We show that, if the team sports designer puts more weight on the performance of high-ability members (e.g., star players) than on low-ability members, the designer encourages the low-ability member to free ride on the high-ability members so that the high-ability members exert even greater efforts. Thus, the designer’s choice approximates the best shot team contest. With more weight on the low-ability member’s performance, the choice approximates the weakest link team contest to undermine the free riding. The approximations work better with more convex effort cost function and/or smaller heterogeneity of group members.
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