Nike Inc. recently signed a trademark-licensing contract with the University of Michigan for nearly US$174 million over 11 years for the rights to be the supplier of athletic apparel and to use the university’s intellectual property (trademark) rights. The focus of this article is to empirically investigate the determinants for trademark-licensing contract values using athletic apparel contract data among NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision schools.
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