In a recent article in this journal, Stefan Szymanski develops a generalized version of the two-team diminishing marginal revenue model of win percentage determination and talent allocation. The standard version of this model assumes a fixed supply of talent for a given season, focusing on the allocation of players among teams. Szymanski claims that this assumption is inappropriate and offers his generalized model as a solution. This comment argues, on the contrary, that the fixed supply assumption underlying the standard model is appropriate for its usual applications, given the “peculiar economics” of sports labor markets.
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