The Supreme Court's decision in NCAA v. Alston already has had profound effects on the governance of college sports. Despite the narrow scope of the relief ordered in Alston, the opinion invites more challenges to NCAA rules that restrict compensation of athletes. Within months after Alston was decided, many athletes already are substantially better off financially, and the NCAA has delegated regulation of compensation of athletes to its conferences and divisions. Moreover, the case represents an intellectual victory for sports economics in that decades of research in the field formed the foundation for the Court's opinion.
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