Abstract
The motion to table plays a prominent role in many scholarly accounts of policymaking in the Senate. Scholars have argued that it is used with several other motions to allow majority party leaders to bias policy outcomes on the chamber floor. Others maintain it provides bill managers with a means of more efficiently managing the floor. We examine how the motion was utilized both prior to and during the development of Senate floor leadership. Our evidence suggests that in the absence of such leaders, majority party members used the motion to defend the floor from both opposing and fellow party members.
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