Although significant scholarship has been devoted to the study of corporate political activity, contradictory messages emerge regarding its impact on public policy outcomes and firm performance. Using meta-analytic methods on a US-only sample of 93 studies, working papers, and books, we try to disentangle two mechanisms that explain why corporate political activity is not always beneficial to firms: (1) the uncertainty about the public policy process itself, that is, can firms get the policies they want through corporate political activity? and (2) the uncertainty about the policies’ impact on the firm, that is, whether firms effectively anticipate the implications of policies for their performance. Our results support the idea that these types of uncertainty play an important role in explaining the intermediary dynamics of corporate political activity. We find that in the United States, corporate political activity only weakly impacts public policy and at best has a (direct) weak effect on corporate outcomes.
*AcemogluDJohnsonSKermaniA. (2013) The value of connections in turbulent times: Evidence from the United States. Working paper series 13-22. Cambridge, MA: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
2.
*AdelinoMDincS (2014) Corporate distress and lobbying: Evidence from the Stimulus Act. Journal of Financial Economics114(2): 256–272.
3.
*AggarwalRKMeschkeFWangTY (2012) Corporate political contributions: Investment or agency?Business and Politics14(1): 1469–1508.
4.
*AlexanderB (1990) Good money and bad money: Do funding sources affect electoral outcomes. Political Research Quarterly58: 353–383.
5.
*AnsolabehereSde FigueiredoJMSnyderJM (2003) Why is there so little money in U.S. politics?Journal of Economic Perspectives17: 105–130.
6.
*AnsolabehereSSnyderJMUedaM (2004) Did firms profit from soft money? MIT Economics Working Paper No. 04-11.
7.
Austen-SmithDBanksJS (1998) Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
*BankerRDasSOuC (1997) Shareholder wealth effects of legislative events: The case of airline deregulation. Public Choice91: 301–331.
10.
BarleySR (2007) Corporations, democracy and the public good. Journal of Management Inquiry16(3): 201–215.
11.
BaronDP (1995) Integrated strategy: Market and nonmarket components. California Management Review37(2): 47–65.
12.
BaronDP (2009) Business and Its Environment, 6th edn.Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
13.
BaumgartnerFRLeechBL (1998) Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
14.
*BaumgartnerFRBerryJRHojnackiM. (2009) Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
15.
BayeMKovenockDDe VriesCG (1993) Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction. American Economic Review83: 289–294.
16.
BensonBL (2002) Regulatory disequilibrium and inefficiency: The case of Interstate trucking. Review of Austrian Economics15(2/3): 229–255.
17.
BernheimBDWhinstonMD (1986) Menu auctions, resource allocation and economic influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics101: 1–31.
18.
BertrandMBombardiniMTrebbiF (2011) Is it whom you know or what you know?An empirical assessment of the lobbying process. Working paper, Chicago Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL.
19.
*BlauBMBroughTJThomasDW (2013) Corporate lobbying, political connections, and the bailout of banks. Journal of Banking & Finance37: 3007–3017.
*BombardiniMTrebbiF (2009) Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy? NBER Working Paper 14771. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
22.
BonardiJ-P (2008) The internal limits to firms’ nonmarket activities. European Management Review5: 165–174.
23.
BonardiJ-P (2011) Corporate political resources and the Resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Organization9: 247–255.
24.
BonardiJ-PKeimGD (2005) Corporate political strategies for widely salient issues. Academy of Management Review30(3): 555–576.
25.
BonardiJ-PHillmanAJKeimGD (2005) The attractiveness of political markets: Implications for firm strategy. Academy of Management Review30(2): 397–413.
26.
*BonardiJ-PHolburnGLFVanden BerghRG (2006) Nonmarket strategy performance: Evidence from U.S. Electric Utilities. Academy of Management Journal49: 1209–1228.
27.
BorensteinMHedgesLVHigginsJPT. (2009) Introduction to Meta-Analysis. Chichester: John Wiley.
28.
*BorghesiRChangK (2014) The determinants of effective corporate lobbying. Working paper, University of South Florida College of Business Administration, Tampa, FL.
29.
BouwenP (2002) Corporate lobbying in the European Union: Towards a theory of access. Journal of European Public Policy9(3): 365–390.
30.
BowmanRNavissiFBurgessR (2000) Regulatory threats and political vulnerability. Journal of Financial Research23: 411–420.
31.
*BrudneyJHerbertFT (1987) State agencies and their environments: Examining the influence of important external actors. Journal of Politics49: 186–206.
32.
BuchananJMTullockG (1962) The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
33.
*BuckmasterDSanigaETadesseS (1994) Measuring lobbying influence using the financial accounting standards board public record. Journal of Economic and Social Measurement20: 331–356.
34.
*CalganoPJacksonJD (1998) Political action committee spending and Senate roll call voting. Public Choice97: 565–585.
35.
CarneyMGedajlovicERHeugnessPP. (2011) Business group affiliation, performance, context and strategy: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal54: 437–460.
36.
*CastellblanchR (2003) Challenging pharmaceutical industry political power in Maine and Vermont. Journal of Health Politics28: 109–132.
37.
*ChappellH (1982) Campaign contributions and roll call voting: A simultaneous probit-tobit model. Review of Economics and Statistics62: 77–83.
38.
ChatterjeeSPriceB (1991) Regression Analysis by Example, 2nd edn.New York, NY: John Wiley.
39.
*ChenHGunnyKRamanaK (2014) Return on political investment in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. Harvard Business School Working Paper 15–050.
40.
*ChenHParsleyDCYangY (2015) Corporate lobbying and financial performance. Journal of Business, Finance & Accounting42(3/4): 444–481.
41.
ClawsonAMorganKWebberD. (1990) Hostile Brothers: Competition and Closure in the European Electronics Industry. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
42.
*CoatesJC (2011) Corporate governance and corporate political activity: What effect will Citizens United have on shareholder wealth? Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 684.
43.
*CoatesJC (2012) Corporate politics, governance, and value before and after Citizens United. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies9(4): 657–696.
44.
*CohenJEHammanJA (2003) Interest group PAC contributions and the 1992 regulation of cable television. Social Science Journal40: 357–369.
45.
*CooperMJGulenHOvtchinnikovAI (2010) Corporate political contributions and stock returns. Journal of Finance65: 687–724.
46.
*CoryKD (1995) Corporate political strategy as a competitive strategy: Influencing public policy to increase firm performance. PhD Dissertation, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX.
47.
DahanN (2005) Can there be a resource-based view of regulation?International Studies of Management and Organization35(2): 8–27.
48.
*DardenGCShogranJFSilvermanJI (1991) The effect of interest group pressure on coal strip mining legislation. Social Science Quarterly72: 237–250.
49.
*Darves-BornozDY (2006) Corporate trade policy activism: Network and organizational determinates. PhD Dissertation, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR.
50.
*DavisFL (1993) Balancing the perspectives on PAC contributions: In search of an impact on roll calls. American Politics Quarterly21: 205–222.
51.
*DeanTJVryzaMFryxellL (1998) Do corporate PACs restrict competition? An empirical examination of industry PAC contributions and entry. Business & Society37: 135–156.
52.
DerthickMQuirkPJ (1985) The Politics of Deregulation. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.
53.
DiLorenzoTJ (1988) Competition and political entrepreneurship. Review of Austrian Economics2(1):59–71.
54.
DixitA (1998) The Making of Economic Policy. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
55.
*DowJLEndersbyJW (1994) Campaign contributions and legislative voting in the California assembly. American Politics Quarterly22: 334–354.
*DuchinRSosyuraD (2012) The politics of government investments. Journal of Financial Economics106: 24–48.
58.
EckhardtJ (2011) Firm lobbying and EU trade policy making: Reflections on the anti-dumping case against Chinese and Vietnamese shoes (2005-2011). Journal of World Trade45: 965–991.
59.
FaccioMMasulisRMcConnellJJ (2006) Political connections and corporate bailout. Journal of Finance61(6): 2597–2635.
60.
*FieldsJAKleinLSSfiridisJA (1997) A market based evaluation of the market versus appointment of regulatory commissioners. Public Choice92: 337–352.
61.
*FismanDFismanRGalefJ. (2012) Estimating the value of connections to vice-president Cheney. Forensic Economics13: 1–18.
62.
*FleisherR (1993) PAC contributions and congressional voting on national defense. Legislative Studies Quarterly28: 399–410.
63.
*FrendreisJPWatermanRW (1985) PAC contributions and legislative behavior: Senate voting on trucking deregulation. Social Science Quarterly66: 401–412.
64.
GetzK (2002) Public affairs and political strategy: Theoretical foundations. Journal of Public Affairs1(4): 305–329.
65.
*GiroudXLeeJMullinsW (2013) The payoffs from corporate political donations: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design. MIT working paper, MIT, Cambridge, MA.
66.
*GoldmanERochollJSoJ (2009) Do politically connected boards affect firm value?Review of Financial Studies22: 2331–2360.
67.
*GoldmanERochollJSoJ (2013) Politically connected boards of directors and the allocation of procurement contracts. Review of Finance17: 1617–1648.
68.
GrayVLoweryD (1997) Reconceptualizing PAC formation: It’s not a collective action problem, and itmaybe an arms race. American Politics Research25(3): 319–346.
69.
GreeneWH (2008) Econometric Analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
70.
*GrenzkeJM (1989) Shopping in the congressional supermarket: The currency is complex. American Journal of Political Science33: 1–34.
71.
GrierKMungerMRobertsB (1994) The determinants of industry political activity. American Political Science Review88(4): 901–926.
72.
GrossmanGMHelpmanE (1994) Protection for sale. American Economic Review84: 833–850.
73.
GurevitchJJMengersenK (2013) Handbook of Meta-Analysis in Ecology and Evolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
74.
HadaniM (2012) Institutional ownership monitoring and corporate political activity: Governance implications. Journal of Business Research65(7): 944–950.
75.
*HadaniMCoombesS (2013) The impact of firm corporate political activity and media visibility on obtaining contracts. Academy of Management Proceedings2013: 12033.
76.
*HadaniMSchulerDA (2013) In search of El Dorado: The elusive financial returns on corporate political investments. Strategic Management Journal34(2): 165–181.
77.
HallRLDeardorffA (2006) Lobbying as legislative subsidy. American Political Science Review100: 69–84.
78.
*HallRLWaymanFW (1990) Buying time: Moneyed interest and the mobilization of bias in congressional subcommittees. American Political Science Review84: 797–920.
79.
*HansenJM (1991) Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919–1981. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
80.
HartDM (2004) “Business” is not an interest group: On the study of companies in American national politics. Annual Review of Political Science7: 47–69.
81.
HedgesLVVeveaJL (1998) Fixed- and random-effects models in meta-analysis. Psychological Methods3: 486–504.
82.
HeinzJLaumannENelsonR. (1983) The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
83.
HeniszWJ (2003) The power of the Buckley and Casson thesis: The power to manage institutional idiosyncrasies. Journal of International Business Studies34: 173–184.
84.
HeniszWJZelnerBA (2012) Strategy and competition in the market and nonmarket arenas. Academy of Management Perspectives26(3): 40–51.
85.
*HerschPNetterJMPopeD (2008) Do campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures by firms create “political” capital?Atlantic Economic Journal36: 395–405.
86.
*HerschPLMcDougallGS (1988) Voting for sin in Kansas. Public Choice57: 127–139.
87.
HerschPLMcDougallGS (2000) Determinants of PAC contributions to House incumbents: Own versus rival effects. Public Choice104: 329–343.
88.
HigginsJPTThompsonSG (2002) Quantifying heterogeneity in a meta-analysis. Statistics in Medicine21: 1539–1558.
89.
*HillMDKellyGWLockhertB. (2013) Determinants and effects of corporate lobbying. Financial Management42: 931–957.
90.
*HillmanAJ (2005) Politicians on the board of directors: Do connections affect the bottom line?Journal of Management31: 464–485.
91.
HillmanAJHittMA (1999) Corporate political strategy formulation: A model of approach, participation and strategy decisions. Academy of Management Review24(2): 825–842.
92.
HillmanAJKeimGD (1995) International variation in the business-government interface: Institutional and organizational considerations. Academy of Management Review20(1): 193–214.
93.
HillmanAJKeimGDSchulerD (2004) Corporate political activity: A review and research agenda. Journal of Management30: 837–857.
94.
*HillmanAJZardkoohiABiermanL (1999) Corporate political strategies and firm performance: Indications of firm-specific benefits from personal service in the U.S. government. Strategic Management Journal20: 67–81.
95.
*HochbergYVSapienzaPVissing-JorgensenA (2009) A lobbying approach to evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Journal of Accounting Research47: 519–583.
96.
HolburnGVanden BerghRG (2004) Influencing agencies through pivotal political institutions. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization20(2): 458–483.
97.
HolcombeRG (2002) Political entrepreneurship and the democratic allocation of economic resources. Review of Austrian Economics15(2/3): 143–159.
98.
*HolianDBKrebsTPWalshMH (1997) Constituency opinion, Ross Perot, and roll call behavior in the U.S. House: The case of NAFTA. Legislative Studies Quarterly22: 369–392.
99.
HunterJSchmidtF (1990) Methods of Meta-Analysis: Correcting for Error and Bias in Research Findings, 1st edn.Newbury Park, CA: SAGE.
100.
HunterJSchmidtF (2004) Methods of Meta-Analysis: Correcting Error and Bias in Research Synthesis, 2nd edn.Newbury Park, CA: SAGE.
101.
*IganDMishraPTresselT (2009) A fistful of dollars: Lobbying and the financial crisis. IMF Working paper.
102.
*JohnsonLL (1985) The effectiveness of Savings and Loans political action committees. Public Choice46: 289–304.
103.
*KauJBKeenanDRubinPH (1982) A general equilibrium model of congressional voting. Quarterly Journal of Economics97: 271–293.
104.
KeimGD (2001) Business and public policy: Competing in the political marketplace. In: HittMAHarrisonJSFreemanRE (eds) Blackwell Handbook of Strategic Management. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 101–121.
105.
KeimGD (2002) Managing business political activities in the USA: Bridging between theory and practice. Journal of Public Affairs2(1): 362–375.
106.
KeimGDZardkoohiA (1988) Looking for leverage in PAC markets: Corporate and labor contributions considered. Public Choice58: 21–34.
107.
*KeiserRJonesW (1986) Do the American Medical Association’s campaign contributions influence health care legislation?Medical Care24: 761–766.
108.
*KelleherBSamphantharakRKTimmonsJE (2009) Lobbying and taxes. American Journal of Political Science53: 893–909.
109.
*KelleherCYackeeSW (2006) Who’s whispering in your ear? The influence of third parties over state agency decisions. Political Research Quarterly59: 629–643.
110.
*KelleherCYackeeSW (2009) A political consequence of contracting: Organized interests and state agency decision-making. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory19: 579–602.
111.
*KellyGWHillMDVan NessRA (2010) Determinants and effects of corporate lobbying. Working paper. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1420224
112.
KershR (1986) Corporate lobbyists as political actors: A view from the field. In: CiglerAJLoomisBA (eds) Interest Group Politics. Washington, DC: CQ Press, pp. 225–247.
113.
KershR (2002) State autonomy and civil service: The lobbyist connection. Critical Review14: 237–258.
114.
*KimCFPantzalisCParkJC (2012) Political geography and stock returns: The value and risk implications of proximity to political power. Journal of Financial Economics106: 196–228.
115.
*KimJH (2008) Corporate lobbying revisited. Business and Politics10: 1–23.
116.
KingsleyAVanden BerghRBonardiJ-P (2012) Political markets and regulatory uncertainty: Insights and implications for integrated strategy. Academy of Management Perspectives26: 52–67.
117.
KollmanK (1998) Outside Lobbying. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
118.
*KostovetskyL (2009) Political capital and moral hazard. Journal of Financial Economics116(1): 144–159.
119.
*KrehbielK (1996) Committee power, leadership, and the median voter: Evidence from the smoking ban. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization12: 234–256.
120.
LaffontJJTiroleJ (1991) Privatization and incentives. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization7: 84–105.
121.
*LangbeinLLotwisM (1990) The political efficacy of lobbying and money: Gun control in the U.S. House. Legislative Studies Quarterly14: 414–440.
122.
LarueJRothenbergL (1992) Institutional features of congressional decisions: The fight to prohibit smoking on airlines. Public Choice73: 301–318.
123.
LawtonTMcGuireJRajwaniT (2013) Corporate political activity: A literature review and research agenda. International Journal of Management Reviews15: 86–105.
124.
LenwaySASchulerDA (1991) The determinants of corporate political involvement in trade protection: The case of the steel industry. In: BaldwinR (ed.) Empirical Studies in Commercial Policy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, pp. 75–112.
125.
LenwaySAJacobsonCKGoldsteinJ (1990) To lobby or to petition: The political environment of US trade policy. Journal of Management16(1): 119–134.
126.
LevineMForrenceJ (1990) Regulatory capture, public interest, and the public agenda: Toward a synthesis. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization6: 167–198.
LohmannS (1993) Information aggregation through costly political action. American Economic Review84: 518–530.
129.
LordM (2003) Constituency building as the foundation for corporate political strategy. Academy of Management Executive17: 112–124.
130.
LoweryD (2007) Why do organized interests lobby? A multi-goal, multi-context theory of lobbying. Polity39: 29–54.
131.
*LuxS (2008) Nonmarket effects on strategic fit and performance: An economic institutional change perspective. PhD Dissertation, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL.
132.
LuxSCrookTWoehrD (2011) Mixing business with politics: A meta-analysis of the antecedents and outcomes of corporate political activity. Journal of Management37(1): 223–247.
133.
MacherJMayoJ (2012) The world of regulatory influence. Journal of Regulatory Economics41: 59–79.
134.
*McKayAYackeeWS (2007) Interest group competition on federal agency rules. American Politics Research35: 336–357.
135.
McWilliamsAVan FleetDCoryK (2002) Raising rivals’ costs through political strategy: An extension of resource-based theory. Journal of Management Studies39: 707–723.
136.
*MarshSJ (1998) Creating barriers to foreign competitors: A study of the impact of anti-dumping actions on the performance of U.S. firms. Strategic Management Journal19: 25–37.
137.
*MastersMFZardkoohiA (1985) Congressional support for unions’ positions across diverse legislation. Journal of Labor Research9: 149–165.
138.
*MeznarMJohnsonJH (2005) Business-government relations within a contingency theory framework: Strategy, structure fit and performance. Business & Society44: 119–143.
139.
MeznarMNighD (1995) Buffer or bridge? Environmental and organizational determinants of public affairs activities in American firms. Academy of Management Journal38: 975–996.
140.
*MooreWJChachereDRCurtisTD. (1995) The political influence of unions and corporations on COPE votes in the U.S. Senate, 1979-1988. Journal of Labor Research16: 203–222.
141.
*MyersBW (2006) Corporate political activity and asset pricing. Working paper, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN.
142.
*NeustadtlA (1990) Interest group PACmanship: An analysis of campaign contributions, issue visibility and legislative impact. Social Forces69: 549–564.
143.
NorthDC (1990) A transaction cost theory of politics. Journal of Theoretical Politics2(4): 355–367.
144.
OlerDHarrisonJAllenM (2008) The danger of misinterpreting short-window event study findings in strategic management research: An empirical illustration using horizontal acquisitions. Strategic Organization6(2): 151–184.
145.
OliverC (1991) Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management Review16(1): 145–179.
146.
OliverCHolzingerI (2008) The effectiveness of strategic political management: A dynamic capabilities framework. Academy of Management Review33(2): 496–520.
147.
OlsonM (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
148.
*OvtchinnikovAVPantaleoniE (2012) Individual political contributions and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics105: 367–392.
149.
*PageBIShapiroRYDempseyG (1987) What moves public opinion?American Political Science Review81: 23–43.
PeltzmanR (1976) Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics19: 211–240.
152.
PfefferJSalancikGR (1978) The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. New York: Harper & Row.
153.
PorterME (1979) How competitive forces shape strategy. Harvard Business Review57(2): 139–145.
154.
*QuinnDShapiroR (1991) Business political power: The case for taxation. American Political Science Review85: 851–874.
155.
RajwaniTLawtonTPhillipsN (2015) The “Voice of Industry”: Why management researchers should pay more attention to trade associations. Strategic Organization13: 224–232.
156.
RamirezCde LongJ (2001) Understanding America’s hesitant steps towards financial capitalism: Politics, the depression and the separation of commercial and investment banking. Public Choice106: 93–116.
157.
*RehbeinKLenwayS (1994) Determining an industry’s political effectiveness with the US International Trade Commission. Business & Society33: 270–292.
158.
RehbeinKSchulerDA (1999) Testing the firm as a filter of corporate political action. Business & Society38(2): 144–166.
159.
ReichRB (1998) The meaning of corporate social responsibility. California Management Review40(2): 8–17.
160.
ReichRB (2010) Aftershock: The Next Economy and America’s Future. New York: Knopf.
161.
*RobertsBE (1990) A dead Senator tells no lies: Seniority and the distribution of federal benefits. American Journal of Political Science34: 31–58.
162.
RoseN (1985) The incidence of regulatory rents in the motor carrier industry. Rand Journal of Economics16: 299–318.
163.
SalamonLMSiegfriedJJ (1977) Economic power and political influence: The impact of industry structure on public policy. The American Political Science Review71: 1026–1043.
164.
*SaltmanGM (1987) Congressional voting on labor issues: The role of PACs. Industrial and Labor Relations Review40: 163–170.
165.
*SchroedelJR (1986) Campaign contributions and legislative outcomes. Western Political Quarterly40: 371–389.
166.
SchulerDA (2002) Public Affairs, issues management and political strategy: Methodological approaches that count. Journal of Public Affairs1&2: 336–355.
167.
SchulerDARehbeinKCramerRD (2002) Pursuing strategic advantages through political means: A multivariate approach. Academy of Management Journal45: 659–672.
168.
SennSJ (2009) Overstating the evidence—Double counting in meta-analysis and related problems. BMC Medical Research Methodology9: 1–7.
169.
ShafferB (1995) Firm-level responses to government regulation: Theoretical and research approaches. Journal of Management21: 495–514.
170.
*ShafferBQuasneyTGrimmC (2000) Firm level performance implications of nonmarket actions. Business & Society39: 126–143.
171.
ShenhavYWeitzE (2000) The roots of uncertainty in organizations: An historical constructivist Analysis. Organization7: 373–401.
172.
*SilbermanJDurdenGC (1976) Determining legislative preferences on minimum wage: An econometric approach. Journal of Political Economy84: 317–329.
173.
SimonHA (1963) Economics and psychology. In: KochS (ed.) Psychology: A Study of a Science. New York: McGraw Hill, pp. 685–723.
174.
SimonHA (2000) Bounded rationality in social science: Today and tomorrow. Mind & Society1: 25–39.
*SmithP (2000) American Business and Political Power. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
178.
*SobelRSGraefe-AndersonRL (2014) The relationship between political connections and the financial performance of industries and firms. Working Paper 14-18. Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center, George Mason University.
179.
SpillerPT (1996) A positive political theory of regulatory instruments: Contracts, administrative law or regulatory. Southern California Law Review69: 477–515.
180.
SteinbergD (2009) Interest group influence in authoritarian states: The political determinants of China’s undervalued exchange rate. In: American Political Science Association 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, Toronto, ON, Canada.
181.
StiglerGJ (1971) The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science2(1): 3–21.
182.
*StratmannT (1991) What do campaign contributions buy? Deciphering causal effects of money and votes. Southern Economic Journal57: 606–620.
183.
*StratmannT (2002) Can special interests buy congressional votes? Evidence from financial services legislation. Journal of Law and Economics45: 345–373.
184.
TasirS (2010) The illusion of regulatory competence. Critical Review21(4): 423–436.
185.
TeskeP (1991) Rent-seeking in the deregulatory environment: State telecommunications. Public Choice68(1): 235–243.
186.
TollisonRD (1982) Rent seeking: A survey. Kyklos35: 575–602.
187.
*TosiniSCTowerE (1987) The textile bill of 1985: Determinants of congressional voting patterns. Public Choice54: 19–25.
188.
*TripathiM (2000) PAC contributions and defense contracting. Business and Politics2: 53–73.
189.
Vanden BerghRGHolburnGLF (2007) Targeting corporate political strategy: Theory and evidence from the U.S. accounting industry. Business and Politics9(2): 1–31.
190.
Van Den PolderR (1994) Lobbying for the European Airline Industry. In: PedlerRHVan SchendelenM (eds) Lobbying the European Union. Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing, pp. 103–122.
191.
VietorR (1994) Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America. Boston, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
192.
*WawroG (1991) A panel Probit analysis of campaign contributions and roll call votes. American Journal of Political Science45: 563–579.
193.
*WaymanFW (1985) Arms control and strategic arms voting in the U.S. Senate: Patterns of change. Journal of Conflict Resolution29: 225–251.
194.
*WelchWP (1982) Campaign contributions and legislative voting: Milk money and dairy price supports. Western Political Quarterly35: 478–495.
195.
WitkoC (2011) Campaign contributions, access and government contracting. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory21(4): 761–778.
196.
WollC (2008) Firm Interests: How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
197.
*WrightJ (1990) Contributions, lobbying and committee voting in the U.S. House of Representatives. American Political Science Review84: 417–438.
198.
*WrightJ (2004) Campaign contributions and congressional voting on tobacco policy, 1980–2000. Business and Politics6: 1–26.
199.
*YackeeJWYackeeSW (2006) A bias toward business? Assessing interest group influence on the bureaucracy. Journal of Politics68: 128–139.
