Previous works conceptualized responsiveness as parties following every movement of median voters (MV) or party supporters. We argue instead that whether a party should follow every movement of MVs/supporters is conditioned, first, by whether the MV (or supporter) moves toward or away from the party position and, second, by whether the party is policy or vote-oriented. We examine these claims based on survey data, which allow locating voter and party positions on a common ideological scale. Our main results nuance previous findings. We show that mainstream parties do adjust their position according to shifts in the position of MVs but only when these shifts are away from their position as predicted by a vote-seeking strategy. Our results also indicate that niche parties do adjust their position but only when their supporters move toward their position as predicted by a policy-oriented strategy. Overall, our results indicate that parties adjust their position with changes in public opinion, but that their responses are contingent on party characteristics and the direction of the change in public opinion.
Abou-ChadiT (2014) Niche party success and mainstream party policy shifts – how green and radical right parties differ in their impact. British Journal of Political Science46(2): 417–436.
2.
AchenCH (1977) Measuring representation: Perils of the correlation coefficient. American Journal of Political Science21(4): 805–815.
3.
AdamsJ (2012) Causes and electoral consequences of party policy shifts in multiparty elections: theoretical results and empirical evidence. Annual Review of Political Science15: 401–419.
4.
AdamsJEzrowLSomer-TopcuZ (2014) Do voters respond to party manifestos or to a wider information environment? An analysis of mass-elite linkages on European integration. American Journal of Political Science58(4): 967–978.
5.
AdamsJHauptABStollH (2009) What moves parties? The role of public opinion and global economic conditions in Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies42(5): 611–639.
6.
AdamsJClarkMEzrowL, et al. (2004) Understanding change and stability in party ideologies: do parties respond to public opinion or to past election results?British Journal of Political Science34: 589–610.
7.
AdamsJClarkMEzrowL, et al. (2006) Are niche parties fundamentally different from mainstream parties? The causes and the electoral consequences of western European parties’ policy shifts, 1976-1998. American Journal of Political Science50(3): 513–529.
8.
BaleTGreen-PedersenCKrouwelA, et al. (2010) If you can’t beat them, join them? Explaining social democratic responses to the challenge from the populist radical right in Western Europe. Political Studies58: 410–216.
BudgeI (1994) A new spatial theory of party competition: uncertainty, ideology, and policy equilibria viewed comparatively and temporally. British Journal of Political Science24(4): 443–467.
11.
CalvoEHellwigT (2011) Centripetal and centrifugal incentives under different electoral systems. American Journal of Political Science55(1): 27–41.
12.
CostelloRThomassenJRosemaM (2012) European parliament elections and political representation: policy congruence between voters and parties. West European Politics35(6): 1226–1248.
13.
CoxG (1990) Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems. American Journal of Political Science34: 903–935.
14.
CuriniLHinoA (2012) Missing links in party-system polarization: how institutions and voters matter. Journal of Politics74(2): 460–473.
15.
DaltonRJ (1985) Political parties and political representation: party supporters and party elites in nine nations. Comparative Political Studies18(3): 267–299.
16.
DaltonRJFarrellDMcAllisterI (2011) Political Parties and Democratic Linkage. New York: Oxford University Press.
17.
DaltonRJ (2015) Party representation across multiple issue dimensions. Party Politics23(6): 1–14.
18.
DaltonRJMcAllisterI (2015) Random walk or planned excursion? continuity and change in the left-right positions of political parties. Comparative Political Studies48(6): 759–787.
19.
DowJK (2011) Party-system extremism in majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. British Journal of Political Science41(2): 341–361.
20.
DownsA (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
21.
D’AlimonteR (1999) Party Behavior in a Polarized System: The Italian Communist Party and the Historic Compromise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22.
EnelowJHinichM (1984) The Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
23.
EzrowL (2011) Reply to dow: party positions, votes and the mediating role of electoral systems?British Journal of Political Science41(2): 448–452.
24.
EzrowLDe VriesCSteenbergenM, et al. (2010) Mean voter representation and partisan constituency representation: do parties respond to the mean voter position or to their supporters?Party Politics17(3): 275–301.
25.
FerlandB (2017) Retrospective ideological representation and its impact on democratic satisfaction. Journal of Elections, Public Opinions and Parties27: 192–212.
26.
FerlandB (2018) Ideological congruence over government mandates under majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems. West European Politics41(2): 350–383.
27.
GolderM (2003) Explaining variation in the success of extreme right parties in Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies36: 432–466.
28.
GolderMFerlandB (2017) Electoral Rules and Citizen-Elite Ideological Congruence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
29.
GolderMStramskiJ (2010) Ideological congruence and electoral institutions. American Journal of Political Science54: 90–106.
30.
GrosecloseT (2001) A model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage. American Journal of Political Science45: 862–886.
31.
MayneQHakhverdianA (2017) Ideological congruence and citizen satisfaction: evidence from 25 advanced democracies. Comparative Political Studies50: 822–849.
32.
KimHMFordingRC (1998) Voter ideology in western democracies, 1946-1989. European Journal of Political Research33: 73–97.
33.
KitscheltH (1994) The Transformation of European Social Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
34.
LehrerR (2012) Intra-party democracy and party responsiveness. West European Politics35(6): 1295–1319.
35.
LinTMEnelowJDorussenH (1999) Equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting. Public Choice98: 59–82.
36.
MatsusakaJG (2010) Popular control of public policy: a quantitative approach. Quarterly Journal of Political Science5: 133–167.
37.
McDonaldMDBudgeI (2005) Elections, Parties, Democracy - Conferring the Median Mandate. New York: Oxford University Press.
38.
MeguidBM (2008) Party Competition Between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
39.
MerrillSIIIAdamsJ (2002) Centrifugal incentives in multi-candidate elections. Journal of Theoretical Politics14(3): 275–300.
40.
MüllerWCStromK (1999) Policy, office, or votes? how political parties in Western Europe make hard decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
41.
PitkinHF (1967) The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press.
42.
PowellGB (2000) Elections as Instruments of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
43.
PowellGB (2004) The Chain of Responsiveness. Journal of Democracy15: 91–105.
44.
PrzeworskiASusanCSBernardM (1999) Democracy, accountability, and representation. In: PrzeworskiA (eds) Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
45.
SchumacherGDe VriesCVisB (2013) Why do parties change position? party organization and environmental incentives. Journal of Politics75(2): 464–477.
46.
SpoonJJ (2011) Political Survival of Small Parties in Europe. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
47.
SteckerCTausendpfundM (2016) Multidimensional government-citizen congruence and satisfaction with democracy. European Journal of Political Research55: 492–511.
48.
WagnerM (2012) Defining and measuring niche parties. Party Politics18: 845–864.
49.
WarwickPV (2010) Bilateralism or the median mandate? an examination of rival perspectives on democratic governance. European Journal of Political Research49(1): 1–24.
50.
WarwickPVZakharovaM (2013) Measuring the median: the risks of inferring beliefs from votes. British Journal of Political Science43(1): 157–175.
51.
WittmanD (1977) Candidates with policy preferences: a dynamic model. Journal of Economic Theory14: 180–189.
52.
WittmanD (1983) Candidate motivation: a synthesis of alternative theories. American Political Science Review77(1): 142–157.
53.
WooldridgeJM (2002) Econometric Analysis of Cross-Sectional and Panel Data. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
