Betting exchanges allow punters to bet on a horse to lose a race. This, many argue, has opened up the sport to a new form of corruption, where races will be deliberately lost in order to profit from betting. We examine whether anecdotal evidence of the fixing of horses to lose—of which there are many examples—is indicative of wider corruption. Following a “forensic economics” approach, we build an asymmetric information model of exchange betting and take it to betting data on 9,560 races run in 2013/2014. We find no evidence of the widespread corruption of horse racing by the betting exchanges.
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