider consultations shows that earlier interventions had deepened divisions by favoring some areas and isolating others. This highlights the need for a more inclusive and fair approach.	The agency evaluates how earlier aid programs had heightened tensions by favoring one group over another, prompting a detailed mapping of risks and opportunities.
2. Design for peace impact	The road network is redesigned to ensure all ethnic and religious groups have equal access to markets and services, connecting divided communities. In doing this, it avoids deepening existing divisions.	The program brings together participants from different ethnic groups via peacebuilding workshops and vocational training, promoting joint economic ventures and intergroup cooperation.
3. Blend peace and development goals	Project objectives are broadened to target not only rural economic expansion but also to reduce travel-related disputes while increasing inter-community trade. Progress is monitored across both infrastructure, income and social cohesion outcomes.	The agency supports joint business ventures across group lines, meeting local income needs while creating opportunities for communities to collaborate, expecting outcomes in terms of dispute reduction and greater social harmony.
4. Adapt and learn	A community feedback system is launched to allow residents to raise concerns and provide feedback on what works and what doesn’t, enabling timely adjustments so the project can remain responsive to local realities and residents’ expectations.	Regular community dialogs and participatory monitoring enable iterative learning and timely adjustments. Participant feedback helps refine training content and group composition, ensuring the program stays inclusive and responsive to emerging challenges.
5. Outcome	By 2030, the initiative not only boosted rural economies but also helped reduce local grievances, fostering greater social cohesion.	By 2033, the project expanded economic opportunities while building new relationships across divided communities, reducing conflict risk and strengthening location foundations for long-term peace.

Turning to PCD indicators, traditional measures, such as GDP growth or ceasefire status, are insufficient for gauging PCD effectiveness (International Alert, 2015). Instead, indicators such as intergroup trust, citizen participation in decision-making, perceived justice and fairness, and the capacity for nonviolent dispute resolution are prioritized (Schmeidl et al., 2025). Tools such as the Social Cohesion Index (Harb, 2017) and Everyday Peace Indicators (Usman & Amjad, 2024) offer adaptive ways to measure these outcomes; however, challenges remain concerning scalability and the risk of oversimplification. When combined with multistakeholder monitoring, these tools help ensure that development interventions remain conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting.

Where development strategies are informed by conflict-sensitive and peace-centered approaches, the prospect for more durable and inclusive peace can be enhanced.

Ultimately, PCD seeks to reduce conflict risks while widening the space for social cohesion, justice, and equitable economic participation. These benefits can emerge when efforts to advance PCD mobilize leadership, partnerships, financing, knowledge, and citizen agency in ways that generate tangible shifts—such as strengthened intergroup trust that supports livelihood cooperation, participation that reduces the likelihood of grievance escalation, and accessible nonviolent dispute mechanisms that help development processes continue even in tense environments. While such outcomes remain difficult to achieve through siloed approaches, making peace a central organizing goal of development can help create conditions in which inclusive governance, economic progress, and social harmony begin to reinforce one another over time.

Connecting Conflict Transformation With Peace-Centered Development: Country Case Studies

This section examines how Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Colombia transitioned from transforming conflicts to intentionally embedding peace as a core element of their development strategies, each through a distinct pathway: livelihood rehabilitation, community reconstruction, and environmental stewardship. The cases presented here illuminate how PCD is shaped by contextual factors (e.g., power relations and institutional choices), leading to the pathways framework outlined in Section 6.

Sierra Leone: Centering Livelihood Rehabilitation as a Pathway

Sierra Leone's civil war (1991–2002) was marked by state collapse, resource predation, and widespread human rights abuses (Gberie, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Keen, 2005). The Lomé Peace Accord in 1999 and the end of the war in 2002 marked the start of a challenging transition period for rebuilding state institutions and citizens’ trust (Chege, 2002).

Postconflict recovery centered on the livelihood rehabilitation pathway, which was prioritized as part of conflict transformation in the pursuit of peace and development. Livelihood rehabilitation included skills training, microcredit, and cooperative initiatives. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program, implemented between 1998 and 2004, was linked to livelihood rehabilitation, targeting over 72,000 ex-combatants (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007), and later incorporated war-affected youth and women (Peters, 2011). Notably, the government's Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (2005–2007) linked DDR and livelihood rehabilitation to broader conflict transformation and development planning (Government of Sierra Leone, 2005). Here, livelihood rehabilitation channeled conflict energy (postwar grievances, reintegration pressures) and conflict-revealed intelligence (exposed gaps in rural livelihoods) into economic gains for citizens. Recognizing that PCD would not be possible without addressing the structural inequalities and economic exclusion that had fueled the war, livelihood rehabilitation became central to state-led conflict transformation and development reform (Zack-Williams, 2012).

Justice processes via the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) ran parallel to livelihood rehabilitation initiatives, enabling truth-telling and acknowledgement of harm, and offering restorative and retributive justice (Kelsall, 2005). The combination of justice with livelihood rehabilitation and economic reintegration enabled communities to move from conflict transformation toward PCD (Shaw, 2005). PCD was strengthened through community-based projects that brought together former adversaries, such as via joint agricultural groups in Kailahun and Kono (Richards et al., 2004), and through a shift from emergency aid to long-term development programming focusing on local capacity-building and institutional strengthening (Fanthorpe, 2006).

However, this transition was not without challenges. Youth unemployment and uneven access to reintegration benefits limited the inclusiveness of livelihood rehabilitation (Acemoglu et al., 2014). Some initiatives were state- and donor-driven rather than genuinely community-led, overlooking community priorities and reinforcing perceptions that ex-combatants were privileged over civilians (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007; Peters, 2011). Although these limitations highlight the politics of inclusion and question whose peace and whose development were advanced, Sierra Leone's experience nonetheless demonstrates that sustained investment in livelihood rehabilitation offers a way to link conflict transformation to PCD.

Rwanda: Pushing the Boundaries of Community Reconstruction

The 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda resulted in the deaths of an estimated 800,000 people within 100 days and the near collapse of the country (Des Forges, 1999; Straus, 2006). In the aftermath, the Rwandan Patriotic Front prioritized national unity and reconstruction through a series of community-based mechanisms (Republic of Rwanda, 2000). Beyond the cessation of violence, conflict transformation through community reconstruction was recognized as a central strategy toward PCD (Clark, 2010).

A core reconstruction mechanism was the adaptation of Gacaca courts, repurposed to process genocide-related cases (Rettig, 2008). Between 2002 and 2012, over 12,000 Gacaca courts tried nearly two million cases, enabling local participation in truth-telling, accountability, and reconciliation (Clark, 2010). Notably, Gacaca transformed conflict energy (genocide trauma, survivor rage) and intelligence (justice system collapse) toward social cohesion. These efforts were complemented by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, Dialogue clubs, Ingando solidarity camps, and Itorero civic training, all designed to foster shared national identity (Buckley-Zistel, 2006). Community reconstruction was further embedded in national policy through Vision 2020, which identified conflict transformation via decentralization as a development objective (Republic of Rwanda, 2000). Programs such as Ubudehe and Umuganda fostered community participation and social healing (Nyamulinda, 2011).

Rwanda's approach yielded significant outcomes. Gacaca provided closure to many victims and supported perpetrator reintegration, although concerns about due process and emotional strain persisted (Clark, 2010). Policies promoting gender equality and the inclusion of youth and marginalized groups further contributed to social cohesion (Buckley-Zistel, 2006). Community reconstruction progressed through a shared national identity, Dialogue spaces, and peace education, strengthening alignment between conflict transformation and PCD via community reconstruction (Ansoms & Rostagno, 2012).

Critiques persist regarding the top-down nature of reconstruction and societal transformation, including uneven access to justice (Ingelaere, 2010). Moreover, the pressure for reintegration, reconstruction, and national unity sometimes overshadows the need for deeper psychosocial healing and trauma recovery (Pham et al., 2004). Rwanda's experience shows that community reconstruction advances PCD, but the politics of unity and state authority dictate which voices are amplified and whose development priorities prevail.

Colombia: Navigating Environmental Stewardship Through Rural Reforms

Colombia's armed conflict spanned more than half a century and resulted in over 260,000 deaths and the internal displacement of more than seven million people (García-Durán, 2020). The conflict was rooted in inequalities, contested land tenure and competition over natural resources, and led to the emergence of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 1964. The 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC marked a major transition, establishing a framework for conflict transformation through rural reform, transitional justice, and environmental stewardship (WOLA, 2021).

The peace agreement recognized the links between conflict, land inequality, and environmental degradation. It prioritized land restoration and restitution, formalization of land titles, and the establishment of Development Programmes with a Territorial Focus (PDET) in highly vulnerable areas. PDET redirected conflict energy (land dispute tensions) and intelligence (rural governance failures) toward environmental stewardship activities such as sustainable agroforestry and zero-deforestation supply chains, facilitating rural reform, including trust building and cooperation between ex-combatants, smallholder farmers, and Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities (CGIAR, 2024).

The 2018–2022 National Development Plan included funding to promote conflict transformation through environmental stewardship and rural investment, prioritizing peace and strengthening the rights and dignity of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups (United Nations, 2023). Transitional justice mechanisms, including the Special Jurisdiction for Peace and the Truth Commission, addressed human rights violations and promoted restorative justice. Colombia's “Peace with Nature” agenda, highlighted at COP16, positioned biodiversity conservation and peacebuilding as mutually reinforcing national development priorities (CGIAR, 2024).

The outcomes of government-led peace efforts included reduced violence, expanded state presence, and the return of displaced families through land restitution and rural investment (WOLA, 2021). Environmental peacebuilding projects brought thousands of hectares under conservation agreements and trained local actors in sustainable practices (CGIAR, 2024). However, these gains have been uneven. Political volatility, elite influence over natural resource governance, and threats against environmental defenders raise important questions about whose environmental peacebuilding priorities are advanced (GIGA, 2024). Deforestation and threats to transitional justice persist, reinforcing the challenge of ensuring that environmental stewardship delivers lasting peace and development for all Colombians (United Nations, 2023).

Comparative Analysis and Synthesis of Lessons Learned

Across all cases, we identified commonalities and divergences in how countries navigated conflict transformation to PCD. Pathways appeared nonlinear and context-contingent, with justice innovations and institutional leadership as recurring central elements. In Rwanda, the government's prioritization of community reconstruction through the Gacaca courts and the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission exemplified a homegrown approach that merged local justice with state-led reconciliation and development planning. In contrast, Sierra Leone centered livelihood rehabilitation with DDR and community-driven development projects fostering socioeconomic inclusion and healing. The integration of DDR within decentralized governance and National Social Action Projects reflected a pragmatic blend of peace and development practices tailored to local needs, although the process was more externally driven than in Rwanda. Colombia's transition, shaped by multiactor peace agreements, explicitly linked environmental stewardship and rural reform to conflict transformation and development. The 2016 Peace Accord's focus on land restitution, participatory rural development, and environmental peacebuilding shows how addressing ecological and territorial grievances can underpin both social cohesion and PCD.

Despite shared patterns, the cases differ in the depth and durability of their transitions and in the balance between centralized and decentralized approaches. Rwanda's transition is often cited as a postconflict development success, driven by a strong, centralized state delivering gains in security, growth, and gender inclusion, yet with limited political pluralism and a constrained civil society space. Sierra Leone pursued a more decentralized and participatory model, with greater space for local agency, yet struggles with sustaining economic recovery and overcoming aid dependency. Colombia's integration of environmental and territorial issues is promising for rural development and ecological restoration but exposes the fragility of peace amidst political contestation and insecurity.

Societal transitions often require new institutions, participatory mechanisms and cross-sectoral linkages. In Rwanda, the Gacaca courts and reconciliation initiatives were integrated into Vision 2020, linking decentralization and poverty reduction, and making justice and peace central to national development. Sierra Leone's DDR and livelihood programs were tied to local governance reforms and community-driven planning, with the National Commission for Social Action and the TRC supporting both economic and social reintegration. Colombia's peace accord was embedded in national development plans and cross-sectoral policies, with environmental stewardship and rural reform enabling peace and development.

A few generalizable lessons are salient. First, moving from conflict transformation to PCD requires institutionalizing conflict, justice, and peace initiatives within broader development strategies, balancing strong central government oversight with local participation. Second, context-sensitive mechanisms, whether traditional justice in Rwanda, community-driven development in Sierra Leone or environmental peacebuilding in Colombia, can amplify legitimacy and trust when genuinely inclusive and locally owned. Third, strong central leadership can drive conflict transformation and PCD but needs pluralism, accountability, and civic space to avoid exclusion. Fourth, external support (e.g., aid, technical assistance, or international monitoring) can facilitate transitions when it builds local capacity and agency rather than dependence. Taken together, embedding conflict transformation within development planning can help address structural inequalities and rebuild trust, unlocking mutually reinforcing peace-and-development outcomes.

Where development strategies are informed by conflict-sensitive and peace-centered approaches, the potential for more durable and inclusive peace may be strengthened.

For policy and practice elsewhere, these cases show that PCD success varies across contexts (see Table 3) and that interventions tailored to institutional capacity and local priorities are often more effective. Transferability depends on adaptation and political fit. Rather than replicating models wholesale, countries pursuing PCD may prioritize participatory diagnostics, invest in building local capacity, and embrace iterative learning. A key pitfall is overlooking deep-rooted structural inequalities or relying excessively on top-down approaches, which may yield short-term gains but undermine long-term legitimacy and trust. The experiences of Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Colombia demonstrate that the journey from conflict transformation to PCD is most effective when institutional leadership and justice innovation are balanced with equity, pluralism, and cross-sectoral linkages.

Table 3.

Indicators and Levels of Success Associated With CT and PCD Across the Selected Cases.

Case	Intervention Facilitating Transitions from CT to PCD	CT and PCD Outcome Indicators	Level of Success Achieved
Sierra Leone	Livelihood rehabilitation	>72,000 ex-combatants reintegrated via DDR Intergroup trust via joint agricultural cooperatives (Kailahun/Kono) Justice platforms (TRC/Special Court) enhancing fairness Institutional shifts: emergency aid to capacity-building and to long-term economic expansion	Partial: Local socioeconomic gains and societal harmony achieved; national challenges persist (e.g., youth unemployment, corruption)
Rwanda	Community reconstruction	Gacaca courts: two million cases processed (truth-telling, closure) Ubudehe/Umuganda schemes: nationwide social healing Vision 2020: embedded peace (via shared Rwandan identity, national cohesion, gender inclusion)	High (national-scale transformation; limited pluralism concerns)
Colombia	Environmental stewardship	Peace agreement leading to PDET (land restitution, rural reform, trust) Conservation agreements: hectares protected via sustainable agroforestry Justice: Special Jurisdiction for Peace plus Truth Commission (restored human rights, accountability) “Peace with Nature” (COP16): biodiversity-peace-development integration	Emerging (violence reduced; uneven political will, delayed peace dividends, new armed groups)

Framing Pathways From Conflict Transformation to Peace-Centered Development

Drawing on Section 5 case analyses, this section advances a framework for conceptualizing pathways from conflict transformation (CT) to peace-centered development (PCD). Figure 2 depicts the sequences in which CT processes are linked to PCD outcomes through three pathway domains: livelihood rehabilitation, community reconstruction, and environmental stewardship. Evidence from Section 5 shows that when interventions spanning these domains are deliberately integrated with CT, they can operate as channels through which transformation enables PCD.

Figure 2.

Conflict transformation to peace-centered development pathways framework.

Figure 2 identifies a “strategic intervention” zone in which stakeholders (authorities, civil society, conflict-affected groups, and implementing partners) co-design interventions through cross-sectoral linkages, participatory mechanisms and justice institutions. Because stakeholders’ interests differ, outcomes may hinge on decision rights and resource distribution. Interventions within each pathway domain must be inclusive and explicitly peace-prioritizing, ensuring conflict-affected groups actively participate in planning and benefit-sharing.

To illustrate CT-PCD integration, consider a livelihood rehabilitation intervention offering microloans to diverse groups to establish collective bakeries and resolve disputes through facilitated dialogue. If co-designed with former combatants, displaced people, and marginalized groups, it may address grievances over economic exclusion. Embedding CT processes (dialogue, mediation, joint problem-solving, and trust-building) within livelihood activities can foster social healing alongside income restoration. When these processes prioritize reconciliation, equity, and collective well-being, the intervention can yield PCD markers: improved livelihoods, strengthened cohesion, reduced intergroup tensions, and enhanced agency.

Political and economic considerations are crucial for CT-PCD integration. Politically, authorities must safeguard inclusive organizing, lawful association, and community feedback channels; otherwise, interventions risk co-option or reinforcement of existing hierarchies. Economically, interventions require infrastructure, market access, credit policies, and public investment to yield visible peace dividends. These considerations determine whether interventions remain discrete or enable CT-PCD outcomes.

Figure 2 indicates that inclusive, peace-prioritizing intervention design within pathway domains can deliver CT-PCD outcomes, although the pathway domains shown are illustrative. Additional domains (e.g., digital inclusion or food systems governance) may similarly channel CT to PCD in other fragile contexts. The underlying logic, we argue, is that when strategic, place-based interventions embed CT processes (dialogue, mediation, trust-building), they can enable durable PCD outcomes.

Applying our CT-PCD pathways framework demands attention to power and contextual realities. Success hinges on the quality of participation and adaptation to specific power asymmetries, cultural norms, and institutional constraints. Without consideration of these factors, including conflict analysis and collective monitoring, even well-intentioned interventions risk reinforcing exclusion or elite capture. In practice, under persistent insecurity, weak governance or restricted civic space, applicability depends on stakeholders’ commitment to dialogue, mediation, accountability, and safeguards against elite capture.

When appropriately contextualized, peace-centered development can help reduce the risk of fragile, easily reversible gains and support more stable progress in conflict-affected settings.

Future research can operationalize the CT-PCD pathways framework presented in Figure 2 through context-sensitive indicators that capture both CT processes and PCD's economic, relational, and institutional dimensions. Comparative analyses across fragile settings beyond Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Colombia could identify combinations of interventions that succeed under specific conditions, such as human rights protections, adequate aid supplies, and absence of external aggressors. Ultimately, CT-PCD pathways can succeed where politics, power, and citizen participation are navigated equitably.

Conclusion

Many conflict-handling approaches in fragile and conflict-affected contexts produce limited and short-lived results because they do not sufficiently connect peace objectives with broader development strategies. Conflict transformation (CT) is often treated as an isolated process rather than a lever for embedding peace within development practice. This often results in fragile and easily reversible peace gains. This article responds to this gap by identifying pathways that link conflict transformation (CT) to peace-centered development (PCD).

We advance the concept of PCD as development in which progress is assessed by contributions to violence reduction and sustainable peace, rather than economic expansion alone. CT is framed as the intentional alteration of structures, systems, and relationships that sustain conflict. Drawing on literature review, country case studies, and comparative analysis, we develop a CT-PCD pathways framework informed by the experiences of Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Colombia—three contexts that have attempted to center peace within their development trajectories.

Our analysis shows that CT and PCD intersect through three pathway domains: livelihood rehabilitation, community reconstruction, and environmental stewardship. Each country illustrates how these domains operate differently, depending on local histories, political configurations, and institutional capacities. Rwanda's emphasis on community reconstruction, Sierra Leone's focus on livelihood rehabilitation, and Colombia's prioritization of environmental stewardship through rural reforms highlight that pathways are not neutral technical choices but are inherently political and relational. Across cases, CT-PCD pathways require navigating power dynamics, institutional constraints, and equity concerns while fostering context-sensitive institutional innovation, multilevel participation, and inclusive leadership.

The CT-PCD pathways framework offers a useful heuristic for advancing peace-centered development in fragile regions by treating development interventions as opportunities for conflict transformation rather than sources of new tension. However, we acknowledge the political economy challenges—such as elite capture, weak institutions, and restricted civic space—that may limit the framework's implementation. Future research should aim to develop context-sensitive CT-PCD indicators to support operationalization of the framework in diverse fragile settings.

Aligning development efforts with peace objectives can help create conditions that are more conducive to durable, peace-centered progress in fragile contexts.

Ultimately, aligning development with peace objectives through a CT-PCD lens can enable policymakers and practitioners to diagnose and address conflict drivers more holistically. Doing so can help transform fragile peace-development gains into more resilient and equitable progress, where development and peace mutually reinforce each other.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the UK Research and Innovation (via the Future Leaders Fellowship Scheme) for the funding that enabled the writing of this article.

ORCID iD

Uche Okpara

Author Contributions

Uche Okpara: conceptualization, writing—original draft, writing—review and editing, visualization, validation, supervision, resources, project administration, methodology, investigation, funding acquisition, formal analysis, and data curation. Sulaiman Yunus: writing—original draft, investigation, formal analysis, and validation.

Funding

Funding for this work was obtained by Uche Okpara from the UK Research and Innovation (via the Future Leaders Fellowship Scheme—Grant Number: MR/V022318/1).

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Data Availability Statement

Data will be made available on request.

Authors Biographies

Uche Okpara (PhD) is a Senior Lecturer and a UK Research and Innovation Future Leaders Fellow at the University of Greenwich. He directs the Prosperity and Peace Pathways Project (see ) where he advances new ways to co-create meaningful prosperity and peace pathways with citizens and governments in the Lake Chad region.

Sulaiman Yunus is a research fellow in Conflict, Peace, and Development at Bayero University Kano. His interest is on innovative approaches for tackling violence in places threatened by human displacement, hunger, and food insecurity.

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