The Myth of Gaza's Reconstruction: The Rise and Fall of Reconstruction Space Under the Israeli Siege

Introduction

The Gaza Strip was recently catapulted to international headlines when the Israeli security cabinet declared a “state of war,” preventing water, electricity, fuel, and food supplies from reaching the already besieged territory, two days after the “Al-Aqsa Flood operation” launched by the Islamic Resistance Movement “Hamas,” on October 7, 2023. As the Israeli war on Gaza continues, it has so far left massive destruction estimated initially at billions of dollars, due to the massive and unprecedented bombing of Gaza's civilian infrastructure. Indeed, the 2023 war is not the first against the Gaza Strip to cause massive destruction, although it is the worst in its history.

The besieged territory has been subjected to several Israeli military operations, the largest of which was the 2009–2008 war that lasted for 21 days. In addition, there was the eight-day war of 2012, the 2014 war that lasted 51 days, and the 2021 war, which lasted 11 days, all followed by several rounds of what was titled the “reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.” As such, the reconstruction of Gaza has been a dominant theme over the past two decades; yet, rebuilding the pre-war and pre-siege society has generally been overlooked by mainstream reconstruction practices and policies. This has turned the reconstruction process, including the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM), which is totally controlled by Israel, into a tool that has contributed to the institutionalization of the siege and occupation of Gaza and caused the territory's de-development.

The purpose of this briefing is to shed light on the reconstruction process in Gaza under siege since 2006 when “Hamas” took control of the Gaza Strip. It begins by reconceptualizing Gaza's reconstruction process and then proceeds to examine the rise and fall of reconstruction space in the region. Finally, the briefing indicates the need to create a new strategy for the reconstruction of Gaza, in addition to several important recommendations that decision-makers must consider in order to move forward. The briefing concludes also by calling for adopting the people-centered liberationist development perspective in dealing with Gaza's Reconstruction.

Rethinking Gaza's Reconstruction Process

There is a remarkable lack of precision in the terminologies adopted to define the process of reconstructing war-torn communities. For example, the United Nations (UN) views reconstruction as a political process that aims at building institutions to achieve physical security and stability and includes political reforms (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). In contrast, economic theories adopt an approach based on their belief in the importance of financial security (Barakat, 2005). In one of the World Bank's definitions, the term reconstruction is considered a process that includes economic reforms (World Bank Group, 1998). As for humanitarian theories, they focus more on society and their ability to accept reconciliation, tolerance, and societal healing (Barakat, 2005). Although these trends lack a comprehensive definition of the term reconstruction, it is worth noting that these are often referred to in post-conflict situations. In other words, reconstruction refers to the activities that take place by a diverse set of actors after the guns have stopped. However, given the perpetual state of conflict in the Gaza Strip, the widespread approaches to post-conflict reconstruction have resulted in major flaws in the planning and implementation of reconstruction programs.

One aspect of these flaws is that none of Gaza's reconstruction policies have concentrated on the restoration of what existed in the pre-war society. These policies focus on restoring physical infrastructure only such as housing and road reconstruction, while avoiding restoring what existed in society before the 2006 Israeli Siege. One can as well argue that the numerous reconstruction projects planned and executed in recent years were destined to fail, as they were not part of a comprehensive, integrated strategy to alleviate the prolonged siege. For that reason, interested actors and stakeholders, after more than two decades of the blockade that has dismantled Gaza's economy, destroyed any opportunity for development, and entrenched the poverty of more than two million people should start thinking distinctively when raising the issue of Gaza's reconstruction and making efforts to reunderstand the process in a new and different logic. Under the siege, the Israeli occupation has prevented the entry of hundreds of raw materials that Israel calls “dual use” (Erakat, 2019). For example, this has resulted in significant damage to industrial facilities in the Gaza Strip (such as furniture factories, carpentry, engineering, and architectural companies, sewing and iron factories, etc.), and, from 2005 to 2022, an average of 90% of these industrial facilities that were operating in Gaza have been closed (Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, 2022). Recurrent wars have also paralyzed the ability of government institutions and the private sector in Gaza to develop infrastructure that can meet the basic needs of the population (Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, 2022).

Since funds began flowing into Gaza in 2009, the reconstruction process has been planned and implemented entirely in accordance with the “Israeli siege policies” and tailored to the approaches allocated to communities that are classified as “terrorist groups” in addition to the flow of aid based on the political and security objectives that serve the interests of the Israeli occupation (Oxfam International, 2017). The Israeli authorities claim that Gaza is an “incubator for terrorist organizations,” most notably “Hamas” and “Islamic Jihad” (Armed Palestinian Resistance Groups), and therefore such a classification allows them to deal with Gaza, including the civilian population, as a hostile entity “which is a meaningless category in international humanitarian law” (Smith, 2019). One of the most prominent pillars of this approach is the securitization of reconstruction, leading to linking the emerging policies to security issues such as the issue of prisoners and the dismantling of the military infrastructure of the resistance, which means preventing any comprehensive and real reconstruction in Gaza.

Accordingly, the reconstruction of Gaza within these policies contributes to the institutionalization of the siege and causes de-development. The reconstruction flows to rebuild Gaza constituted in themselves a real opportunity to open the way for rebuilding the economy, but the complete Israeli control over the mobility of assistance undermined and paralyzed any state of development. Hence, it would be wrong from a theoretical perspective to classify Gaza's reconstruction in the context of post-conflict studies in an environment suffering from the longest armed conflict in contemporary history. One of the explanations that leads to this conclusion is the argument posited by Sarah Roy (2016) that the process of rebuilding the Gaza Strip is an extension of the policy of de-development aimed at making the place “functionally unviable” rooted in the colonial mentality of the Israeli occupation. Roy argues that Gaza's reconstruction does not include any political solutions to the conflict or to the problems of governance, does not provide a real alternative to the type of economy, and is planned and implemented without changing (or challenging) the political framework, which frustrates the reconstruction efforts (Roy, 2016). Now, after two decades of siege and more than 33 military operations launched by Israel on Gaza since 2003, including five major operations in 10 years, one can argue that the reconstruction of Gaza was nothing but another form of sustaining the Israeli occupation and preventing any opportunity that could constitute a window to restore development to the Gaza Strip (Roy, 2016).

The Rise and Fall of Gaza Reconstruction Space: “Putting Palestinians on a Diet”

The year 2009 marked the start of the so-called reconstruction of Gaza, approximately three years after the Israeli blockade entered into force on the coastal area following the Hamas movement's control of the reins of power there. More specifically, the first appearance of the term “reconstruction” in the context of the ongoing conflict dates to March 2, 2009, when a donor conference was held in Cairo, Sharm El-Sheikh, immediately after the end of the military operation launched by Israel against Gaza. Donors’ pledges at the conference reached about US$4.481 billion to support the Palestinian economy and rebuild Gaza (Arab News, 2009). It is, however, striking that some commentators ensure that none of the pledges of donor states after the Sharm El-Sheikh conference in 2009 reached Gaza until after the 2014 war (Mahmoud, 2014, p. 3). It is worth pointing out that the 2009 Cairo Conference coincided with a complex political and security context associated with the furious Israeli military campaign against the Gaza Strip as part of its series of military operations launched, as claimed by Israel, to deter armed resistance movements, which started with the assassination of the Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in March 2004, and intensified after the capture of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit June 2006 (Abuamer & Alarabeed, 2022; Mahmoud, 2014).

It was hoped that the Cairo conference would mark a new beginning for a political, economic, and developmental breakthrough in Gaza, but it was soon evident that it lacked clear mechanisms for implementation, focusing only on physical reconstruction, without proposing or devising any political process through which the Israeli blockade would end. On top of that, Israel has imposed a wide range of restrictions and obstacles, such as the denial of freedom of movement of individuals and goods to and from the Gaza Strip, which have greatly hampered the effectiveness of the reconstruction process (Barakat et al., 2018).

After the end of the large-scale military operation launched by Israel on Gaza in the summer of 2014, the second international conference of its kind was held under Egyptian–Norwegian sponsorship in Cairo in October 2014, when more than 50 countries and 20 regional organizations pledged to provide a total amount of US$5.082 billion, but under specific conditions such as choosing a consensus government to hand over administration of Gaza and its reconstruction. This was perceived by some analysts as conditions intended to isolate “Hamas” from the management of the reconstruction process and to impose a control mechanism on the flow of reconstruction assistance to meet security needs claimed by Israel (Barakat, 2020).

The 2014 Cairo Conference was followed by a mechanism approved by the UN in agreement with Israel, and the Palestinian Authority, known as the GRM or the “Serry” mechanism, named after Robert Serry, head of the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process at the time. According to the GRM, Israel was granted the “veto” to control the flow of foreign aid related to reconstruction, and to place Israel's security on the list of priorities, with UN oversight of reconstruction activities and materials allocated for this purpose, and to ensure that all materials and mechanisms are not used in digging tunnels and building underground shelters. Oxfam stated that “the GRM takes as its starting point the blockade, formalizing and giving the appearance of legitimizing an extensive control regime that is designed to restrict rather than facilitate the entry of materials” (Martin & Klawitter, 2017). I argue that the GRM is the crucial point where Gaza's reconstruction space started to shrink and fall. Some criticize that GRM is designed to monitor a nuclear program, and added that Gaza reconstruction, “if it continues at the same pace, will take a hundred years” (Roy, 2016). The GRM has turned the reconstruction process into a sanctions regime, adding a new layer of the Israeli restrictions already imposed by the siege (Beaumont, 2014).

From the donor community's perspective, the World Bank's (2018) assessment of the progress of the process of disbursing the pledged reconstruction funding revealed that only about US$1.884 billion was disbursed, which represents only 54% of US$5.082 billion, which is the total pledges announced at the Cairo Conference to reconstruct the Gaza Strip after 2014 war. It is worth noting that out of 53 donors at the Cairo Conference, only 32 fully fulfilled their pledges. The total disbursements made by the first seven donors amounted to US$1.28 billion, representing 44% of the total pledges. As of 2023, a Hamas official has stated that the funding gap for rebuilding structures destroyed by Israel in 2022 exceeds US$250 million. This number does not reflect the actual direct and indirect damage to the economy and other social and psychological impacts caused by the siege and recurrent wars since 2003.

Recent data indicate that donors have withdrawn or retreated over time from supporting the Gaza Strip, because of Israel's policies and repeated wars. Furthermore, donors’ fear of Israeli anger and prioritizing Israel's security over any other considerations, and donors’ unwillingness to deal directly with the civilian personnel of the Hamas government due to the imposed Israeli restrictions are other factors that contributed to the fall of reconstruction space. Additionally, donors are concerned about the possibility of further military operations in Gaza, the ongoing Palestinian division, and the conflicts in the broader Arab region, such as Syria, Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and Sudan. These factors have all contributed to the narrowing of the reconstruction space. Another observer adds that the shrinking of a large portion of support for the reconstruction of Gaza, especially from Arab donors, is a result of the Gulf crisis that broke out in 2017 and the changes taking place in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Barakat, 2020).

In fact, due to the nature of the mechanism through which reconstruction has taken place in Gaza since 2009, none of the proposed programs for Gaza's recovery were concerned with lifting the siege or striving hard to reach a solution to the chronic problems suffered by the society under occupation. Rather, the focus was always on the interests of the other side, Israel. In a nutshell, Israeli-controlled reconstruction policies can be perfectly summarized by what Dov Weisglass, then a senior advisor to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, stated in 2006 when he described those Israeli policies in Gaza were designed “to put the Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger” (IMEU, 2014).

Necessary Conditions to Expand the Reconstruction Space in Gaza

Gaza's reconstruction was never part of a comprehensive, carefully thought-out strategy that included political, economic, and social mechanisms to improve Palestinian lives. Instead, what is happening in Gaza reflects the absence of a long-term and shared vision and strategy for reconstruction projects. Considering the Israeli policies aimed at crippling the Palestinian economy's ability to recover and prosper, the briefing suggests a set of recommendations to enhance efforts in designing a new strategy for Gaza's reconstruction. Although this briefing will not address the results of the current aggression that erupted on October 7, 2023 in the Gaza Strip in terms of destruction and the cost of reconstruction, which still lacks an urgent evaluation and assessment in terms of direct and indirect costs due to the ongoing war, the existing recommendations can be taken into consideration when implementing any reconstruction process when the Israeli guns fall silent in Gaza.

Creating a new strategy for Gaza's reconstruction. There is an urgent need to start thinking about a new strategic plan for Gaza's reconstruction, particularly after the end of the 2023 Israeli military operation, that is compatible with the political, economic, and social conditions of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination. It should be recalled that the Israeli restrictions imposed to hamper the reconstruction process in the region, reflect one of the goals of Israeli colonialism intended to prevent the renaissance and prosperity of the colonized community. This reality is already recognized by several human rights bodies inside and outside occupied Palestine, including Human Rights Watch, B’Tselem in Israel, and the Palestinian Center for Human Rights in Gaza, which revealed in several reports that Israel allows the entry of foreign assistance into the Gaza Strip to meet only the minimum prerequisites of life. Any new strategy must take these facts into account and truly address them.

Forming a new committee for reconstruction and economic recovery. The reconstruction process in Gaza will benefit well from the establishment of a new committee to lead the recovery process and coordinate with all regional and international actors in this field. Over the past few years, the GRM designed to reconstruct Gaza after 2014 has failed to meet the aspirations of the Palestinians for development and recovery. Likewise, justifying control over reconstruction by claiming that it is set to prevent “feeding terrorism,” is a logic that constitutes an institutionalization of the Israeli siege and occupation. This logic also falls within the policy of collective punishment that Israel imposes on more than 2 million civilians living in Gaza who have the right to a decent standard of living. This requires canceling the GRM that was designed in 2014 to control the flow of reconstruction aid to the Gaza Strip and creating a new committee to undertake reconstruction and economic recovery, without any interference from Israel, while confronting the Israeli siege policies in parallel.

Long-term strategic planning. While multiple Gaza reconstruction projects have been planned in the absence of a long-term strategic vision, the Israeli occupation continues its policies of oppression against Palestinians. Shortcomings also include that the GRM, as with donors’ humanitarian and development response approaches, treats crises in the occupied Palestinian territories as humanitarian, thus focusing on alleviating the situation, rather than envisioning and consciously working towards the future. One reason that led to the lack of long-term planning is the silence of the international community towards the brutal policies of the Israeli occupation, instead of rejecting and challenging them by finding a common strategic vision intended to change the status quo and confront the occupier. Therefore, a new long-term approach is needed for the international community when dealing with Gaza's reconstruction.

Placing local actors in the driver's seat. Too often, local people are simply portrayed as victims, passive recipients of international aid, or as a liability to be neutralized instead of being seen as assets for investment. In fact, local creativity and memory are crucial during the reconstruction process (Barakat, 2021). In contrast, imported and externally imposed models ignore the two most fundamental needs for recovery: reaffirming a sense of identity and regaining control over one's life. Therefore, in any discourse on the reconstruction of Gaza, it is crucial to recognize that reconstruction, from the perspective of those affected, becomes more than mere tangible manifestations—as does the physical reconstruction imposed by the donors (Barakat, 2021). Moreover, the marginalization of the local powers in the reconstruction processes can be, consciously or unconsciously, a contribution to the occupation's goal of removing and dissipating the cultural identity of the place, which portends the occurrence of disturbances in one's identity. So, when developing a new vision for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, it is essential for the donor community to ensure a real presence of the community's voice in setting priorities, coordinating with local bodies, and engaging women and youth. Coordination and participation will be required in developing the new vision.

Achieving Palestinian national reconciliation. The current military operation against the Gaza Strip continues with the declared Israeli goal of “eliminating Hamas.” There is almost a consensus among analysts that this goal is illogical and will not be achieved on the ground (Milton, 2023). Even if the goal is achieved by “eliminating Hamas” as a military power, as Israel claims, this will not provide security and peace in the region in that the Palestinian resistance will continue against the Israeli occupation in one shape or form. Therefore, any real reconstruction process in the Gaza Strip must be done within the framework of the Palestinian reconciliation between the Hamas movement, which leads the Gaza Strip, and the Fatah movement, which leads the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Therefore, to advance any future reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, Palestinians must move towards Palestinian reconciliation and confront Israel's destructive plans in the postwar phase in Gaza (Qarmout, 2023). Indeed, achieving Palestinian reconciliation will help ensure the participation of all Palestinian political forces and parties without marginalizing any party at the expense of the other.

Adopting a strategy for Gaza's reconstruction based on “People-Centered Liberationist Development”: Khalil Nakhleh (2012) defines the concept of “People-Centered Liberationist Development” as “a process of purposeful intervention aimed at expanding the range of individual and collective choices to the greatest extent possible for the human being, the individual, the ordinary citizen, and which can be sustained across generations.” Nakhleh believes that the ultimate goal of this approach is to enable Palestinians to achieve political self-determination and liberate themselves from the powers of colonialism, occupation, and domination, thus putting an end to social, economic, and political inequality (Nakhleh, 2012). Accordingly, any future vision for the reconstruction of Gaza should adopt a strategy based on the “People-Centered Liberationist Development,” which recognizes the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and their right to resist Israeli occupation.