Norm acquisition,rational judgment and moral particularism

Abstract

Moral particularism, defined as the view that moral judgment does not require moral principles, has become prominent both in moral philosophy and in philosophy of education. This article re-examines Nussbaum’s case for particularism, based on Sophocles’ Antigone, because her stress on sensitive appreciation of circumstantial specifics is salutary, though it cannot justify particularism because the problem lies not with moral principles, nor with moral judgment, but with a constricted and untenable view of rational judgment as simple syllogistic ratiocination. To improve our understanding of the central role of principles in moral judgment and in educational theory, this article explicates ‘mature judgment’ and highlights key features of Thomas Green’s account of norm acquisition, and of Kant’s account of the autonomy of rational judgment. These provide a basis for justifying liberal arts education in today’s context.