Deepening partisan polarization in the US House has incapacitated many of Congress’s bipartisan features. A common critique of Congress is that members are too disconnected from one another; however, evidence that legislators’ connections might overcome partisan influence is mixed. Can connections among members of Congress alleviate some partisan gridlock? This study theorizes that voluntary and sustained connections increase cooperation among Republican and Democratic pairs of legislators and analyzes the extent to which such connections affect bipartisan cooperation. Using a panel approach to analyze congressional activity, this study examines the effect of institutional connections on cooperative behavior over twelve congresses. Results largely support the theoretical expectation that networks made of voluntary and sustained relationships foster greater cross-party cooperation, relative to compulsory or episodic connections; however, the substantive effects of these connections are too modest to offset partisan polarization.
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