How parties manage capitols and constituencies in the American context is the subject of much political inquiry. This research examines whether majority parties’ institutional capability depends on their ability to organize beyond the legislative chamber. An opportunity to examine such a question presents itself in a curious historical occurrence, the Minnesota Legislature’s abrupt de jure ban on political parties. Using data compiled from the Minnesota House of Representatives, I compare partisan characteristics in roll call voting in the context of an experimental setting. The results suggest legislative leadership powers lose efficacy when party’s organizational capacity beyond the chamber diminishes.
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