Abstract
The article discusses the relationship between the boundary problem in democratic theory and the paradox of democratic foundation. It argues that although these famous “democratic paradoxes” are affected by an analogous logical difficulty and equally concur in grounding the legitimacy of a “people,” they are two different problems. The recognition of their distinction helps illuminate the complexity of practical normative judgments on the legitimacy of a people. The article analyzes four theories in search of an approach that can consistently resolve both paradoxes: the all-affected principle, Sofia Näsström's theory of democracy as a spirit of emancipation, Alessandro Ferrara's redefinition of the issue based on the distinction between ethnos and demos, and David Owen's proposal to bring together the all-affected and the all-subjected principles to solve the boundary problem. The article's conclusion points to a possible tension between the two paradoxes and raises a final question: can such a tension be resolved?
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