The limits of justification: Critique,disclosure and reflexivity

Abstract

I argue that Forst’s justification paradigm is less radical than claimed in that it fails to establish an immanent connection between the role of justification as a transcendental principle and as a tool of disclosing, reflexive critique. I maintain that the construal of justification as a trans-historical principle, by definition, shields it from systematic criticism and consequently constrains critique’s capacity for reflexive self-scrutiny. Reflexivity is ignited by disclosure to the degree that it is reflection on the non-identical elements of social life that may prompt critical re-evaluation of a theory’s conceptual framework. Justification critique’s capacity for disclosure, and hence reflexivity, is crucially limited, however, by Forst’s reliance on a tendentious concept of noumenal power, which does not satisfactorily explain the complex, material dynamics through which structural inequalities are reproduced. It is further stymied by a disregard of the latent power dynamics often at work in actual conversations about justice that subvert formally equal relations of justification. In short, the lack of reflexivity is evident in Forst’s failure to adequately consider how entrenched asymmetries of power may require him to advance beyond an abstract, one-dimensional account of mutually owed justifications.