Abstract
In his article ‘An Ameliorative Analysis of the Concept of Education’, Jack Marley-Payne sets out to provide an ameliorative analysis of the concept ‘education’. Marley-Payne draws an important distinction between what he labels the ‘Broad’ and the ‘Narrow’ account of education. His conclusion is that an ameliorative conceptual analysis of education favours the narrow account. The main argument is that a narrow approach, tightly connected to formal schooling, provides a better basis for pursuing an egalitarian agenda. Contrary to Marley-Payne, I will argue that an amelioration of the concept education need not favour either a wide notion or a narrow notion. I believe that there are other alternatives to choose from, that in fact leads to an amelioration of what education can and ought to mean. The problem with Marley-Payne’s conclusion is thus, not only that it builds upon a false dichotomy but also that it is not emancipatory enough. We need an amelioration that is inclusive rather than exclusive.
Keywords
In his article ‘An Ameliorative Analysis of the Concept of Education’ (2021), Jack Marley-Payne sets out to provide an ameliorative analysis of the concept ‘education’. Marley-Payne draws an important distinction between what he labels the ‘Broad’ and the ‘Narrow’ account of education:
Drawing on Sally Haslanger’s (2012) ideas about ameliorative conceptual analysis, Marley-Payne holds that an ameliorative conceptual analysis of education favours the narrow account. The main argument is that a narrow approach, tightly connected to formal schooling, provides a better basis for pursuing an egalitarian agenda. Marley-Payne offers three arguments in this regard:
The narrow account allows for a clearer division between the different components of domestic policy, leading to a more effective policy agenda.
The narrow account ensures attention, and resources are dedicated to the specific goal of developing knowledge and skills that cannot be acquired in the natural course of life.
The narrow account eliminates pernicious equivocation about the different policy goals schools could pursue 1 (Marley-Payne, 2021: 272).
At first glance, Marley-Payne’s argument is sound. I agree with Marley-Payne’s underlying idea that conceptual engineering, including ameliorative conceptual analysis, can be justified as both useful and novel approaches to conceptual analysis within philosophy of education and philosophy in general. And, hypothetically, if the educational aim is to produce ‘happy and productive members of society’, formal educational institutions dedicated to this specific kind of education with a specified content will probably be more effective in the pursuit of this aim. It will probably also undermine ‘pernicious equivocation’ concerning what is, and what is not, education. 2
The problem with Marley-Payne’s conclusion lies elsewhere. First, the central purpose of ameliorating concepts is to enhance our concepts, not necessarily to make the thing the concept is trying to track better or more effective. Consider the following description of ameliorative conceptual analysis given by Haslanger (2012), which Marley-Payne himself refers to: Ameliorative projects, in contrast [to traditional approaches], begin by asking: What is the point of having the concept in question; for example, why do we have a concept of knowledge or a concept of belief? What concept (if any) would do the work best? . . . those pursuing an ameliorative approach might reasonably represent themselves as providing an account of our concept – or perhaps the concept we are reaching for – by enhancing our conceptual resources to serve our (critically examined) purposes. (Haslanger, 2012: 386)
Thus, the purpose of ameliorating concepts is to help us to tackle cognitive and practical tasks and not to change the meaning of our concepts to better match an ideal notion of the things our concepts are trying to track.
Second, Haslanger (2020) is also clear on the fact that her project is a non-ideal project, in the sense that we should try to avoid ideologically based assumptions and conclusions. Marley-Payne starts with the assumption that the aim of education is emancipation. While it is perfectly fine to hold that view, it should be recognized that this core idea behind liberal education is at least shaped by the political idea that freedom is valuable and should be pursued through education. In addition, one might add, Marley-Payne (2021) assumes that the aim of education is to produce ‘happy and productive members of society’ (p. 272). To have those assumptions as basic premises in an amelioration of the very concept of education will exclude any other types of education that do not meet the criteria of having emancipation or the production of happy and productive citizens as its basic aim.
Third, Marley-Payne’s choice to focus on the narrow account of education also ignores an aspect of education that is very dear to both the liberal tradition as well as the more radical liberational tradition advocated by theorists such as Paulo Freire (2017 [1971]) and Ivan Illich (2019 [1971]): the recognition of the distinction between informal, non-formal, and formal education.
Fourth, Marley-Payne’s definition of a wide account is extremely wide because it does not even distinguish between education and learning. 3 This leads me to suspect that Marley-Payne’s distinction between a wide account and a narrow account, in combination with the idea that we need to choose between them, actually leads to a false dichotomy.
Taken together, these four points leads one to think that Marley-Payne’s choice between whether to read the concept ‘education’ broadly or narrowly as part of ameliorative analysis presents philosophers of education with a false choice when they are searching for an ameliorative analysis of the concept education. Instead, I will hold that an amelioration of the concept education need not favour either a wide notion or a narrow notion. I believe that there are other alternatives to choose from, better ones, that in fact leads to an amelioration of what education can and ought to mean. 4
Marley-Payne holds that amelioration of the concept education will essentially involve reducing education to formal schooling such as it has been conceived in the Western world. However, a broader ameliorative analysis of the concept of education could result in the inclusion of alternative educational institutions within our concept of education and open up various different kinds and forms of educational relations that take place in family, among friends, indigenous groups and nomadic people outside of the contemporary Western, liberal lifestyle.
To clarify how a broader rather than a narrow reading of a concept can have ameliorative outcomes, consider the example of the concept ‘family’. The informational content of the term ‘family’ has definitely changed through both culture and history due to different social conditions. However, there has also been an active amelioration of our concept of family by, for example, the LGBTQ-movement, resulting in slogans like ‘we are family too’ (Haslanger, 2020: 251). Re-imagining the concept ‘family’ in this way could be viewed as an epistemic amelioration if we say that we were simply ignorant of the fact that ‘family’ actually refer to so much more than only nuclear families. However, we could also argue that this is also a semantic amelioration in the sense that the concept of family has been expanded to mean much more than the nuclear family. And this is valuable for our human coordination and a less unjust conception of family than the one we had before.
Returning to education, the informational content of the term ‘education’ has also changed a lot through history and culture. Plato, Rousseau and Dewey had very different ideas concerning education (Dewey, 2011 [1916]). In addition, there are a number of reasons to be sensitive to the fact that education actually refer to much more than just formal schooling. There are also a number of reasons for not abandoning formal educational institutions such as schools. First, Tristan McCowan argues that schools ‘enable instruction of large numbers of children, through a methodological curriculum and one that can be replicated for all and that lends itself to monitoring and regulation’ (McCowan, 2013: 90). This is a pragmatic perspective; a formal and common school system is a practical and effective way of enforcing the right to education. Second, ‘the more ad hoc learning that would take place in the absence of school is likely to benefit the privileged’ (McCowan, 2013). Disadvantaged groups often lack both resources and education to properly organize learning opportunities for their children. Accordingly, schools are potentially valuable from an equality perspective. Third, ‘schools allow for sustained interaction between an individual and diverse others in society, in a way that may not happen if children are only learning within the family and with acquaintances’ (McCowan, 2013). This supports Marley-Payne’s narrow account. However, the same account not only fails to recognize the value of non-formal education, but it is also a very reductive account of formal education. While the radical anarchistic ideas of Illich focus on values of equality, the intrinsic value of learning and the avoidance of de-humanization, others have criticized the narrow notion of formal education on other grounds (see e.g. Coombs, 1976; La Belle, 1982). Tristan McCowan points out that ‘(i) many cases non-formal education is culturally sensitive, educationally relevant and politically engaged – providing a more meaningful experience than that available in formal institutions’ (McCowan, 2013: 90). We should therefore acknowledge the value of both non-formal and informal education, as well as formal education, besides the value of formal education with the aim to produce happy and productive citizens. The problem with Marley-Payne’s conclusion is thus, not only that it builds upon a false dichotomy but also that it is not emancipatory enough.
Marley-Payne’s paper brings into clear focus the idea that analysis of the concept ‘education’, arguably the foundational conceptual analysis in the field of philosophy of education, should be conducted amelioratively and not conceptually. However, more than one plausible ameliorative analysis is possible. In this article, I have argued that ameliorative analysis of the concept education should not be a choice between Marley-Payne’s idea of a broad or a narrow account of education. It should be a better one that is more inclusive than exclusive.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Marianna Papastephanou, Johan Dahlbeck and Morten Korsgaard for comments on a draft of this paper.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.