This article examines whether Independent Regulatory Commissions (IRCs) received less presidential resource support (employment and outlays) than Dependent Regulatory Agencies (DRAs). the principal-agent theory was used to explain why DRAs fare better in the hands of presidents than IRCs in terms of resource allocation. It also examines whether there were differences in spending priorities between social and economic regulation. the database for this study was composed of 31 federal regulatory agencies, during the period between 1980 and 2000, broken down into social regulation and economic regulation. This study has used Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) pool time series cross sectional analysis on agency budget outlays and employment, along with several political and economic control variables. the findings indicated that IRCs received less resource support than DRAs, due to the uncertainty presidents face monitoring the performance of these agencies.
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