Government funding constitutes a key source of revenue for nonprofits to survive. However, how to acquire government funding has not received sufficient scholarly attention yet, and the limited number of studies yields three major limitations. In order to address this knowledge gap, we examine the extent to which accountability, institutionalization, and political embeddedness affect nonprofits’ receipt of government revenue and the amount acquired from the government from the perspective of interorganizational relationship, particularly the government-nonprofit relations angle. Using two years panel data derived from a sample of 382 social service organizations in Guangdong Province, China, the research shows that nonprofits that are accountable to the government, more formalized, and hold (or once held) cadre positions at county and municipal level are more likely to acquire government funding. The effect of political council membership and being accountable to the public are relatively limited.
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