The first stage in the policy lifecycle—creation—has garnered significant attention while the final stage—repeal—has received scarcely any. To reconcile this imbalance, an extensive data set recording repeals to landmark laws enacted from 1951 to 2006 was complied. Event history analysis yields three significant results. First, the incidence of repeal exhibits a regular pattern characterized by an increasing hazard immediately after enactment followed by institutionalization and a monotonically declining hazard. Second, divided government has a complementary effect on the policy process, simultaneously constraining lawmakers from reversing enacted policies while effecting more durable legislation over the long term. Thus, the negative effects of divided government on policy production are offset by a decrease in policy repeal. Third, polarization has a curvilinear effect on the risk of repeal. Moderate polarization facilitates coalition formation when enacting repeals while polarized and depolarized periods have an attenuating effect.
Alt, J.E., & Lowry, R.C. ( 1994). Divided government, fiscal institutions, and budget deficits: Evidence from the states. American Political Science Review , 88, 811-828.
2.
Anderson, A.R. ( 1999). Disabled without benefits: The impacts of recent social security reforms on disabled children. Boston College Law Review, 41, 125-152.
3.
Austen-Smith, D., & Riker, W. ( 1987). Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation . American Political Science Review, 81, 897-918.
4.
Baumgartner, F. ( 2006). Punctuated equilibrium theory and environmental policy . In R. Repetto (Ed.), Punctuated equilibrium models and environmental policy (pp. 24-26). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
5.
Baumgartner, F., & Jones, B.D. ( 1993). Agendas and instability in American politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
6.
Baumgartner, F., & Jones, B.D. ( 2002). Policy dynamics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
7.
Berry, C.R., Burden, B.C., & Howell, W.G. ( 2010). After enactment: The lives and deaths of federal programs . American Journal of Political Science, 54, 1-17.
8.
Bianco, W. ( 1994). Trust: Representatives and constituents. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
9.
Binder, S.A. ( 2003). Stalemate: The causes and consequences of legislative gridlock. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
10.
Bond, J.R., & Fleisher, R. ( 1990). The president in the legislative arena. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
11.
Box-Steffensmeier, J.M., Reiter, D., & Zorn, C. ( 2003). Nonproportional hazards and event history analysis in international relations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47, 33-53.
12.
Brady, D., & Volden, C. ( 1998). Revolving gridlock: Politics and policy from Carter to Clinton. Boulder, CO: Westview Press .
13.
Burns, J.M. ( 1963). The deadlock of democracy: Four-party politics in America . Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall .
14.
Cleves, M.A., Gould, W., Gutierrez, R., & Marchenko, Y. ( 2008). An introduction to survival analysis using Stata. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
15.
Coleman, J.J. ( 1999). Unified government, divided government, and party responsiveness . American Political Science Review, 93, 821-835.
16.
Conley, R.S. ( 2003). The presidency, Congress, and divided government. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
17.
Corder, K.J. ( 2004). Are federal programs immortal? Estimating the hazard of program termination. American Politics Research, 32, 3-25.
18.
Cox, G.W., & McCubbins, M.D. (2007). Legislative leviathan: Party government in the House (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
19.
Dahl, R.A. ( 1967). Pluralist democracy in the United States: Conflict and consent. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally .
20.
Diller, M. ( 1998). Working without a job: The social messages of the new workfare. Stanford Law and Policy Review, 9, 19-43.
21.
Dodd, L.C. ( 1981). Congress, the Constitution, and the crisis of legitimation . In L. C. Dodd & B. Oppenheimer (Eds.), Congress reconsidered (2nd ed., pp. 390-420). Washington, DC: CQ Press.
22.
Dodd, L.C. ( 1994). Political learning and political change: Understanding development across time. In L. C. Dodd & C. Jillson (Eds.), The dynamics of American politics (pp. 331-364). Boulder, CO : Westview Press.
23.
Dodd, L.C., & Oppenheimer, B. (1977). The house in transition . In L. C. Dodd & B. Oppenheimer (Eds.), Congress reconsidered (pp. 21-53). New York, NY: Praeger.
24.
Dodd, L.C., & Schraufnagel, S. (2009). Reconsidering party polarization and policy productivity: A curvilinear perspective. In L. C. Dodd & B. Oppenheimer (Eds.), Congress reconsidered (9th ed., pp. 393-418). Washington, DC: CQ Press.
25.
Edwards, G.C., III. (2003). On deaf ears: The limits of the bully pulpit. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
26.
Edwards, G.C., III, Barrett, A., & Peake, J. ( 1997). The legislative impact of divided government. American Journal of Political Science, 41, 545-563.
27.
Erikson, R.S., MacKuen, M.B., & Stimson, J.A. ( 2006). Public opinion and congressional policy: A macro-level perspective. In E. S. Adler & J. S. Lapinski (Eds.), The macropolitics of Congress (pp. 79-95). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
28.
Espino, R., & Canon, D.T. ( 2009). Vote switching in the U.S. House. Journal of Politics, 71, 324-338.
29.
Finocchiaro, C.J., & Rohde, D.W. ( 2008). War for the floor: Partisan theory and agenda control in the U.S. House of Representatives. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 33, 35-62.
30.
Grambsch, P.M., & Therneau, T.M. (1994). Proportional hazards tests and diagnostics based on weighted residuals. Biometrika, 81, 515-526.
31.
Hammond, T., & Miller, G. ( 1987). The core of the constitution. American Political Science Review, 81, 1155-1174.
32.
Heitshusen, V., & Young, G. ( 2006). Macro-politics and changes in the U.S. Code: Testing competing theories of policy production, 1874-1946. In E. S. Adler & J. S. Lapinski (Eds.), The macropolitics of Congress (pp. 129-150). Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.
33.
Heller, W.B. ( 1997). Bicameralism and budget deficits: The effect of parliamentary structure on government spending. Legislative Studies Quarterly , 22, 485-516.
34.
Himelfarb, R. ( 1995). Catastrophic politics: The rise and fall of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988. University Park: Penn State University Press.
35.
Howell, W., Adler, E.S., Cameron, C., & Riemann, C. ( 2000). Divided government and the legislative productivity of Congress, 1945-94. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25, 285-312.
36.
Horn, M.J., & Shepsle, K.A. ( 1989). Administrative process and organizational form as legislative responses to agency costs. Virginia Law Review, 75, 499-508.
37.
Jones, B.D. ( 1994). Reconceiving decision-making in democratic politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
38.
Jones, B.D., & Baumgartner, F. (2005). The politics of attention: How government prioritizes problems. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
39.
Jones, C.O. ( 2005). The presidency in a separated system. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
40.
Kelly, S.Q. ( 1993). Divided we govern? A reassessment. Polity25: 475-84.
41.
Kernell, S. ( 1997). Going Public (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: CQ Press.
42.
Kiewiet, D.R., & McCubbins, M.D. (1988). Presidential influence in the appropriations process. American Journal of Political Science, 32, 713-736.
43.
King, G., & Zeng, L. ( 2001). Logistic regression in rare events data. Political Analysis, 9, 137-163.
44.
Kingdon, J. ( 1995). Agendas, alternatives and public policies (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
45.
Krehbiel, K. ( 1991). Information and legislative organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
46.
Krehbiel, K. ( 1998). Pivotal politics: A theory of U.S. lawmaking. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
47.
Lewis-Beck, M.S., & Nadeau, R. ( 2004). Split-ticket voting: The effects of cognitive Madisonianism . Journal of Politics, 66, 97-112.
48.
Long, S.H., & Gordon, N. ( 1989). Updated estimates of Medicare’s Catastrophic Drug Insurance Program. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office.
49.
Maltzman, F., & Shipan, C.R. ( 2008). Change, continuity and the evolution of the law. American Journal of Political Science, 52, 252-267.
50.
Mayhew, D.R. ( 1991). Divided we govern. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
51.
Mayhew, D.R. ( 2005). Divided we govern (2nd ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press .
52.
McCarty, N.M. ( 2000). Presidential pork: Executive veto power and distributive politics. American Political Science Review, 94, 117-129.
53.
McCarty, N.M., Poole, K.T., & Rosenthal, H. ( 2006). Polarized America: The dance of ideology and unequal riches. Cambridge: MIT Press.
54.
Miller, W.E., & Stokes, D.E. ( 1963). Constituency influence in Congress. American Political Science Review, 57, 45-56.
55.
O’Connor, W.J., Jr. (1980). Truth in lending simplification . Business Lawyer, 36, 1161-1202.
56.
Page, B.I., & Shapiro, R.Y. ( 1983). Effects of public opinion on policy. American Political Science Review, 77, 175-190.
57.
Parker, D.C.W., & Dull, M. ( 2009). Divided we quarrel: The politics of congressional investigations, 1947-2004. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 34, 319-345.
58.
Patashnik, E.M. ( 2008). Reforms at risk. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
59.
Pierson, P. ( 2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. American Political Science Review, 77, 175-190.
60.
Pierson, P. ( 2004). Politics in time: History, institutions, and social analysis . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
61.
Polen, L.E. ( 1998). Salvaging a safety net: Modifying the bar to Supplemental Security Income for legal aliens. Washington University Law Quarterly, 76, 1455-1490.
62.
Poole, K.T. ( 2000). A non-parametric unfolding of binary choice data. Political Analysis, 8, 211-237.
63.
Poole, K.T. ( 2007). Changing minds? Not in Congress!Public Choice, 131, 435-451.
64.
Quirk, P.J., & Nesmith, B. ( 1995). Divided government and policy making: Negotiating the laws. In M. Nelson (Ed.), The presidency and the political system (4th ed., pp. 565-588). Washington, DC: CQ Press.
65.
Riker, W.H. ( 1988). Liberalism against populism. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.
66.
Rohde, D. ( 1991). Parties and leaders in the postreform House. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
67.
Sabatier, P.A. ( 1999). The need for better theories. In P.A. Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process (pp. 3-17). Oxford : Westview Press.
68.
Schattschneider, E.E. ( 1942). Party government. New York, NY: Farrar &Rinehart.
69.
Schoen, L.M. ( 1997). Working welfare recipients: A comparison of the Family Support Act and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. Fordham Urban Law Journal, 20, 637-657.
70.
Shepsle, K.A. ( 1986). Institutional equilibrium and equilibrium institutions . In H. F. Weisberg (Eds.), Political science: The science of politics (pp. 51-81). New York, NY : Agathon Press.
71.
Soroka, S., & Wlezien, C. ( 2005). Opinion-policy dynamics: Public preferences and public expenditure in the United Kingdom. British Journal of Political Science, 35, 665-689.
72.
Stimson, J.A. ( 1999). Public opinion in America (2nd ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press .
73.
Stimson, J.A., MacKuen, M.B., & Erikson, R.S. ( 1995). Dynamic representation. American Political Science Review, 89, 543-565.
74.
Sundquist, J. ( 1988). Needed: A political theory for the new era of coalition government in the United States. Political Science Quarterly , 103, 613-615.
75.
Thorson, G.R. ( 1998). Divided government and the passage of partisan legislation, 1947-1990. Political Research Quarterly, 51, 751-764.
76.
Weatherford, M.S. ( 1993). Responsiveness and deliberation in divided government: Presidential leadership in tax policy making. British Journal of Political Science, 24, 1-31.
77.
Wilson, W. ( 1885). Congressional government: A study in American politics . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
