Abstract
The aim of this article is to understand who was/are most likely to join paramilitary republican groups both during the Troubles and in contemporary Northern Ireland. Fifty-three primary source interviews with community leaders and former paramilitaries based in Belfast were thematically analysed. The analysis is based on the abductive engagement with social learning theories and general strain theory of terrorism (GSTT). Four themes were identified in the thematic analysis: (1) community experiences and history of injustice and violence, (2) socio-economic influence, (3) family lineage versus individual vulnerability and (4) not leaving the communities. The first two themes explain the community context helping to shape the justification for the existence of paramilitary groups, while the final two themes outline who is most likely to join. It was noted that GSTT provides a good theoretical explanation for the community contexts, while social learning theories partially assists in developing our understanding of who is most likely to join. The research emphasises the need for an integrated theoretical approach to understanding engagement in paramilitary republicanism.
Introduction
Over a quarter of a century has passed since the signing of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, bringing an end to the three-decade-old conflict commonly referred to as The Troubles. The people of Northern Ireland are now living in a time of peace. However, this is an imperfect peace. The power-sharing institutions in Stormont have failed to consistently maintain the political promise of the 1998 Agreement. The anti-Good Friday agreement violent dissident republican (VDR) groups still present a threat. And across communities, paramilitary groups still threaten those suspected of criminal or anti-social behaviour with paramilitary-style attacks (Morrison, 2024a). Contemporary violence has not reached the persistent levels of the Troubles. This, however, should not lead the academic community to turn a blind eye to the conflict in both its historical and contemporary forms. As Drake (1991) noted, with Ireland partitioned, paramilitary republicanism will persist.
It is acknowledged that the Troubles is one of the most heavily researched conflicts across the social sciences (Gill and Horgan, 2013). However, the research presented in this article further extends our knowledge of the conflict and the individuals involved. New insights can assist in the development of a critical understanding of the core factors which influence paramilitary engagement at both individual and organisational levels. To date, there has been a general absence of criminological consideration on this specific topic. While recently, there has been the criminological analysis of community legitimisation of paramilitary republicanism (Morrison, 2024b), we are yet to see a criminological analysis of who is most likely to join the paramilitary groups. This article seeks to address this gap. Throughout, the article considers the theoretical insight that a criminological framework can provide when considering who is most likely to join a non-state politically violent Irish Republican Movement. In doing so, there is an assessment of the applicability of social learning and general strain theories in particular.
Throughout the course of the Troubles, there was widespread violence across Northern Ireland. However, as noted by Drake (1991), there was very little coordination between areas or even within areas. It is therefore important to consider the local nature of involvement and the localised factors impacting individual decision-making processes. Belfast, and specifically North and West Belfast, was the epicentre for much republican activity during the Troubles (Gill and Horgan, 2013). Therefore, this article provides that localised focus through the analysis of 53 primary source interviews with former republican paramilitaries and community leaders, each of whom was based in North and West Belfast. Alongside the assessment of Troubles-era paramilitary violence, the article also analyses the key factors influencing post-Troubles VDR paramilitarism in Belfast. Thus, the localised empirical analysis presented in this article, utilising pre-existing criminological theories as a framework, will advance our understanding of key factors impacting historical and contemporary engagement in paramilitary republicanism. When criminological theory has been applied to terrorism and political violence, this has invariably focused on jihadist and far-right extremism. In order to meet its true potential, we need to see criminological theory applied more broadly across different ideologies, geographical locations, and conflicts.
Joining the Irish Republican Army
Prior to assessing the applicability of criminological theory, this article first considers the extant literature on joining paramilitary republicanism. Within this literature, there is consistent emphasis on non-ideological rationales for joining. Ferguson and McAuley (2020) noted that engagement in Northern Irish paramilitarism is primarily in reaction to locality and circumstance, rather than based on ‘ideological radicalisation’. They emphasise that ideological transformation occurs at the later stages of involvement. Bosi and Ó Dochartaigh (2018) found the same in their consideration of Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) armed activism. They observed that ideology was of secondary importance in choosing which group to join. Alonso (2006) emphasised though that while ideological justifications may be of secondary importance for individuals, the paramilitary organisation needs to have a clear ideological rationale to justify its continued existence, alongside its strategic and tactical approaches. This disparity of ideological importance when comparing individual members and the organisation emphasises that one cannot presume that the organisational ideology aims translate to individual rationale for joining or remaining involved. This contends with the ideologically centric focus seen through the ‘radicalisation’ framing of the broader analysis of involvement in terrorism (Ferguson and McAuley, 2020). This does not suggest that there are no individuals who join for ideological reasons. Bosi and Della Porta (2012) outlined that for those who join for ideological reasons, their rationale had a foundation in deeply rooted family or local traditions of ‘counter-hegemonic consciousness’. However, this ideological framing is not the dominant rationale found across the research.
Across the literature, one can see the interaction between identity, locality, strains, peer groups, and role models in the process of individuals’ choice to join paramilitary groups. There is not one consistent rationale for joining paramilitary republican groups. Bosi and Della Porta (2012) proposed distinct paths to engagement. Alongside the ideological path, they identify the instrumental path for those looking to break with the past in joining or mobilising armed groups. They seek armed action leading to concrete results. Finally, the solidaristic path sees a move towards political violence at a time of escalating conflict beyond one's normal control. This can lead to individuals, alongside their peers, joining armed groups to defend and avenge their communities. This emphasises that the dominant rationale for joining a group can fluctuate based on the context of the time. However, even at one specific temporal period, the rationales for those joining can be different based on personal experiences.
Bosi and Ó Dochartaigh (2018) proposed that engagement in paramilitary republicanism at the outset of the Troubles was an enactment of collective identity, as an expression of individual agency. This can be seen as an active choice made due to identification with a community, most specifically a local community with an oppositional relationship to those seeking to ‘dominate it’. For those joining the paramilitary group, this serves to express their identification with their local area. In seeking a group to join, they are searching for an organisation that expresses that sense of local community most clearly. Ferguson et al. (2014) emphasised the influence of sectarian segregation of much of the working-class urban districts of Northern Ireland, with Protestants and Catholics living largely separate lives, yet in close geographical proximity. They proposed that this segregation significantly impacts one's sense of social identity, perception of threat and attribution of bias. In his analysis of individual motivations to join the PIRA, Alonso (2006) observed a relegation of individuality and an emphasis on the promotion of a group identity to assist in the continued legitimisation of the armed struggle. Waldmann (2005) similarly observed the need for the acceptance of a common identity and destiny as a condition for the formation of a radical community.
While the organisational goals are understandably portrayed as national, research has consistently demonstrated that individual decisions to engage are more frequently influenced by an individual's local circumstances. Bosi and Ó Dochartaigh (2018) emphasised the importance of locality and local community to the identities of IRA personnel. For many, their engagement was not primarily to achieve a united Ireland but was more pressingly to assist in the defence of their community. Theirs was a recognition of the individual- and community-level aspects of the struggle (Bosi, 2012). Ferguson and McAuley's (2020) interviewees placed primary emphasis on the reactions to local community events, as opposed to the broader national picture. While the IRA may have been striving for a united Ireland, many members were joining to defend their local communities, which were the site of their strongest personal networks (Malešević and Ó Dochartaigh, 2018). These personal networks included peers who they were looking to impress and stick by (Alonso, 2006), as well as role models who they were seeking to emulate (Ferguson and Burgess, 2009). Morrison (2011) similarly placed an emphasis on the importance of ‘regionalism’ when he analysed the factors influencing why individuals would join VDR groups. Within this, he emphasised that for some members, a paramilitary organisation can be perceived as having a role to play within a specific geographical region, which may supersede the purposive goal of the organisation (Morrison, 2011), echoing the work of Bowyer Bell (1998: 250), who stressed that organisational ideals are interwoven with localised aspirations. Additionally, the geographical context provides the structural opportunities for those wishing to join, superseding attitudinal affinity in order of importance (Gill and Horgan, 2013).
Criminological theory and terrorism
Traditionally, the topics of terrorism and political violence were analysed utilising the academic frameworks provided by political science and international relations (Silke, 2004). However, recent years have seen great advances being made through the application of a wider variety of disciplinary perspectives, including criminology (LaFree, 2021). While there has been an increased criminological understanding of terrorism, it has been a slower process to see the application of criminological theory (LaFree and Yanez, 2024). Approximately half of terrorism-focused articles in leading criminology journals from 2000 to 2020 were atheoretical analysis and reviews (LaFree and Yanez, 2024). The largest proportion of the research with a theoretical focus has applied rational choice and situational crime prevention theories (Fisher and Kearns, 2024; LaFree and Yanez, 2024). While not all criminological theories are effective in explaining terrorism (Fisher and Kearns, 2024), the predominance of two, closely related, theoretical frameworks reflects the narrow application of criminological theory to non-state terrorism and political violence. Yet there is a broader scope to the potential application of criminological theory to our understanding of this area of research (Freilich and LaFree, 2015).
When one considers who is most likely to engage with paramilitary republicanism, a broader theoretical framework needs to be considered. As outlined below, the understanding of this can consider a range of criminological explanations, including general strain theory (GST), differential association and social learning theory. As terrorism, like all crimes, is a multi-factorial social phenomenon, this requires understanding gained through integrated theories (De Waele and Pauwels, 2014). Therefore, the presentation of the theories here should not be considered as theories in competition with each other. Instead, they should be viewed as two potential parts of an integrated theory of paramilitary involvement. This is similar to the proposal by Rottweiler et al. (2022), who recommended a structured integration of individual- and environmental-level theories to account for radicalisation in their German-based research.
GST of terrorism
Agnew (2010) proposed an adaptation of GST to specifically focus on terrorism. The original GST proposes that negative treatment by others (strains) can result in negative emotions necessitating coping strategies which can manifest in engagement in criminal activity. Within the GST of terrorism (GSTT), terrorism becomes more likely when the strains are
Agnew (2017) stated that collective strains are more likely to be viewed as unjust when
the strain is perceived as undeserved, the strain is not in service of a greater good, the process leading to the strain is perceived as unjust, the strain violates social norms and values held by the collective, and the collective strain is perceived as significantly different from past treatment in similar situations or the treatment of other similar collectives.
These collective strains are likely to be viewed as unjust when the first two conditions are met, or alternatively any one of the other conditions. Considering the comparison group of similar others, these are most likely to be different from the strained collective in terms of a prominent social dimension, for example, religion, geographical location, race/ethnicity and/or political ideology (Agnew, 2010). The result of these collective strains can be the prominence of strong negative emotional states deemed conducive to terrorism (Agnew, 2017). The negative emotional response of anger can lead to individuals being less able to assess a situation or effectively communicate with others, resulting in the lowering of inhibitions and thus leading to the combined reduction of concern for and awareness of the consequences of one's behaviours (Agnew, 2010). There is a weakening in the belief of the immorality of terrorism, leading members of the strained collective to tolerate and even support terrorism. This can see them directly or indirectly providing legitimacy to the terrorist actors in their violent opposition to the perceived collective strains. While the collective strains contribute to negative emotions, they can also serve as a social identity device which heightens the sense of belonging (Ljujic et al., 2017).
One can see aspects of the theory reflected in models of radicalisation. For example, McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) emphasised the mechanisms of personal and group grievances resulting in anger and humiliation, reminiscent of Agnew's theory (Freilich and LaFree, 2015). When the theory has been empirically tested, there has been support found for both individual and collective strains predicting higher levels of legal cynicism, which in turn predicts greater violent extremist intentions (Pauwels and Schils, 2016; Rottweiler et al., 2022). The presence of strain on its own is not predictive of extremism, as despite high levels of collective strain, the majority still do not turn to extremism (Skoczylis and Andrews, 2022). It has been proposed that, in the context of far-right extremism, low levels of resilience as opposed to collective strain are better predictors of extremism (Skoczylis and Andrews, 2022). However, this was for individuals with minimal connection to the wider social body. This finding therefore emphasises the need to differentiate between those with/without significant ties to a community when considering the impact of collective strains.
Considering the theory's application to the case of paramilitary republicanism, the groups have continuously emphasised collective strains experienced by the Catholic/nationalist/republican population of Northern Ireland. Historically, this has included lack of access to housing, education or voting rights. Decades prior to the development of GSTT, Robert White (1989) came to similar conclusions when considering the micro-mobilisation of the PIRA. He indicated that prior to endorsing the utility of political violence, PIRA supporters, as victims of repression, must firstly view the repressing authority (i.e., the British state) as illegitimate, that peaceful protest in the face of repression was futile and, finally, that they considered the reactions to repression of those with whom they had close ties and trusted. For White social placement is key in understanding the reaction to repression. He emphasised that members of the working-class and student activists are most likely to experience repression and the efficacy of political violence. Therefore, engagement in political violence was not a function of economic deprivation, but a result of state repression, reflective of what Agnew would later propose with the development of the GSST.
Differential association and social learning theories
Research on paramilitary republicanism emphasises the influence of environment, community and sectarian segregation on individual decision-making processes, suggesting the potential application of differential association and social learning theories. Differential association proposes that criminal and non-criminal behaviours are learned through the interaction of small groups, who learn and adopt behaviours and values. Individuals learn how to engage in criminal behaviour, while also adopting an understanding of the justification of this behaviour (Breen, 2019). Therefore, what may externally be considered deviant can gain a sense of legitimacy and virtue amongst peers and communities. Sutherland (1972) proposed that a person becomes criminal due to an excess of definitions in favour of law-breaking. Behaviours are adapted based on both positive and negative reinforcements and punishments (Akers, 1973).
Central to differential association and learning theories is the role of influential individuals, friends, guardians and families. They can effectively and continuously reinforce deviant behavioural options
Akins and Winfree (2016) emphasised that those joining terrorist groups are often drawn from the same region as the conflict. They highlighted that considering this regional dimension of recruitment, a variety of social forces are interacting in the process leading to initial engagement in terrorism, best understood through the application of social learning theory. Hamm (2005) proposed that the acquisition of skills by terrorists comes from deliberate teaching, training and socialisation. These teachings will be effective when isolated from conflicting messages and when potential recruits are physically separated from contradicting voices (Decker and Pyrooz, 2015). The social conditions leading to this can include the structural dimensions including family, social geography, exposure to propaganda, isolation and indoctrination (Akers, 1998). Becker (2021) found that weaker social control and stronger social learning were specifically associated with violent rather than non-violent extremism, a finding reflective of Borum's (2011) proposition to consider engagement with terrorist groups because of a social process, rather than through the lens of ideological radicalisation.
To be successful in recruiting young members, terrorist groups must be able to focus the essential precursor of individual discontent by providing them with a means to solve their problems and achieve a reward (Akins and Winfree, 2016). This can be facilitated by family members and peers who share this discontent and who have been involved in terrorist or extremist organisations, as has happened across the history of paramilitary republicanism in Northern Ireland (Morrison and Gill, 2016). Those who are immersed in insular groups of likeminded peers are most susceptible to the biasing dynamics we see within terrorist groups (LaFree et al., 2018).
The benefits of social learning theory, and the subsequent social structure social learning model (Akers, 1998), emphasise the role of community in the cognitive development of individual members, the potential application of which can be seen in Belfast and across Northern Ireland. Since the dawn of the Troubles in 1969, the working-class communities of Belfast have been segregated by religious identity. There are still miles of ‘peace walls’ at interface areas separating Catholic/nationalist/republican from Protestant/unionist/loyalist communities. During the conflict, these communities rarely mixed with each other, or even with likeminded others from separate parts of the city. This provided isolated environments where individuals were not exposed to alternative narratives on the conflict and the utility of violence, enabling paramilitary and political republicanism to define the community's narrative.
The present study
This research aims to gain an understanding of who is most likely to join paramilitary republican groups during the Troubles and in a post-Good Friday Agreement period and what factors influence their engagement. This is achieved through an abductive approach with an iterative engagement between the pre-existing theoretical understanding presented above and primary interview data with former paramilitaries and community leaders. There is a specific focus on the communities of North and West Belfast, as they represent republican areas most heavily hit by paramilitary and state violence (Kelleher, 2010), while also providing a significant proportion of paramilitary recruits.
Methodology
The analysis which follows is based on three separate sets of qualitative semi-structured interviews with a total of 53 separate interviewees:
Sixteen semi-structured interviews (October 2007–February 2009) with former Belfast-based republican paramilitaries, interviewed for a previous project on Irish republicanism (Morrison, 2013). Each interviewee was involved with the PIRA during the Troubles, with three of them becoming dissident republicans in the aftermath of the Troubles. Ten semi-structured interviews with former Belfast-based republican paramilitaries (February–October 2019). Each interviewee was involved with the PIRA during the Troubles, with one becoming a dissident republican in the aftermath of the Troubles. Twenty-seven semi-structured interviews with Belfast-based contemporary non-paramilitary community ‘leaders’ (February–October 2019).
Participants were recruited based on their own personal experience or their professional expertise on the topic. It was deemed necessary to interview individuals from a variety of professional backgrounds, allowing for a triangulation of findings. Community leaders included youth workers, civil servants, members of the clergy, members of NGOs, police officers, community activists, academics, trade unionists and members of transitional justice organisations. One of the core purposes of the interviews with community leaders was to gain an insight into the factors influencing those joining contemporary dissident republican groups. Their direct experiences with this population provided them with the expertise to be able to comment on this. It is important to acknowledge that within this research, there was more of a direct insight gained in the experiences of those joining the PIRA as a result of paramilitary interviewees from samples (i) and (ii) being mainly those from the PIRA.
Convenience, purposive, and snowball sampling strategies were used to recruit interviewees. Gatekeepers assisted in the recruitment of former paramilitaries. Interviews were also organised through
Those who agreed to participate in the research were interviewed either in person or online. Interviews took between 45 minutes and 4 hours. In-person interviews were at a location of the participants’ choosing. Two participants requested for their interview not to be recorded. During another interview, there were technical difficulties with the recording equipment and was therefore only partially recorded. Contemporaneous notes were taken for these interviews.
Development of interview protocols
Each interview followed a semi-structured interview protocol, which was pilot-tested with three colleagues, each with expertise in the area. Their feedback fed into the finalised protocol.
Each interview in the first cohort began with the question of ‘how and why did you become engaged in paramilitary republicanism?’ The remainder of their interview was focused on the topic of organisational splits and their personal allegiance choices in the aftermath of the splits.
For the remaining two cohorts of interviewees, the interview protocols included six core questions. The questions were as follows:
How do people/did you get involved in paramilitary republicanism? What is/was the most typical way for people to get involved in paramilitary republicanism? What other ways do/did people get involved in paramilitary republicanism? Who becomes/became involved in paramilitary republicanism? What specific places did/do people meet as members of paramilitary republican groups? Could you describe the communities (physical and virtual) where paramilitary republican recruitment takes/took place?
Each interviewee was asked these questions, in this particular order. The protocol was developed to ensure that participants were provided with the opportunity to share in detail their own experiences and expertise without being led by the interviewer. Former paramilitaries were given the opportunity to discuss their own experiences, while also being asked about the general experiences of paramilitaries. This enabled discussion of paramilitary involvement while being unencumbered by any misgivings they may have had in discussing their involvement.
The focus on the ‘typical way’ in which people became/become involved enabled the analysis to identify and examine factors which were most common, rather than being diverted by potential outliers. It has been noted that self-report studies suffer from the potential of ‘retrospective construction’ (Freilich et al., 2015: 263), when individuals construct specific moments deemed significant in retrospect. It was not possible to completely prevent this. However, this research was designed to mitigate the potential impact. The triangulation of the paramilitary self-report with community leaders’ analysis and the assessment of the ‘typical way’ dilutes the potential impact of any potential retrospective constructions.
Ethics
Prior to starting data collection, the research was approved by the University of East London and the Royal Holloway, University of London Research Ethics Committees. Before each interview, participants were asked to read a participant information sheet and sign the informed consent form. At the end of the interview, participants were asked if they still consented to the interview being used as part of the research. For those online interviews and a selection of the in-person interviews, participants were asked to give oral informed consent. Across the interviews, participants were informed that they were not obligated to answer any question they did not wish to. They could also request for the interview and recording to be stopped at any time.
Thematic analysis
Each interview was listened to in full, to familiarise the author with the data, and transcribed verbatim. The interviews were anonymised with a numerical identifier. Each individual transcript was analysed using thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). After the initial stage of analysis, 62 individual codes were identified. Through the next stage, each code was reassessed, through the re-analysis of the transcripts. As a result, the codes were then reduced to 27. These codes were reassessed, alongside the original transcripts to ensure the interviewees were accurately represented. During this process, codes were grouped into four separate themes, which were reviewed to assess their good fit with the coded data. The themes identified are as follows:
Community experiences and history of injustice and violence Socio-economic influence Family lineage versus individual vulnerability Not leaving the communities
These themes can be subdivided under the headings of (i) community context and (ii) who becomes a paramilitary republican?
This research focuses on both paramilitary republican involvement during the Troubles and contemporary VDR involvement in a post-Good Friday Agreement environment. While there are two distinct sections of analysis, they are presented here as one. Throughout the presentation of the themes, the thematic applicability to each of the two temporal focuses is emphasised.
Findings
Community context
Before considering who is most likely to join the paramilitary republican groups, the results emphasise the need to consider community context. The core contextual factors identified by participants relating to North and West Belfast are the communities’ experiences of injustice and violence, alongside socio-economic influences. Below is an analysis of the impact of these factors.
The former paramilitaries each emphasised the significance of the day-to-day conflict influencing their decision-making processes and defining the moral context for the community. In the area where I grew up … it was occupied and was under British Army attention more than anything else … You had family members who were murdered by the British State, British Army, and Loyalists. Your day-to-day experience in a community that is very much dealt with inequality, its dealing with lack of employment, education. You’re in a process in where you feel like you have to come together to do something to change that. (Former Paramilitary, 004)
From the late 1960s, the localised violence was politicising the communities’ young people, influencing their views and actions. For those who ultimately joined the paramilitaries and many of those who did not, the state powers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the Ulster Special Constabulary (B-Specials) and the British Army were seen as enemy and oppressor, rather than providing protection and security. 1969 onwards you were being politicised by what you were seeing on the street. What we were seeing in terms of state, and state violence wasn’t pretty. It was legitimised violence. It was violence denied. It was justice denied. There was people from my community who was killed, people who my parents knew, or knew their families. They weren’t killed, they were actually murdered, and the state washed its hands. (Former Paramilitary, 003)
As a result of the ongoing violent activity and the presence of the British Army in Northern Ireland, the PIRA presented themselves as an army of resistance, taking up arms against the oppressor.
When discussing the role that community plays for contemporary VDR groups, the romanticisation of conflict is key. These are areas physically and morally defined by the conflict. That's the romanticism of it. That's also stirring up emotions in young people. If … you’re 19/20. You’re a child of post-Good Friday Agreement. All of this [conflict] is alien. All this should be alien to you in terms of a process. But the fact that it's visual all of the time means that it's not. It means that you do get caught up in that narrative. You do get caught up and it's something appalling that the British did to us. That's something appalling that Loyalists did to us. That's something appalling, as if it was yesterday. (Youth Worker, 121)
The transition from conflict can prove difficult for former paramilitaries to adjust to. Many spent decades fighting against the very institutions their former comrades from within the PIRA are now actively engaged with. Sinn Féin have successfully convinced most of the republican electorate to accept that their engagement with these institutions is a necessary part of their long-term strategy to reach a united Ireland. However, they have not been successful in convincing everyone, thus providing the VDR groups with the opportunity to promote Sinn Féin as having abandoned republicans. They challenge the normalisation of post-Good Friday Agreement politics by stating that this is not what the people of these areas fought and died for. In doing so, they promote themselves as being the only ones willing to keep ‘taking the fight to the Brits’.
So, the people who were directly affected by British occupation was within the working-class areas because that's the people who had poor housing, were second class citizens, didn’t have the right to an education, didn’t have the right to a job. What did people want to do? Sit back? (Former Paramilitary, 004)
This interpretation of inequalities should not be considered as paramilitary hyperbole. This is also acknowledged by those opposed to violent confrontation. The 1960s saw the emergence of the peaceful Northern Irish civil rights movement, established to challenge inequality and discrimination of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. They promoted peaceful protest to challenge the state on issues such as housing, education and voting rights.
It is suggested that VDR recruiters are utilising the history of inequality to convince potential recruits that nothing has changed. They aim to convince others that British oppression is the reason for inequality. This provides them with an opportunity to justify their opposition to Sinn Féin's politicisation and promote themselves as ‘true republicans’ willing to stand up for the communities’ rights. Because in north Belfast you have a patchwork of communities and then you have a lack of social housing in the Catholic community. That is being restricted because the Protestant community is not prepared to give up territory. So that feeds into … You can hear [well-known dissident republican] all the time going ‘these ones won’t give us housing’. He uses that territorialism as an excuse to say ‘this is the same old. Ah here these Brits, it's the same as 1916’. It's that sort of rhetoric. It's different challenges in different areas. But there is … a constant socio-economic sort of foundation to a lot of what these issues are. (Youth Worker, 101)
The most disadvantaged young people within these areas often do not see any opportunity to escape from their lives of deprivation. What happens mostly in deprived areas is people don’t get a chance. So, they are on a pathway, and nobody is taking them off that pathway. (NGO Member, 108)
It is acknowledged across the respondents that this lack of opportunity makes individuals more suspectable to both being enticed and being targeted by the paramilitary recruitment strategies.
When considering the role of social deprivation, we must not solely look at this from an economic perspective. There must also be consideration for the more individual characteristics of deprivation, a point emphasised across the interviews. You’re also talking about all the normal social inequalities that is in any Western inner city, mental health, suicide, drugs and alcohol, unemployment, high levels of hopelessness. And there is a real growing sense of a mental health epidemic in the area, suicide. We have lost more people from suicide in this community than we did during the conflict since 1998. So, thousands of people have lost their lives, and a real growing sense of hopelessness. (Youth Worker, 114)
Across this theme, it is important to emphasise that the social deprivation described by interviewees is not being proposed as the cause of paramilitary engagement. However, it was consistently emphasised by each interviewee as one of the primary characteristics of the areas where paramilitary recruitment and activity is taking place, thus facilitating recruitment.
With the empirical testing of strains, there is often focus on financial or educational strains (see, e.g., Ljujic et al., 2017). However, if the design of our studies considers only commonly attributed strains, it reduces the opportunity to identify alternative collective strains, including history of conflict and violence, and other related strains, identified here.
The presence of these collective strains is acknowledged across the interviews. However, on their own, they are not enough to predict who would join paramilitary groups (Skoczylis and Andrews, 2022). There is therefore a need to consider an integrated theoretical approach including the more individualised factors focused on within rest of the analysis (De Waele and Pauwels, 2014).
Who becomes a paramilitary republican?
We now look to individualised factors leading to paramilitary engagement, including analysis of family lineage versus individual vulnerability and not leaving the communities.
Contemporary VDR membership has been identified as coming from two core groups, those with republican family lineage and those identified as the most vulnerable young people. I would divide the younger people into two groups. Those who are vulnerable, at risk and get drawn into becoming a victim of one of those armed groups, or get drawn into their activities, or the second is younger generation who come from republican families and their fathers or uncles or whoever are disaffected republicans, and they follow the same path in the absence of alternative routes. (Trade Unionist, 107)
There is a long tradition of family lineage in Belfast republicanism. During the Troubles, there were a small number of families who were seen as the republican core. When asked how they first became involved in the IRA, a significant proportion of interviewees detailed their earlier exposure to the movement through family members’ involvement. I became an active Republican because it was more or less like a family tradition and my father had been, and my uncles back to 1920, and stuff like that, and cousins and uncles were all involved … I joined when I was young, I was sixteen at the time … The politics of it and all came later. (Former Paramilitary, 209)
For those who came from a republican heritage, their membership was seen as a natural progression, rather than a subversive move. I came from a historically Republican family … So I grew up in a Republican environment and surrounded by Republicans … It was sort of a natural progression for me to go on to be a member of the IRA. If there hadn’t of been the Troubles, I dare say I would still have been a member of the IRA. I believed in the concept of a Republican freedom for the people of Ireland. (Former Paramilitary, 208)
For young people joining the paramilitary groups today, family still plays a role for some. However, this is not due to fact that family members are still involved. For those whose close relatives had been involved in glorified ‘active service’ during the Troubles, they see the status achieved and strive to achieve this identity for themselves. So, you are getting a group of young people now who are coming up, post-ceasefire children who don’t know this pain and hurt and suffering. They’re seeing it as ‘my grandad was a warrior. I want to be a warrior’. (Youth Worker, 101)
While family heritage is still the case for a minority, it was identified that the more common young recruits for the VDR were the most vulnerable and marginalised in North and West Belfast. Citing paramilitary involvement as tantamount to non-political criminality, a significant proportion of interviewees intimated that membership as being closer to gang than terrorist group membership. Rather than the line of ‘it was the family, or it was the cause’. The cause has become secondary. It's much more around criminality. (Member of NGO, 110)
For some who are recruited, or targeted, by the groups, their membership may sometimes be deemed as an alternative to being the victim of a paramilitary-style attack. Their membership is the price to pay to avoid a potential kneecapping. Sometimes the same young people who are vulnerable to paramilitary style assaults are also the young people that they’re recruiting. And sometimes the recruitment itself is an alternative to getting a shooting or a beating. So really, they prey off vulnerable young people in the communities. They obviously also try to recruit higher calibre of young people who are brighter and can kind of spread the political ideology. But mostly it's young people who will do their dirty work. It is my view that the paramilitaries here have pretty much all morphed into organised crime gangs and the political stuff is a bit of a veneer in most cases. (Youth Worker, 104)
These recruits are deemed to have little to no opportunities to ‘succeed’ in life in a traditional sense. This therefore provides the paramilitaries with an opportunity to take advantage of their susceptibility. The ones that are most extreme [are recruited]. The ones that have little to no education. The ones who are living on rhetoric … There are the ones if you have been in trouble we will turn a blind eye because we can use you later on. (Member of Clergy, 109)
For those from a republican family and individually vulnerable young recruits, their involvement in paramilitarism could be most accurately referred to as social selection, rather than self-selection. They are influenced by the context in which they grew up. Across the interviews, it was emphasised that ideology was only a minor influencing factor. Many were not even fully aware of the organisational ideology upon first engagement. This developed across time and, for some, was only truly established upon their incarceration. I wasn’t thinking that I am going to become involved in the conflict because I want a 32-county socialist republic. I became involved in the conflict because I wanted them ones to stop attacking my community. And you know, if you keep doing that then people are going to react … So that is why I became involved. It wasn’t a political ideology. My politics developed over the course of me maturing, over the course of me being in prison. Over the course of my life my politics developed. When I got involved in the conflict I got involved in the conflict because I was angry, and I wanted to hit back. (Former Paramilitary, 043)
The peripheral nature of ideology is seen as a defining characteristic of the contemporary VDR actors upon initial engagement as well. So, there is a very small core who would be ideologically driven. Then just around that they attract just a mass of gangsters, anti-social, whatever. (Youth Worker, 117)
When the dissidents do espouse their ideology, it is to present a society which is still ‘oppressed by the British colonial power’, a society unchanged by the Good Friday Agreement. They aim to present a narrative of an occupied territory requiring armed activity to free its people. To succeed, they not only need to present ‘the British’ as the oppressor but also portray Sinn Féin as traitorous. I think ideology is used to exploit. I think it's used to almost manipulate communities and people into a way of thinking that does no longer exist. There is no British soldiers on our streets … We are represented and governed … by our own people. So, we have self-determination. And eventually the island will unite. Demographics and population changes are saying we are going to eventually change. But the thing is what we are not doing is recognising that the ideology is out of context now. (Youth Worker, 101)
The focus of much of this research has been on young new recruits into VDR groups. However, there is another group of individuals who join up these paramilitary groups, namely, those who had previous paramilitary involvement during the Troubles. Theirs is a different rationale and process for membership. Their decision on membership is based not on their vulnerability or family heritage but on their previous experiences and relationships from within the movement. It is through this lens of experience, and the individuals whom they trust, that they interpret their own view 21st-century Irish republicanism and its strategic vision. It is important to therefore respect this heterogeneity of VDR actors.
The fracture in northern society created a ghettoization. If you look at places like north Belfast, you were literally surrounded by a sea of unionism. So, the transport system didn’t necessarily make a difference. You didn’t leave it. You lived within that community, and when you did leave it, you felt vulnerable leaving. (Former Paramilitary, 003)
While it was certainly true that members of the republican communities did not frequent neighbouring loyalist communities, they did not even visit those republican communities in relative proximity. They were reliant on word of mouth or trusted media sources to ascertain what was happening elsewhere. So, you were very polarised. Of course, you were based on what you were reading in An Phoblacht (republican newspaper) … You wouldn’t have had the same understanding of what was happening through west Belfast as you would now as you would then. (Former Paramilitary, 004)
As a result of the enclaved nature of republican communities, they developed all the amenities and social spaces required within their close-knit areas. This brought the community closer together. The resultant closeness was seen as a reason for the long-term ability of the communities to endure the conflict together. I would have said I was very isolated. But I was very consumed with what was going on. If I lived in Andersonstown, or West Belfast what was happening in North Belfast was a million miles away … So, I think you became very polarised, in your own wee area, and you became very parochial in your own area. There was no place like your own area … Nobody went into the city centre to have a drink … That's why we were more successful, because people never left the area … there was a fear factor, and rightly so. (Former Paramilitary, 004)
This accentuates the moral influence of the area. There are limited opportunities to be exposed to alternative perspectives and experiences. I think it [not leaving their community] is very important because it actually reinforces the narrative that is being fed in those particular areas … If you have been brought up on the same diet each day within the particular house, and it is being reinforced. And sometimes the actions of the police out on the ground can go to reinforce what they already think at that particular time. (Police Officer, 106)
For many of the most vulnerable to contemporary VDR recruitment, their desire may be to maintain this stasis. They seek to continue their social, familial and professional lives within the confines of their home communities, a reality enforced upon the previous generations of their families.
This community-based isolation has traditionally been determined by the sectarian segregation of the city. Within relatively small geographical areas of Belfast, there are a series of working-class communities defined by their history of conflict and religious/political demographics. Traditionally, members of the republican communities would not venture into the neighbouring loyalist areas. This therefore reinforces the community structures, while equally providing greater opportunities for the paramilitaries to maintain control. Northern Ireland is still quite a segregated community and generally most communities, Protestant or Catholic, at least live within their own areas and don’t … especially within West Belfast where I look at the particular person who doesn’t really go outside that particular area. So sometimes it can be quite insular what they are actually doing. Within those communities then there is a certain amount of control that has been instilled in people over the years where you don’t report to the police. You are seen to be an informant, or a tout is the word that they use which is punishable by being shot … fatally shot in some cases as well. So, you are fighting up against that sort of thing. (Police Officer, 106)
For the negative influences of community-based isolation to be countered, there needs to be consistent, natural and positive experiences outside of people's own geographical area. It was observed across the interviewees that the most vulnerable to recruitment were not leaving. However, there was an observed change in the behaviour of their peers deemed less susceptible to recruitment. You’re starting to see a change in atmosphere and a change in behaviour that I think, and a change in attitude as well where I think our generation will be eventually the last generation. (Youth Worker, 101)
When there is a moral and social environment creating a greater propensity for paramilitary engagement, the influence of this is accentuated by a lack of exposure to divergent communities. Therefore, the sustained exposure to outside influences must be promoted, alongside the support of positive influences from within the community.
However, while these theories may be applicable for some, it is imperative to acknowledge the heterogeneity of paramilitary recruits. As identified by participants across the interviews, there are also those who join contemporary VDR groups not because of their belief in the moral justification of the republican cause but instead because of their vulnerability. They were being recruited as an alternative to their personal victimisation. Their membership may not be because of their social learning of what is right, but alternatively who one should fear, behaviours adapted by negative reinforcement (Akers, 1973).
In contemporary Belfast, there are no longer the conflict-based reasons for community-based isolation. However, there are still those who do not leave their communities. These are likely to be the ones most impacted by the collective strains previously described and may also be the individuals most lacking in resilience, similar to the findings of Skoczylis and Andrews (2022) or with weaker social control (Becker, 2021). This particular area requires further research.
Conclusion
Through the analysis of interviews with Belfast-based former paramilitaries and community leaders, this research has aimed to gain an understanding of who was likely to join paramilitary republican groups during the Troubles and today. Thematic analysis identified four core themes:
Community experiences and history of injustice and violence Socio-economic influence Family lineage versus individual vulnerability Not leaving the communities
When these themes are abductively analysed in relation to social learning and GSTT, one can see the adaptability of these theoretical perspectives to explain the processes involved in engagement with paramilitary republicanism. Considering the community experiences and socio-economic themes, GSTT can provide a clear theoretical explanation for the emergence of, and the justification for, the paramilitary groups within communities. Within the communities, the associated strains, caused by significantly more powerful others, are considered unjust and in violation of the social norms and values.
These contexts provide the settings from which people can be recruited into paramilitary republicanism. However, it does not provide the full explanation as to who within these communities are most likely to join the groups. This is more clearly explained by the final two themes of ‘family lineage versus individual vulnerability’ and ‘not leaving the communities’, which are partially explained by social learning theories. Social learning theories emphasise that when individuals are physically separated from conflicting messages and voices, the teachings of the criminal actors are more likely to be effective (Decker and Pyrooz, 2015). While social learning theories emphasise the acquisition of skills through small-group interactions, they also emphasise how one adopts an understanding of the justification for engagement in the criminal behaviour. Those externally reprehensible behaviours gain virtue when the narrative is unchallenged and isolated. While recruits are trained in the skills required by the paramilitary groups, the interview data indicate that at this early stage of engagement, the central aspect which they learn is the moral justification of engagement, from their families and/or the wider community. For those looking to deter membership of paramilitary groups, this emphasises the need to focus on the local contexts and influences from which membership is shaped.
Across both the Troubles and contemporary Northern Ireland, there is minimal emphasis on the role of ideology in individual decision-making processes. Ideology may be utilised to legitimise the continued existence of the paramilitary groups. However, individual motivations for joining will often differ and be more localised and personal. When one considers contemporary VDR membership, local communities are still playing a significant role in recruitment. However, a key difference between today and the Troubles is that there is no longer as much emphasis on the solidaristic rationale for joining (Bosi and Della Porta, 2012). The interviewees point to the dual recruitment strategy where there are those who volunteer, alongside those most vulnerable within society who are targeted by the groups. This is divergent from the extant literature on who is most likely to join paramilitary republican groups and emphasises the need for an integrated theoretical approach. We must therefore understand not only why individuals choose to join but also those whose vulnerabilities are manipulated by the groups. This article has demonstrated that integrated criminological perspectives can assist us in understanding these processes. Future research should look to see the broader applicability of criminological theory, looking at alternative theoretical frameworks, relating to non-state political violence.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Prof. Noemie Bouhana and Prof. Andrew Silke for feedback on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank the reviewers for their anonymised feedback, as well as the editorial team at the
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was funded by the Minerva Research Initiative, award number FA9550-16-1-0516.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author declared the following potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: John F. Morrison declares no conflicts of interest in relation to this research and the publication of this article.