This research examines the relationship between courts and legislatures in a comparative perspective. Specifically, I examine how (a) the ideological composition of the bench, (b) the propensity of court involvement in a given policy area, and (c) the disposition of court decisions in a given policy area influence the ideology of bill introductions and policy enactments by state legislatures. By examining HMO regulation and education policy in the American states during the 1990s, I find evidence that judicial influence does affect legislative policymaking, in both the introduction and enactment stages, across both policy areas. Although traditional scholarship has depicted the judicial branch as having minimal effect on policy formation, and subsequently social change, the findings of this study suggest that we have overlooked an important policymaking role of the judicial branch. Furthermore, state policy research has not given adequate attention to judicial influence as an explanation for policy formation in the American states.
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