The positivist dispute in German sociology: A scientific or a political controversy?

Abstract

In 1914 the dispute about scientific value judgments in economics reached its climax. In the 1960s it was followed by the positivist dispute in German sociology. In both controversies one party pretended to provide ethical knowledge and questioned the distinction between what is and what should be. In 1961, at a conference of the German Sociological Association, Karl Popper and Theodor W. Adorno gave lectures on “the Logic of the Social Sciences”. While Popper tried to contribute to methodology, Adorno pleaded for a dialectical philosophy of society. In 1963 Jürgen Habermas criticized Popper’s contribution and Hans Albert made a counterplea. At this time Habermas assumed that critical theory, i.e. neomarxist dialectical theory of society, provided ethical knowledge. Instead of seriously defending this assumption he attacked the self-understanding of the empirical social sciences, in particular the idea of the value freedom of research. Albert showed that Habermas’ criticism of the methodology of Popper’s critical rationalism was completely untenable. So the positivist dispute was not a scientific dispute. Nevertheless Habermas’ version of a critical theory of society was politically immensely influential. It provided the illusion that leftist political programs could be known to be ethically right. In 1981 Habermas admitted that his critical theory was due to ‘confusions in fundamental concepts’. Meanwhile he had proposed a consensus theory of the rightness of norms and his ethics of discourse. Both proved to be untenable as well. Finally Habermas turned to religion and advocated the political influence of religious organizations.