The dual-role method (DRM) extracts subject preferences as two players in experimental economic games. Previous research indicates mixed effects of DRM on game performance. A two (role)-by-two (role order) design for the ultimatum game (UG) was implemented in a naturalistic setting across 2 years. Subjects played according to the role they were assigned (proposer or responder). Immediately after, they played as the other role. Meta-analyses show no mean effect of role order on performance across studies or between laboratory and naturalistic settings. Power analyses indicate sample sizes needed to find an effect using the DRM is larger than many small-scale populations.
Alvard, M.S.2004. Introduction. Socioeconomic aspects of human behavioral ecology. Special issue, Research in Economic Anthropology23:1-15.
2.
Anderson, C.A., J.J. Lindsay, and B.J. Bushman.1999. Research in the psychological laboratory: Truth or triviality. Current Directions in Psychological Science8:3-9.
3.
Baron, J.2001. Purpose and methods. Commentary on R. Hertwig and A. Ortmann. Behavioral and Brain Science24:403.
4.
Bax, L., L.M. Yu, N. Ikeda, N. Tsuruta, and K.G.M. Moons.2006. Development and validation of MIX: Comprehensive free software for meta-analysis of causal research data. BMC Medical Research Methodology6:50.
5.
Brandts, J., and G. Charness.2000. Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preferences stability in experimental economic games. Experimental Economics2:227-38.
6.
Burks, S.T., J.P. Carpenter, and E. Verhoogen.2003. Playing both roles in the trust game . Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization51:195-216.
7.
Camerer, C.F., and E. Fehr.2004. Measuring social norms and preferences using experimental games: A guide for social scientists. In Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies, eds. J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, and H. Gintis , 55-95. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8.
Carter, J.R., and M.D. Irons.1991. Are economists different, and if so, why?Journal of Economic Perspectives5:171-77.
9.
Chen, K., and F. Tang.2009. Cultural differences between Tibetans and ethnic Han Chinese in ultimatum bargaining experiments. European Journal of Political Economy25:78-84.
10.
Cohen, J., P. Cohen, S.G. West, and L.S. Aiken.2003. Applied multiple regression/ correlation analysis for the behavioral and social science. 3rd ed. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum .
11.
Colman, A.M.1982. Experimental games. In Cooperation and competition: In humans and animals, ed. A. Colman, 113-40. Berkshire, UK: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
12.
Colman, A.M.1995. Game theory and its applications. 2nd ed. London: Butter-worth-Heinemann .
13.
Eckel, C.C., and P.J. Grossman.2001. Chivalry and solidarity in ultimatum games. Economic Inquiry39:17-88.
14.
Faul, F., E. Erdfelder, A-G. Lang, and A. Buchner.2007. G*Power 3: A flexible statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical science. Behavior Research Methods39:175-91.
15.
Flinn, M.V., and B.G. England.1997. Social economics of childhood glucocorticoid stress response and health. American Journal of Physical Anthropology102:33-53.
16.
Gil-White, F.J.2001. A good experiment of choice behavior is a good caricature of a real situation. Commentary on R. Hertwig and A. Ortmann. Behavioral and Brain Sciences24:409-10.
17.
Gurven, M., and J. Winking.2008. Collective action in action: Prosocial behavior in and out of the laboratory. American Anthropologist110:179-90.
18.
Guth, W., R. Schmittberger, and B. Schwarze.1982. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization3:367-88.
19.
Guth, W., and R. Tietz.1990. Ultimatum bargaining behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology11:417-49.
20.
Henrich, J.2000. Does culture matter in economic behavior? Ultimatum game bargaining among the Machiguenga. American Economic Review90:973-79.
21.
Henrich, J.2001. Challenges for everyone: Real people, deception, one-shot games, social learning, and computers. Commentary on R. Hertwig and A. Ortmann. Behavioral and Brain Sciences24:414-15.
22.
Henrich, J., R. Boyd , S. Bowles, C. F. Camerer, E. Fehr, and H. Gintis, eds. 2004. Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
23.
Henrich, J., R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C.F. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, and R. McElreath.2004. Overview and synthesis. In Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies, eds. J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, and H. Gintis , 8-54. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
24.
Hertwig, R., and A. Ortmann.2001. Experimental practices in economics: A methodological challenge for psychologists. Behavioral and Brain Sciences24:383-451.
25.
Hoffman, E., K. McCabe, and V. Smith.1996. On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games. International Journal of Game Theory25:289-301.
26.
Kagel, J.H., and A.E. Roth.1995. The handbook of experimental economics . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
27.
Kuznar, L.A.2001. Risk sensitivity and value among Andean pastoralists: Measures, models and empirical tests. Current Anthropology42:432-40.
28.
Kuznar, L.A.2002. Evolutionary applications of risk sensitivity models to socially stratified species: Comparison of sigmoid, concave, and linear functions . Evolution and Human Behavior34:265-80.
29.
Kuznar, L.A., and J.M. Lutz.2007. Risk sensitivity and terrorism. Political Studies55:341-61.
30.
Lipsey, M.W., and D.B. Wilson.2001. Practical meta-analysis, vol. 49. Applied Social Science Research Methods Series . Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
31.
Macfarlan, S.J., and R.Q. Quinlan.2008. Kinship, family, and gender effects in the ultimatum game. Human Nature19:294-309.
32.
Marlowe, F.W.2004. What explains Hadza food sharing? Socioeconomic aspects of human behavioral ecology. Special issue, Research in Economic Anthropology23:69-88.
33.
Munier, B., and C. Zaharia.2002. High stakes and acceptance behavior in ultimatum bargaining: A contribution from an international experiment. Theory and Decision53:187-207.
34.
Oosterbeek, H., R. Sloof, and G. van de Kuilen .2004. Cultural differences in ultimatum game experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis. Experimental Economics7:171-88.
35.
Paciotti, B., and C. Hadley.2003. The ultimatum game in Southwestern Tanzania: Ethnic variation and institutional scope. Current Anthropology44:427-32.
36.
Quinlan, M.B.2004. From the bush: The front line of health care in a Caribbean village. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth .
37.
Quinlan, R.Q.2006. Gender and risk in a matrifocal Caribbean community: A view from behavioral ecology. American Anthropologist108:464-79.
38.
Rosenthal, R., and M.R. DiMatteo.2001. Meta-analysis: Recent developments in quantitative methods for literature reviews. Annual Review Psychology52:59-82.
39.
Roth, A.E.1995. Introduction to experimental economics. In The handbook of experimental economics, eds. J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, 3-109. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
40.
Roth, A.E., V. Prasniker, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and S. Zamir.1991. Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Lbubliana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study. American Economic Review81:1068-95.
41.
Slonim, R., and A.E. Roth.1998. Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the Slovak Republic. Econometrica66:569-96.
42.
Thaler, R.1987. The psychology of choice and the assumptions of economics . In Laboratory experimentation in economics: Six points of view, ed. A. E. Roth, 99-130. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
43.
Weber, J.M., S. Kopelman, and D.M. Messick.2004. A conceptual review of decision making in social dilemmas: Applying a logic of appropriateness. Personality and Social Psychology Review8:281-307.
44.
Weg, E., and V. Smith.1993. On the failure to induce meager offers in ultimatum games. Journal of Economic Psychology14:17-32.
45.
Weissner, P.2009. Experimental games and games of life among the Ju/’hoansi Bushmen. Current Anthropology50:133-38.
