This paper analyzes the financial incentives for entities to self-impose punishments post-apprehension but before the enforcement body imposes punishment. We argue that violators punish themselves in order to affect the level and type of total punishment. Violators may be able to choose the punishment that minimizes lost revenue. The model includes an enforcing body whose objective is to be perceived as fair by the public. We consider the case of university self-sanctions for National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) violations to test our self-punishment model using data from Division I schools’ major infractions of NCAA rules. The estimation results show that university self-imposed punishments can significantly affect the form or type of the final punishment they receive from the NCAA in response to a violation of NCAA rules.
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