It is a cliché to observe that modern democratic states are composed of citizens with diverse interests. Yet it seems fair to say that the formal study of how heterogeneity in an electorate - of incomes, preferences, political influence and in other dimensions -plays a role in shaping the policies that emerge in competitive democratic equilibria is, if not in its infancy, still far from mature. the purpose of this symposium is to call attention to the importance of explicitly addressing the role of heterogeneity in theoretical and applied research on public policy and to contribute to this task.
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