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Abstract

Conflict over presidential nominations has grown more acrimonious in recent decades. Senators have increasingly exploited their procedural prerogatives to block or delay nominations that they oppose. In this article, we utilize a newly collected dataset on holds placed by Republican senators to explore the usage and effect of obstructive tactics on nominations in the 100th to 104th Congresses (1987-1996). We find that nominees subject to a hold see a significant delay in disposition of their nomination, but we do not find evidence that holds regularly prevent nominees from being confirmed by the Senate.

Keywords

obstruction nominations senate holds

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