It is often argued that electoral vulnerability is critical to constituency responsiveness. We investigate this possibility using different measures of vulnerability, but argue that in the United States the Republican Party may be less responsive than the Democratic Party due to its core constituency and view of representation. We test our hypotheses relying on an innovative research design that exploits referenda in U.S. states to compare legislator voting behavior with voter preferences on exactly the same policy proposal, allowing us to overcome the measurement problems of much previous research. Based on a newly compiled data set of more than 3,000 voting decisions for 818 legislators on 27 referenda, we find high levels of congruence, but that congruence with the median voter is higher for legislators who are running for reelection. We also find that Democrats are more responsive after a close election but that Republicans are not sensitive to electoral margins.
AhujaS. (1994). Electoral status and representation in the United States Senate does temporal proximity to election matter?American Politics Quarterly, 22(1), 104–118.
2.
AnsolabehereS.BradyD.FiorinaM. (1992). The vanishing marginals and electoral responsiveness. British Journal of Political Science, 22(1), 21–38.
3.
BarrD. J.LevyR.ScheepersC.TilyH. J. (2013). Random effects structure for confirmatory hypothesis testing: Keep it maximal. Journal of Memory and Language, 68(3), 255–278.
4.
BartelsL. M. (2008). Unequal democracy: The political economy of a new gilded age. Princeton University Press.
5.
BeyerD.HänniM. (2018). Two sides of the same coin? Congruence and responsiveness as representative democracy’s currencies. Policy Studies Journal, 46, S13–S47.
6.
BroockmanD. E.SkovronC. (2018). Bias in perceptions of public opinion among political elites. American Political Science Review, 112(3), 542–563.
BrunnerE.RossS. L.WashingtonE. (2013). Does less income mean less representation?American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 5(2), 53–76.
9.
ButlerD. M. (2014). Representing the Advantaged: How Politicians Reinforce Inequality. Cambridge University Press.
10.
DownsA. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. Harper & Row.
11.
EnnsP. K. (2015). Reconsidering the middle: A reply to Martin Gilens. Perspectives on Politics, 13(4), 1072–1074.
12.
FrankoW. F.KellyN. J.WitkoC. (2016). Class bias in voter turnout, representation, and inequality. Perspectives on Politics, 14, 351–368.
13.
FromanL. A. (1963). Congressmen and their constituencies. Rand McNally.
14.
GayC. (2007). Legislating without constraints: The effect of minority districting on legislators’ responsiveness to constituency preferences. Journal of Politics, 69(2), 442–456
15.
GelmanA.HillJ. (2007). Data analysis using regression and multilevel/hierarchical models. Cambridge University Press.
16.
GerberE. R. (1996). Legislative response to the threat of popular initiatives. American Journal of Political Science, 40, 99–128.
17.
GigerN.KlüverH. (2016). Voting against your constituents? How lobbying affects representation. American Journal of Political Science, 60(1), 190–205.
18.
GilensM. (2011). Policy consequences of representational inequality. In EnnsP. K.WlezienC. (Eds.), Who gets represented? (pp. 247–284) Russell Sage Foundation.
19.
GilensM. (2012). Affluence and influence: Economic inequality and political power in America. Princeton University Press.
20.
GilensM.PageB. I. (2014). Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups, and average citizens. Perspectives on Politics, 12, 564–581.
21.
GlazerA.RobbinsM. (1985). Congressional responsiveness to constituency change. American Journal of Political Science, 29, 259–273.
22.
GriffinJ. D. (2006). Electoral competition and democratic responsiveness: A defense of the marginality hypothesis. Journal of Politics, 68(4), 911–921.
23.
GrossmannM.HopkinsD. A. (2016). Asymmetric politics: Ideological republicans and group interest democrats. Oxford University Press.
24.
HardenJ. J. (2013). Multidimensional responsiveness: The determinants of legislators’ representational priorities. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 38(2), 155–184.
25.
Hertel-FernandezA.MildenbergerM.StokesL. C. (2018). Legislative staff and representation in congress. American Political Science Review, 113, 1–18.
26.
JewellM. E. (1983). Legislator-constituency relations and the representative process. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 8(3), 303–337.
27.
JonesP. E. (2013). The effect of political competition on democratic accountability. Political Behavior, 35(3), 481–515.
28.
KingA. S. (1997). Running scared: Why America’s politicians campaign too much and govern too little. Free Press.
29.
KorpiW. (1978). The working class in welfare capitalism: Work, unions, and politics in Sweden. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
30.
KuklinskiJ. H. (1977). District competitiveness and legislative roll-call behavior: A reassessment of the marginality hypothesis. American Journal of Political Science, 68(4), 627–638.
31.
LaxJ. R.PhillipsJ. H. (2012). The democratic deficit in the states. American Journal of Political Science, 56(1), 148–166.
LeckieG. (2013). Cross-classified multilevel models using stata: How important are schools and neighborhoods for students’ educational attainment? In GarsonG. D. (Ed.), Hierarchical linear modeling: Guide and applications (pp. 311–322). SAGE.
34.
MacRaeD. (1952). The relation between roll call votes and constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives. American Political Science Review, 46(4), 1046–1055.
35.
MansbridgeJ. (2003). Rethinking representation. American Political Science Review, 97(4), 515–528.
36.
MasketS. E.NoelH. (2012). Serving two masters: Using referenda to assess partisan versus dyadic legislative representation. Political Research Quarterly, 65(1), 104–123.
37.
MatsusakaJ. G. (n.d.). When do legislators follow constituent opinion? Evidence from matched roll call and referendum votes. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
38.
MayhewD. R. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. Yale University Press.
39.
MillerS.WitkoC.WoodsN. D. (2018). How the unorganized mass public (sometimes) gets represented in regulatory politics. Political Research Quarterly, 71, 88–101.
40.
RehfeldA. (2009). Representation rethought: On trustees, delegates, and gyroscopes in the study of political representation and democracy. American Political Science Review, 103(2), 214–230.
41.
RhodesJ. H.SchaffnerB. F. (2017). Testing models of unequal representation: Democratic populists and republican oligarchs?Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 12(2), 185–204.
42.
RogersS. (2017). Electoral accountability for state legislative roll calls and ideological representation. American Political Science Review, 111, 555–571.
SteenbergenM. R.JonesB. S. (2002). Modeling multilevel data structures. American Journal of Political Science, 46(1), 218–237.
45.
WlezienC. (2017). Public opinion and policy representation: On conceptualization, measurement, and interpretation. Policy Studies Journal, 45, 561–582.
46.
WolakJ. (2017). Public expectations of state legislators. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 42(2), 175–209.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
