Abstract
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) programs are critical components of postwar transitional processes. The interlinkages between the two programs have been essential, especially in determining how combatants in armed groups and armed forces could become part of reconstituted security sector institutions, including the military and the police. Additionally, these links help determine who may be eligible as participants in these processes, and why some actors should be excluded. Over the past four or so decades, academic and policy understanding of postconflict settings has led to the acknowledgment that the two programs reinforce each other and should be designed to ensure fluidity and complementarity. However, there are usually gaps in linking the two, which have negative implications for peace, security, and stability in countries in transition from violence to peace. While there are several studies on the links between DDR and SSR, this paper seeks to examine both previous and current practices in both conflict and postconflict settings, with the aim of interrogating the changes that have been introduced over time to strengthen the links, and some of the gaps that are still existing, or emerging, especially as the nature of armed conflicts continue to change in Africa. Methodologically, the paper adopts a qualitative approach, through which interviews were conducted with practitioners, policy makers, and academics in the fields of DDR and SSR, across countries that previously implemented and those that are currently implementing DDR and SSR programs.
Introduction
In the aftermath of civil wars, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants and security sector reform (SSR) programs become critical components of the transition processes that ensue, as countries attempt to build sustainable peace. In the last three decades, it has become clearer that despite their differences in approaches, DDR and SSR are conceptually and practically interlinked. Thus, there have been growing calls that these two programs be contextually grounded to enhance their relevance and effective contribution to postconflict transitions (Bryden & Scherrer, 2012; Maggi, 2022). Most notably, the Report of the Panel on United Nations (UN) Peace Operations, referred to as the Brahimi Report (2022), 1 highlights the direct contribution that peacebuilding makes to public security, law and order through DDR processes—thus, definitively linking DDR and SSR.
The Brahimi Report underlines the need for all UN agencies, funds, and programs in the framework of UN Peace operations to integrate their programing and coordinate their actions to get the best possible outcomes in transition processes. Following this, over the next two decades, other actors such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), and other bilateral partners have built a consensus for implementing an integrated approach to postconflict peacebuilding and security sector governance. 2 However, on critical reflection, academic literature and the way peacemaking and peacebuilding processes have been approached by practitioners over the years, have entrenched DDR and SSR as two distinct processes, with varying mandates, timelines, priorities, actors, and frameworks. As a result, the programatic linkages between DDR and SSR remain highly underdeveloped, and they are often implemented separately and independent of one another. This has also led to the creation of highly specialized silos of academics and bureaucrats, leaving a critical gap between the two processes that need to be filled.
The fundamental need to have an integrated approach to SSR and DDR exists because both processes seek to achieve the same objective in both conflict and postconflict settings—to move conflicted regions and communities toward peace, security, and stability. Consequently, understanding how the two can be interlinked and complement each other, will enhance sustainable and effective peacebuilding and security sector governance. An inclusive approach to programing could help to mitigate the potential for relapse in postconflict settings.
In line with the challenges highlighted above, there have been a few postconflict contexts in which DDR and SSR programs were undertaken simultaneously with considerable linkages. An example is the case of Sierra Leone (Bryden et al., 2005; von Dyck, 2016), where security actors were a major party to the conflict, and the reformation of the sector was of intrinsic significance to the peacebuilding process in the country. In situations such as these, where domestic security actors play a major role in internal conflicts, and the lines between state and nonstate armed actors are blurred, the interlinkages between the two programs have been essential. They can help determine how combatants in armed forces and armed groups could become part of reconstituted security sector institutions, including the military and the police. The experiences from these cases, many of which were piloted in Africa, could provide lessons and insights on the outlook for framing the DDR–SSR nexus, and shaping priorities for future programs.
Methodologically, the chapter paper adopts a qualitative approach, through which 18 virtual and nine face-to-face interviews were conducted with practitioners, policy makers, and academics in the fields of DDR and SSR, across countries that previously implemented and those that are currently implementing DDR and SSR programs. These interviews were conducted between July and September, 2022. This paper builds on the contemporary literature that prioritizes the interlinkages of DDR and SSR programs, and provides a brief overview of the evolution of these schools of thought. In particular, the paper examines both the previous and current practices in linking DDR and SSR programs and provides an assessment of the changes that have been introduced over time to strengthen the links. This is followed by an analysis of the gaps and challenges that still exist, and need to be overcome, to build a robust framework linking DDR and SSR in both conflict and postconflict settings in Africa. Finally, it recommends ways of enhancing the link between the two concepts, providing a forward-looking approach to policy and practice on the continent.
DDR Programs and Related Initiatives in Africa
In the last three decades, several DDR programs and related initiatives have been implemented in Africa. This is a result of the plethora of conflicts that have been experienced on the continent since the 1980s. While the Cold War between the United States of America and the Russians came to an end, leading to the emergence of the US, as the dominant power in the world, several African states, mostly ridden with autocratic regimes, exploded into civil wars, most of which were protracted and complex. Thus, there was a need for global efforts aimed at ending these conflicts and supporting the countries’ transition to peace. The quest for peace necessitated DDR programing in Africa. The question then is, what is DDR? According to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) (UNDDR, 2022): Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs.
Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups …
Reintegration is the process through which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily occurring in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often requires long-term external assistance.
DDR is a political process and a critical component of transition processes from violence to peace. It seeks to contribute to the transformation of ex-combatants into peaceful citizens, either reintegrated into communities from their communities of origin, or communities that they would choose to move into, to begin their new lives.
The UN's first involvement in DDR programing started in 1989, with the UN Observer Group in Central America, becoming the first UN peace operation with a mandate to undertake DDR activities.
3
In the 1990s and 2000s, countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Algeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone had DDR programs. These programs have been termed as being part of the “First Generation DDR,” which are programs that were implemented under the framework of peace agreements between belligerent factions (International Organisation for Migration, 2019). However, as noted by Munive and Stepputat (2015, pp. 1–2) there was the need to reconfigure DDR to “(1) deal with armed groups while conflict is still ongoing and without a negotiated peace accord being in place and (2) deal with situations of armed conflict that involve hybrid forms of violence as well as a range of armed actors that control, or influence significantly, population and territories, without being part of peace negotiations or under direct state control.” These realities led to the emergence of what is described as Second-Generation DDR as emphasized by Anatole Ayissi (2021, pp. 145–146): The exceptionally tough challenges that UN peacekeeping operations met in Africa, including in places such as Sierra Leone and Somalia, greatly informed the thinking that followed these recommendations and which, in 2010, led the UN to develop “the ‘second generation’ DDR.” A major emerging trend in the “transformation of conflict” taken into consideration when crafting the second generation of DDR was the mounting threat of … “Armed Non-Statutory Actors” (ANSAs),
4
i.e., those spoilers who were neither part of national armed forces nor “non-state” (rebel) armed groups formally part of the process of implementation of peace agreements.
As stated in the IDDRS (2022: Module 2.10): Together, DDR programmes, DDR-related tools, and reintegration support provide a menu of options for DDR practitioners … DDR-related tools may be used before, after or alongside a DDR programme… may also be applied in the absence of preconditions and/or following the determination that a DDR programme is not appropriate for the context. In these cases, DDR-related tools may serve to build trust among the parties and contribute to a secure environment, possibly even paving the way for a DDR programme in the future (if still necessary).
What has emerged as critical over time, throughout the various approaches to DDR, is the understanding that local communities are critical players in DDR processes and that a Community-Based Approach could yield more positive results. The role of local communities in DDR is much more crucial during the reintegration phase, as their willingness to accept, or reject combatants will make the process more or less difficult. Additionally, the nature of the socio-economic and psychosocial support to both combatants and local communities plays a critical role in promoting peace, healing, and reconciliation in communities. Thus, there is a need to mainstream communities in the design and implementation of DDR programs or tools/activities, so that they can take ownership of the process and contribute to its success.
Conceptual Understanding of SSR and Its Evolution in Africa
In the late 1980s and 1990s, as civil wars became common in Africa, practitioners in the security and development assistance sectors recognized that reforming security institutions and enhancing the capacity of state mechanisms to deliver safety and justice is a crucial part of postconflict peacebuilding. In postcolonial Africa, security was essentially state-centric, with a limited focus on the broader security needs of society. This challenge was amplified during the Cold War, as the global powers armed their allies, and protected regimes that were despotic but served their interests. As indicated by Saliou Diallo, a security expert in Guinea:
7
Both during and after the Cold War, support to security institution in Africa was largely focused on national security, and not humanised. This enabled states to have equipped security institutions that protected regimes and not the interest and needs of ordinary people. There was the need for change and that change process has been gradual.
In addition to the observation of Diallo, donor interventions and involvement in the security sector in matters of conflict transformation and peacebuilding had been sporadic. There was a need to shift to a much more integrated and development-focused approach to SSR, so as to enable it to meaningfully contribute to peacebuilding processes and eventually, development, and state building. This is especially so, given the fact that security actors are, in some cases, part of the groups responsible for the eruption of violence and the prolongation of conflicts in the first place.
In the 1990s, the British government gained interest in SSR programing in Africa, and provided both the resources and the political capital that was essential in drawing the required attention to, and the use of, the concept, especially in Africa. 8 Since then, SSR frameworks have generally focused on three main short-to-long-term tasks. The first is to restore order by neutralizing and delegitimizing so-called illegal, non-statutory armed groups (militias, gangs, community defence groups, etc.). The second involves re-establishing formal state security forces to maintain public order within the rule of law. The third involves restoring or establishing state institutions that oversee and monitor these security forces to ensure compliance with formal rules and norms (von Dyck, 2016). These institutions include, but are not limited to, executive actors such as the interior and defence ministries, parliamentary bodies, the judicial system, and civil society (Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2002; Islam, 2021).
The case for SSR in Africa has been built by a combination of factors. Firstly, since its liberation from colonial rule, the continent has witnessed a continuing pervasiveness of violent conflicts and other existential and emerging threats to security. As such, there is low public safety, high crime rates, an alarming proliferation of small arms and light weapons, porous borders, a rise of violent extremism—consequently rendering internal stability a challenge. Secondly, although independence brought progressive changes in some countries, in others, the new ruling political elites simply replicated what their colonial predecessors did. This was especially manifested in how the elites viewed the security sector, instrumentalizing it to enhance the protection of their regimes, and the intimidation of their opponents (Ukeje, 2005). Additionally, the design of security forces within colonial rule was not well structured—this created space for multiple parallel security actors to co-exist. As noted by respondents engaged during this study, political elites continue to maintain security structures and networks that are loyal to them, and that are focused on protecting their regimes. Additionally, where parallel structures may not exist, elites reformat security institutions to meet their needs and aspirations, creating patrimonial networks within militaries, police and intelligence agencies, as is the case in countries such as Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe and Nigeria.
In the present day Africa, the security sector is characterized by an array of nonstate as well as state armed actors, including private security/military companies, local militias, guerrilla armies, warlords, vigilantes; the state is just one among many providers of security in postconflict situations (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2006; Bendix & Stanley, 2008; Ebo, 2007; Isima, 2007; Petri, 2002; Richards & Smith, 2007) and often fails to have legitimate control over violence, a critical Weberian component of state building. As such, SSR at its conceptualization, was developed to foster a shift away from the militarized approach to the security sector in some states and was perceived to “enhance democratic control, strengthen the security of the poor, reduce the risk of violent conflict, and free resources for social change” (Bendix and Stanley, 2008, p. 13).
Much like DDR, local ownership of SSR initiatives has been a vital key in promoting the required changes in the societies they are implemented in. The first decade of SSR interventions focused on bilateral efforts, which aimed to alter the rules and norms within developing countries’ security sectors to enhance state capacity-building, promote good governance and enhance the delivery of basic human security. For instance, with the British government's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International Development, the UK's Ministry of Defence helped to design a special program to coordinate policy—the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP). The ACPP focused on SSR as a primary approach toward conflict prevention (United Kingdom Department for International Development, 2000). The ACPP was active in Sierra Leone, Uganda, Ghana, and in several other Southern Africa Development Community countries, such as Zimbabwe and South Africa. Much like DDR, local ownership of SSR initiatives has been a vital key in promoting the required changes in the societies they are implemented in
Today, the UN and other regional and multilateral organizations, such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the EU, the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe have become actively involved in supporting SSR programs in member states and partner countries.
In the 2000s, other bilateral partners began forming working groups on SSR, producing knowledge products related to it, and restructuring their programing to prioritize the concept. In an effort to address some of the tensions over international versus locally driven SSR, the 2007 OECD-Development Assistance Committee Handbook on Security System Reform stressed on the importance of enhancing security sector governance within a framework that supports local buy-in, ownership and leadership (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008).
The UN Secretary-General's report “Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Security Sector Reform” (S/2008/39) of 23 January, 2008 describes SSR as: A process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law (United Nations, 2009, p. 6).
Academics and practitioners alike agree that a comprehensive approach to SSR requires fundamental characteristics: A holistic strategy related to SSR, facilitation of local ownership and democratic participation, and the imagination of security as people-centered (Wulf, 2004). The use of a comprehensive approach to SSR helps to modernize and strategically position the it, as a contributor to change processes envisaged in society. This is why SSR efforts should be tailored toward supporting the state apparatuses to reach effective security governance through genuine, transparent and democratic reform. Thus, from a strategic sense, the key objectives of SSR are about building the framework and paving the pathway for comprehensive security provision and governance. This should also include building the capacity of the actors and incentive structures involved in reform and institution-building processes, including civil society and other stakeholders (Islam, 2021). The use of a comprehensive approach to SSR helps to modernize and strategically position the it, as a contributor to change processes envisaged in society
Linking DDR-SSR in PostCold War Africa
Drawing from the lessons and experiences from the DDR and SSR programs implemented in Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the DRC, among others, the UN has improved on its efforts to strengthen the links between DDR and SSR. As stated by Henry Mbawa, a security and justice sector expert:
9
It was obvious that there was the need on the part of the UN to improve the link between DDR and SSR, especially given the reality that they have to face in dealing with former combatants who wanted to join the security sector, and the need to reform, democratise and position security agents as agents of change and peacebuilders.
DDR and SSR processes mainly intersect during the demobilization phase of DDR, where ex-combatants indicate whether they would like to be part of the security sector or to go through reintegration. The determination to participate in SSR will come principally from whether such as an option is possible, as was the case in Algeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, or whether it is not possible, as is currently the case in Nigeria and other countries in the Lake Chad Basin. With Liberia and Sierra Leone, the programs focused on including members of the armed groups that wanted to be part of the reformed defence and security sectors, to be part of them. The intention was to provide them with employment opportunities given the skills that they had acquired during the civil wars. That worked well for both the state and the ex-combatants. The same cannot be said for the approach to former Boko Haram fighters, as the context is still evolving, and the aim is to have them disengaged, deradicalized, and reintegrated in local communities. Even though the contexts may differ, the key point here is that the linkages and the steps in integrating excombatants into the security sector is politically defined, and depends largely on the nature of the war fought, and the sensitivities that remain as the society searches for peace. Despite this, both DDR and SSR have a common goal, and the pitfalls and setbacks in both processes are similar—requiring mitigation of the re-emergence of conflict and retraction of any peace agreement.
Postconflict security institutions, reshuffled and created by the DDR process, are where a significant proportion of the ex-combatants find employment. Hence, the natural opening for linking DDR and SSR in any context is during the design and implementation of the framework for integrating former combatants into state security forces. As such, the demobilization phase of DDR is the key to identifying former combatants who are eligible for inclusion in the new security sector that may be established as part of the postwar reconstruction process (McFate, 2010). DDR provides a unique opportunity to collect and compile information on ex-combatants, in order to build a database that can help identify, whether they should be reintegrated or disarmed. Failure to establish such a database could lead to ad hoc integration within the security forces, which has negative implications for the SSR program. Moreover, if the ceasefire peace agreement or some other political arrangement agrees on a certain proportion of guaranteed participation, the downsizing and integration of ex-combatants can heavily disrupt the existing security forces. For instance, in Burundi, a quota was set for ex-combatants in the police force which led the law enforcement headcount to increase ten-fold, as it absorbed an overwhelming majority of the ex-combatants and dissolved the gendarmerie of many of its qualified officers. The management and oversight mechanisms within the police force were not able to rescale immediately, partly also because there was no database on the ex-combatants. In the years following this reform, there were increasing reports of the police force engaging in human rights violations, which could have been perpetrated by the police, or by bandits dressed in police uniforms. Determination of the truth and action thereafter was a challenge (Rumin, 2012).
The confidence and trust levels of the public in its security sector greatly influences their buy-in for the DDR and SSR initiatives. Civil conflicts originate due to the mistreatment of large segments of the population. Decommissioning combatants must be accompanied by efforts to correct certain behaviors likely to trigger conflict. DDR is intimately linked to SSR; both must be conceived as part of an overall postconflict stabilization and long-term recovery program.
The first generation of DDR and SSR initiatives were heavily inspired by the postCold War reform agenda (Bendix & Stanley, 2008). As in the case of the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) in the DRC, SSR components were included in the Governance Capacity Enhancement Project, which sought to strengthen security governance beyond the project's duration. The MDRP, funded by the WB, 12 industrialized countries, and the European Commission, also embraced more than 30 partner organizations, including the UN. Here, the DDR initiatives were perceived to be Western-prescribed, rigid, and out of touch with contextual realities (Banholzer, 2014). Hence, in these contexts, when the SSR reform agendas were introduced, much scepticism and defensiveness from the national actors and local communities was experienced. This initially complicated linking DDR and SSR, however, the understanding of the necessity among actors in various contexts, to link the two has improved.
The kind of institution funding an SSR program also to a large extent determines the focus and priorities of the program. As noted by respondents, if the international donor agencies prioritise the army in their programing, the SSR programing is more likely to be driven by military priorities, and the considerations for other security actors might be overlooked. This will undermine the operationalization of an SSR framework. The militarization of SSR programs can alienate other stakeholders, create a hostile environment between security actors and civil society, increase public expenditure on military equipment and defense spending, instead of developing other infrastructure, cause undemocratic behaviors such as spying on citizens etc. Hence, wider integration of security sector institutions during DDR enhances a consistent and more inclusive approach to SSR.
Peace agreements have a huge role in influencing the sequencing of activities required to link DDR and SSR. Sequencing is important for the emergence of a comprehensive political solution, and it also greatly determines the transitional government's legitimacy. Sometimes, the fixed nature of an agreement, and expectations from the agreement, can undermine the ability to ensure an orderly sequence of activities related to DDR and SSR. In addition, the necessity for clear results to satisfy sceptical and impatient former combatants and their leaders can also cause a problem. For instance, in the CAR, it was widely accepted that the most urgent activities were related to DDR, as they were required to support reconciliation and peace consolidation. At the same time, SSR needed to be carried out according to the timetable agreed on by stakeholders. The limited resources available, and the differences in the opinion of local and international actors as to how the two programs could be sequenced, led to the actors resorting to ad hoc and ineffective initiatives.
Contextual and Programatic Obstacles to Bridging DDR and SSR in Africa
Peacebuilding in postconflict contexts is always a complex process. As such, failure to identify ways to link DDR with SSR in peacebuilding processes has a direct impact on the stability of the country. In countries that prioritized only DDR in their postconflict era, for instance, Burundi, the CAR, Mali, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda, the peace process did not establish lasting and sustainable peace. In these countries, although disarmament was initiated over the course of the DDR process, there was a relapse into violence (Banholzer, 2014). By contrast, in Sierra Leone and Liberia, SSR was at the heart of the postwar transition and reconstruction process. DDR and SSR were rolled out with the aim of ensuring that the military, which had been a major part of the civil wars in both countries, was democratized and shaped to function within a constitutional order.
One of the most important challenges in linking DDR and SSR initiatives is the need to secure political ownership, leadership, and support from key stakeholders. If DDR initiatives exclude certain actors, or favor others, during the disarmament and demobilization phases, there might be a risk of a political fallout. When such a political fallout occurs, proceeding with the imagination and design of a comprehensive SSR framework proves to be challenging. As argued by all the respondents, the success of any DDR or SSR program depends on the availability of political will. The achievement and sustenance of peace itself, depends on the availability of political will. The lack of such will, can lead to relapse into violence. Thus, cultivating that political will, should go alongside the linking of DDR and SSR programing. One of the most important challenges in linking DDR and SSR initiatives is the need to secure political ownership, leadership, and support from key stakeholders
Experts interviewed are essentially joined in consensus that, that local buy-in and ownership, especially at the community level, or the lack of it, can also determine the success and sustainability, or failure of DDR and SSR programs, and the ability to adequately link and sequence them. If the DDR process in itself has limited local buy-in, ownership, and leadership, engaging local actors in the SSR processes might prove to be a challenge. Here, the level of local ownership is determined by the perceived level of autonomy, to design and implement the program. At the heart of any successful DDR or SSR programing, should be local communities, and the ability of programers to harness their support and buy-in. Their support helps to strengthen the potential for peace, and at the same time mainstreaming them into DDR-SSR programing, helps to address the trust deficit that usually permeates both conflict and postconflict settings.
An integrated and well-informed approach to DDR and SSR is required not only for the stability of peace in a country but also in contexts where the conflict has transnational and regional effects. DDR and SSR programing in the Great Lakes and the Mano River Basin are examples of internal peace processes influencing regional conflict dynamics (Bezerra et al., 2010). For instance, the DDR program that ensued in Liberia in 1996, at the end of the country's First Civil War contributed to the circulation of weapons in countries of the Mano River Basin, such as Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, and the movement of fighters across borders in the region. The reversal of this phenomenon was observed when the demobilization of the RUF in Sierra Leone, led to the weakening of Charles Taylor in Liberia (Rufer, 2005).
DDR and SSR programs are currently largely tailored to suit the subjective needs of communities in conflict, unlike previous programs that were based on expansive, internationally mediated peace agreements. This is especially the case in Africa, as conflicts are evolving, with some transnationalized, with violent extremist groups spreading across the continent. In the last two decades, there has been a significant increase in the activities of violent extremist and terror-related groups in Africa. Groups such as Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Mourabitoun in the Sahel, are spreading their activities on the continent (Bangura & Mbawa, 2023).
The new reality has called for a shift in the approach to both DDR and SSR, with measures taken to both prepare armed forces and intelligence networks among others, to face and deal with the threat. At the same time, the third-generation approach to DDR, has become much more relevant, as the absence of peace agreements, and the need to deal with the evolving threat becomes critical.
This shift experienced on the continent, has created its own complexities, especially in view of the fact that programing takes place in the midst of conflict and violence. Thus, there is the pressure of both saving lives and addressing the causes of the conflicts, as is the case in the Lake Chad Basin and the Horn of Africa. The security sectors in both Somalia and Nigeria have undertaken several reformation processes, while at the same time undertaking DDR programs. However, it is worth noting that DDR and SSR programing in both settings are not necessarily aimed at creating synergy between the two programs, but rather SSR is aimed at providing the requisite capacity that institutions need to deal with the conflict.
Efforts aimed at countering “terrorism” and “violent extremism” (terms that are interchangeably used), have, by and large, created distrust between security institutions, especially the military, police, and intelligence units, and civil society. The heavy-handed approaches used by security forces, in most cases, succeed in pushing communities into conflict with state security institutions. The Nigerian military's fight against Boko Haram highlights the challenge of using a militarized approach to DDR, providing a typical example of how institutions undertaking DDR efforts are themselves in need of SSR to democratize and better position them to properly approach the conflict and the disengagement, deradicalization, and reintegration of ex-combatants in the region (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010).
There is a struggle to adapt and connect DDR and SSR within conflict setting and there is the need for a comprehensive strategic, and contextualized approach, that will help guide the changes required in dealing with threats and preparing countries to transition from violence to peace. This challenge calls for a rethink of the approach toward DDR and SSR, with the aim of enhancing their contribution to peace and stability in countries either trapped in violence or transitioning from violence to peace.
Rethinking the Link: SSR–DDR and a Forward-Looking Approach to Policy and Practice in Africa
As indicated in the section above, the ability of policy makers and practitioners to better link, sequence, and operationalize DDR and SSR programs will go a long way in helping to strengthen the quest for peace, security, and stability in conflict-affected settings. A vital area that requires much more thinking relates to the point made above on the changing nature of conflicts in Africa, and the spread of violent extremist groups. While DDR has been adapted by governments and their development partners to meet these changes, there is limited realization, in places like the Lake Chad Basin, that the armed forces supporting such efforts also need reform processes that will help them to be better governed, managed, and to conduct themselves within the framework of human rights standards. In Nigeria for instance, the military has been continuously accused of committing horrendous human rights violations that further push communities into the hands of Boko Haram, and other groups operating in the Lale Chad Basin. 10 Thus, SSR in such contexts focuses not on the former fighters in extremist groups, but the armed forces themselves that lack the professionalism and discipline to conduct actions against such factions. This is coupled with the need for policy makers to shift to the use of human security-based approaches to dealing with threats on the continent. This also calls for a conducting SSR, amid ongoing conflicts and DDR-related activities.
Assessments for both DDR and SSR, and how they can be linked and sequenced, must begin prior to conducting negotiations for peace; experts in the fields of DDR and SSR should support the development of peace agreements, with the aim of ensuring that the linkages between the two are well defined. This will go a long way in helping create a comprehensive peace process that utilizes DDR and SSR tools in tandem, while maintaining their distinct practices during program roll out. It will assist in right-sizing the army that will be reconstituted, and also inform the kind of approaches that should be used to widen SSR processes to accommodate excombatants who are eligible to join the security sector.
Linking DDR and SSR programing has been vital in the promotion of synergy, coordination and having a harmonized approach, while not taking away from the other, as experienced in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Failing to link them leads to each program working in isolation, which denies former combatants with the opportunity of benefiting from a linked approach. Policy makers should continuously monitor the implementation of the two programs, as failure in one could have immediate effects on the other, especially if for instance, there is a relapse into violence. In essence, when ex-combatants leave demobilization centers to begin the process of inclusion in the security sector, it should not signal the end of collaborative programing between DDR and SSR. Ex-combatants joining the security sector may still be loyal to their armed groups, and as such the failure of the DDR process, or the peace process, will have ramifications. Such challenges have been experienced in Sierra Leone prior to 2000, and in Mozambique. Thus, the approach to peace should be comprehensive and sustainable, with both DDR and SSR regarded as being critical to its success or failure.
The criteria for inclusion in the security sector should be much more carefully set, with vetting done on human rights violations, especially given the spread of violent extremist groups and activities in Africa at the moment. A well-defined process will help to create a sector that will have the wherewithal to prevent a relapse into violence. Additionally, eligibility and vetting processes for SSR during demobilization processes, have to be conducted in tandem with security sector actors, to ensure that the numbers accepted for integration are in line with the absorption capacity of the sector. Bringing in more people than the sector could absorb will undermine the effectiveness of the SSR process.
Establishing an integrated approach to DDR and SSR is a lengthy process—the actors and external stakeholders involved need to manage their expectations accordingly. The multi-stakeholder consultation and decision-making structures need to be retained over time, and although pressing issues of disarmament and demobilization should be carried out in a timely manner, the other aspects also require consistent pursuing. To establish a coherent and sustainable security governance framework, consensus needs to be built over time.
Tied to the point above, former combatants reintegrated into local communities could play a meaningful role in SSR processes, without being part of security institutions. For instance, they could be part of structures that promote For instance, in Sierra Leone, former combatants are part of the Local Police Partnership Boards and Community Security Volunteers networks established as part of the Local Policing Needs Program at the end of the civil war in 2002 (Bangura, 2016).
Given the limited absorption capacity of security sectors, policy makers and practitioners of DDR and SSR processes should effectively engage private security entities, with the aim of having them recruit and train former combatants. Incentives could be provided to them, such as tax deductions or relief, to encourage them to take in more excombatants and provide them with employment opportunities. While such proposals are common in the literature on SSR, they are seldom effectively used.
Conclusion
Several countries in Africa have experienced various conflicts over the past decades—as such they have also experimented with an array of postconflict peacebuilding efforts. Postconflict contexts within Africa have been the implementation grounds for several mechanisms and methodologies. All of these share a common purpose—to facilitate the transition from armed conflict, stabilize environments, and support the development of lasting peace.
DDR and SSR programs have evolved over the years as part of the search for peace and stability in conflict-affected settings. While DDR has a programatic impetus, and organization, the SSR programs were viewed as longer-term processes to support sustainable peace. Major international actors within the sector, such as the UN, the British government, and the EU, have attempted to create comprehensive frameworks for integrating DDR and SSR programs within the larger scope of peacebuilding. Likewise, there have been institutional efforts to align programatic approaches and intervention in postconflict contexts as well.
With only a few success stories, for instance, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the linking of SSR and DDR initiatives is still beset by many maladies. To successfully link SSR and DDR, there is the need for political will, sequencing of activities, and work focus on enhancing complementarity and harmonization of efforts.
Additionally, the nature and trajectory of conflicts within Africa vary considerably and issues such as the prevalence and penetration of small arms, the presence of warlords, and other non-state security actors, are all common to these contexts. Thus, in most cases, the use of DDR alone will be insufficient in addressing existing challenges, especially in cases where security sector actors were part of the reasons for the eruption of violence in the first place. Effectively aligning DDR and SSR could contribute to the production of a credible and capable security sector that will help to restore stability, peace and order in countries in transition from violence to peace.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.