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Abstract

How much do factual information and other kinds of frames affect policy attitudes? And whose attitudes are most malleable? I address these questions via two original survey experiments about the estate tax. I demonstrate that correct information about who is potentially subject to the estate tax increased support for the estate tax. Furthermore, this information did not appear any less persuasive than pro- or antitax arguments that emphasized values such as equality or fairness. Finally, the effects of this information were concentrated among lower income conservatives and Republicans. These findings contrast with previous research on estate tax attitudes and have broader implications for the study of political information, framing, and policy attitudes.

Keywords

public opinion framing estate tax political information

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Stories or Science? Facts,Frames,and Policy Attitudes

Abstract

Keywords

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