This article shows that under certain circumstances, an increase in doping sanctions can decrease the number of participants in the competition. The model, which is based on a work of Haugen, is formulated as a two-stage game in which agents first decide whether to participate in a competition and second whether to use an illicit but effective drug when competing. If initially low sanctions are increased but do not prevent a certain overall level of doping, then the payoff for all athletes is reduced, which, in turn, reduces their willingness to participate in the competition.
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