Discounting the future,yet again

Abstract

The question of `discounting the future' is one on which philosophers and economists have divergent professional views. There is a lot of talking at cross-purposes across the disciplinary divide here; but there is a fair bit of confusion (I think) within disciplines as well. My aim here is essentially clarificatory. I draw several distinctions that I see as significant:

• between inter-temporal and intergenerational questions

• between price (discount rate) and quantity (inter-temporal and intergenerational allocations) as the ethically relevant magnitude, and

• between price change and preference change as the primary instrument of change.

I show that discounting does not violate the principle of inter-temporal and intergenerational neutrality, but I also cast some doubt on whether making adequate allowance for future generations has really been the problem that economists and philosophers seem to have taken it to be.