There is a puzzle in the literature on presidential unilateral power that, on one hand, presents executive orders as the outcome of presidential prerogative but on the other hand identifies delegated discretion as a limit to presidential action. To address this question, we examine the use of delegated authority in unilateral orders from 1951 to 2009 and relate these to the ideological underpinnings of the institutions delegating and overseeing the use of this discretion (Congress and the Court). Our findings indicate that presidents are likely to issue unilateral directives with more substantive discretion when ideologically farther away from either the medians in Congress or the Supreme Court, but more likely to scale back their use of discretion when both branches are jointly ideologically distant from the president. The results demonstrate support for both an assertive and restrained president when relying upon delegated authority to act unilaterally.
AgrestiA. (2002). Categorical data analysis. New York, NY: John Wiley.
2.
BaileyJ. D.RottinghausB. (2014). Reexamining the unilateral politics model: Source of authority and the power to act alone. American Politics Research, 42, 472-502.
3.
BaileyM. A.MaltzmanF. (2008). Does legal doctrine matter? Unpacking law and policy preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court. American Political Science Review, 102, 369-384.
4.
BawnK. (1995). Political control versus expertise: Congressional choices about administrative procedures. American Political Science Review, 89(1), 62-73.
5.
BawnK. (1997). Choosing strategies to control the bureaucracy: Statutory constraints, oversight, and the committee system. The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 13, 101-126.
6.
BelcoM.RottinghausB. (2017). The dual executive: Unilateral power in a separated but shared power system. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
7.
BendorJ.GlazerA.HammondT. (2001). Theories of delegation. Annual Revie of Political Science, 4, 235-269.
8.
BendorJ.MeirowitzA. (2004). Spatial models of delegation. American Political Science Review, 98, 293-310.
9.
BerryW. D.GolderM.MiltonD. (2012). Improving tests of theories positing interaction. Journal of Politics, 74, 653-671.
10.
BlackR. C.MadonnaA. J.OwensR. J.LynchM. S. (2007). Adding recess appointments to the president’s “tool chest” of unilateral powers. Political Research Quarterly, 60, 645-654.
11.
ChiouF.RothenbergL. S. (2014). The elusive search for presidential power. American Journal of Political Science, 58, 653-668.
12.
ChiouF.RothenbergL. S. (2017). The enigma of presidential power: Parties, policies, and the strategic uses of unilateral action. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
13.
CooperP. J. (2002). By order of the president: The use and abuse of executive direct action. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
14.
DeeringC. J.MaltzmanF. (1999). The politics of executive orders: Legislative constraints on presidential power. Political Research Quarterly, 52, 767-783.
15.
DickinsonM. J. (2008). The politics of persuasion: A bargaining model of presidential power. In RockmanB.WatermanR. (Eds.), Presidential leadership: The vortex of power (pp. 277-310). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
16.
DickinsonM. J.GubbJ. (2016). The limits to power without persuasion. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 46(3), 48-72.
17.
EpsteinD.O’HalloranS. (1994). Administrative procedures, information and agency discretion. American Journal of Political Science, 38, 697-722.
18.
EpsteinD.O’HalloranS. (1999). Delegating powers: A transaction cost politics approach in policymaking under separate powers. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
19.
FennoR. F.Jr. (1958). President-cabinet relations: A pattern and a case study. American Political Science Review, 52, 388-405.
20.
FineJ. A.WarberA. L. (2012). Circumventing adversity: Executive orders and divided government. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 42, 256-274.
21.
FiorinaM. (1982). Legislative choice of regulatory forms: Legal process or administrative process?Public Choice, 39, 33-61.
22.
FiorinaM. (1986). Legislator uncertainty, legislative control, and the delegation of legislative power. The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 2, 33-51.
23.
FisherL. (1989). Micromanagement by Congress: Reality and myth. In Gordon CrovitzL.RabkinJ. A. (Eds.), The fettered presidency (pp. 139-158). Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
24.
FisherL. (1998). The politics of shared power: Congress and the executive (4th ed.). College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
25.
FisherL. (2007). Constitutional conflicts between Congress and the president (5th ed.). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
26.
FleishmanJ. L.AufsesA. H. (1976). Law and orders: The problem of presidential legislation. Law and Contemporary Problems, 40, 1-45.
27.
FranzeseR.KamC. (2009). Modeling and interpreting interactive hypotheses in regression analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
28.
FriedrichR. J. (1982). In defense of multiplicative terms in multiple regression equations. American Journal of Political Science, 26, 797-833.
29.
GibsonT. T. (2008). Office of legal counsel: Inner workings and impact. Journal of Law and Courts, 18(2), 7-12.
30.
GilliganT. W.KrehbielK. (1987). Collective decision-making and standing committees: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures. The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 3, 287-335.
31.
HowellW. G. (2003). Power without persuasion: The politics of direct presidential action. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
32.
HowellW. G. (2005). Unilateral powers: A brief overview. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 35, 417-439.
33.
KatyalN. K. (2006). Internal separation of powers: Checking today’s most dangerous branch from within. Yale Law Journal, 115, 2314-2349.
34.
KiewietD. R.McCubbinsM. D. (1991). The logic of delegation: Congressional parties and the appropriation process. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
35.
LindsayJ. (1994). Congress, foreign policy, and the new institutionalism. International Studies Quarterly, 38, 281-304.
LongS. J. (1997). Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
38.
MayerK. R. (1999). Executive orders and presidential power. The Journal of Politics, 61, 445-466.
39.
MayerK. R. (2001). With the stroke of a pen: Executive orders and presidential power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
40.
MayerK. R. (2009). Going alone: The presidential power of unilateral action. In EdwardsG. C.HowellW. G. (Eds.), Oxford handbook and the American presidency (pp. 427-454). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
McCubbinsM. (1985). The legislative design of regulatory structure. American Journal of Political Science, 29, 721-748.
43.
McCubbinsM.LupiaA. (1994). Who controls? Information and the structure of legislative decision making. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19, 361-384.
44.
McCubbinsM.NollR. G.WeingastB. R. (1987). Administrative procedures as instruments of political control. The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 3, 243-277.
45.
McCubbinsM.NollR. G.WeingastB. R. (1989). Structure and process; politics and policy: Administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies. Virginia Law Review, 75, 431-482.
46.
MelnickR. S. (2005). The courts, jurisprudence, and the executive branch. In AberbachJ. D.PetersonM. A. (Eds.), The executive branch (pp. 466-497). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
47.
MitnickB. M. (1973, August). Fiduciary rationality and public policy: The theory of agency and some consequences. Paper presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, pp. 1-45, New Orleans, LA.
48.
MitnickB. M. (1975). The theory of agency: The policing “paradox” and regulatory behavior. Public Choice, 24, 27-42.
49.
MoeT. M. (1987). An assessment of the positive theory of congressional dominance. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 12, 475-520.
50.
MoeT. M. (1990). The politics of structural choice: Toward a theory of public bureaucracy. In WilliamsonO. E. (Ed.), Organization theory: From Chester Barnard to the present and beyond (pp. 116-153). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
51.
MoeT. M. (1998). The presidency and the bureaucracy: The presidential advantage. In NelsonM. (Ed.), The presidency and the political system (5th ed., pp. 365-389). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
52.
MoeT. M.HowellW. (1999). The presidential power of unilateral action. The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 15, 132-179.
53.
NeustadtR. E. (1990). Presidential power and the modern presidents: The politics of leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (3rd ed.). New York, NY: The Free Press.
O’DonnellG. (1994). Delegative democracy. Journal of Democracy, 5(1), 55-69.
56.
OuyangY.WatermanR. W. (2015, September). How legislative (In) activity, ideological divergence, and divided government impact executive unilateralism: A test of three theories. Congress & the Presidency, 42(3), 317-341.
57.
PildesR. H.IssacharoffS. (2004). Between civil libertarianism and executive unilateralism: an institutional process approach to rights during wartime. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 5(1), 1-45.
58.
PooleK. T.RosenthalH. (1991). Patterns of congressional voting. American Journal of Political Science, 35, 228-278.
59.
PooleK. T.RosenthalH. (1997). Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
60.
QuintP. E. (1989). Reflections on the separation of powers and the judicial review at the end of the Reagan era. George Washington Law Review, 57, 427-458.
61.
RelyeaH. C. (2008, November, 26). Presidential directives: Background and overview. Congressional Research Service. 98-611 GOV.
62.
RottinghausB. (2015, September). Assessing the unilateral presidency: Constraints and contingencies. Congress & the Presidency, 42(3), 287-292.
63.
RudalevigeA. (2005). The structure of leadership: Presidents, hierarchies, and information flow. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 35, 333-360.
64.
RudalevigeA. (2014). The letter of the law: Administrative discretion and Obama’s domestic unilateralism. The Forum, 12(1), 29-59.
65.
SchoenbrodD. (1993). Power without responsibility: How Congress abuses people through delegation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
66.
ShaneP. M.BruffH. H. (1996). Separation of powers law. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
ShugartM. S.CareyJ. M. (1992). Presidents and assemblies: Constitutional design and electoral dynamics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
69.
ShullS. A. (1997). Presidential-congressional relations: Policy and time approaches. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
70.
SpenceD. B. (1999). Managing delegation ex ante: Using law to steer administrative agencies. The Journal of Legal Studies, 28, 413-459.
71.
StackK. M. (2005). The statutory president. Iowa Law Review, 90, 539-600.
72.
StackK. M. (2006). The president’s statutory powers to administer the laws. Columbia Law Review, 106, 263-323.
73.
ThrowerS. (2016). The president, the court, and policy implementation. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 47, 122-145.
74.
WarberA. L. (2006). Executive orders and the modern presidency: Legislating from the oval office. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
75.
WatermanR. W.MeierK. J. (1998). Principal-agent models: An expansion?Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 8, 173-202.
76.
WhittingtonK. E. (2009). Judicial checks on the president. In EdwardsG. C.HowellW. G. (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of the American presidency (pp. 646-666). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
77.
YoungL. (2013). Unilateral presidential policy making and the impact of crises. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 43, 328-352.
78.
YuO.WatermanR. W. (2015). How legislative (in)activity, ideological divergence, and divided government impact executive unilateralism: A test of three theories. Congress & the Presidency, 42, 317-341.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
