Talent Versus Payroll as Strategic Variables in Game Theoretic Models of Sports Leagues

Abstract

This is a response to Madden’s comment on our original article: It’s Not Over ‘til the Fat Lady Sings: Game-Theoretic Analyses of Sports Leagues.

Keywords

game theory duopsony strategy space sports league models

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References

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Vrooman

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