The goal of this contribution is to discuss the application of the principal–agent framework to the study of interactions between elected politicians – the principal – and independent regulatory agencies – the agent. Through a review of recent research we suggest that the principal–agent framework, despite its parsimony and analytical leverage, requires considerable refinement to make sense of these relations. Indeed, evidence on the functioning of independent regulatory agencies shows that some of their key practices tend to deviate from expectations based on the principal–agent framework. First, principals do not necessarily seek to exert control over agencies. Second, relations which structure the principal–agent mechanics other than those with elected principals are decisive in shaping the behaviour of regulators. Third, agencies can acquire political power over time and eventually subvert the logic of delegation. It is time to recognise that these deviations should not be conceived as anomalies but rather as systemic features that characterise post-delegation relations between elected politicians and independent regulators.
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