Are national governments responsive to citizens’ opinions when negotiating policies in the Council of the European Union? Conceiving of the Council’s policy-making space as encompassing left-right and pro-anti integration issues, I argue that governments apply different ‘modes of responsiveness’ on these issues. As left-right issues are more reliably and intensely salient in domestic elections than pro-anti integration issues, governments’ responsiveness to left-right public opinion should be more systematic than to pro-anti integration opinion. Statistical analyses of 3700 policy positions of governments in the Council demonstrate that governments highly structure their responsiveness on left-right issues according to electoral cycles and systems (‘systematic mode’). However, they only sporadically respond to public opinion on pro-anti integration issues, when parties and events trigger the public salience of integration (‘sporadic mode’).
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